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Preface
This second volume in Palgrave Studies in Digital Business & Enabling 
Technologies further contributes to multidisciplinary research on digital 
business and enabling technologies in Europe by exploring the evolving 
domain of the next generation of financial technologies or “FinTech”. 
The concept of evolution is important in this context as FinTech is not 
a new concept. Since the 1950s, each decade has witnessed a new tech-
nology that has transformed how financial services operate and how 
we interact with them. Credit card processing, ATMs, electronic stock 
trading, e-commerce are just some of the myriad of technologies that 
we take for granted. Today, we are seeing the advent of a new genera-
tion of FinTech built on near-ubiquitous access to the Internet through 
mobile and cloud computing, machine learning, artificial intelligence 
and blockchain. These technologies are resulting in significant disruptive 
changes to the financial services sector, not least opening up the sector to 
increased competition and empowering customers in ways unthinkable 
just a decade ago.
While practice might view FinTech as a co-evolution and convergence 
of finance and technology, one could be mistaken in thinking that for 
finance researchers it is business as usual. Finance research is concerned 
with risk and return framed by established theories such as asset pricing 
theory, modern portfolio theory and the efficient market hypothesis, 
albeit with emerging challenges from the set of theories underpinning 
behavioural finance. Yet, it is clear that FinTech is changing, as Drucker 
(1994) might put it, the ‘theory of the business’ or ‘mental models’ 
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upon which the financial sector is based. In the same way that established 
financial services firms, banks, and insurance companies are being forced 
to rethink their role and activities in the market, finance researchers 
need to reflect on the impact of FinTech innovation on finance research. 
What are the implications of FinTech innovation for finance literatures? 
As FinTech represents greater convergence of finance and technology, 
is greater collaboration between the finance and technology research 
domains required to ensure greater relevance and market impact? Does 
FinTech represent a new discipline in itself? While this book does not 
seek to address these questions, it has value to university educators and 
researchers, industry practitioners, and policymakers as an entrée into the 
wider FinTech ecosystem and some of the extant, although early stage, 
research being undertaken in this space.
Addressing the call for inter-disciplinarity, contributors have been 
drawn from an international group of scholars in finance, law, computer 
science and management. “Disrupting Finance” presents a variety of per-
spectives on how technologies are making us rethink lending, regulation 
and compliance, risk management, insurance, stock trading, payments, 
and money in the fourth industrial age. FinTech is changing how individ-
uals, projects and businesses access finance and from whom. Chapters 1  
and 2 discuss crowdfunding and online peer-to-peer (P2P) lending, a 
form of crowdfunding that bypasses conventional intermediaries, pro-
cesses and requirements to connect borrowers and lenders. Information 
asymmetry is a key issue in lending that can result in moral hazard or 
adverse selection. Chapter 2 explores this issue specifically discussing 
some of the mechanisms being used by online P2P lending platforms to 
reduce this risk. The theme of risk management is continued in Chapter 3 
where the role of machine learning and artificial intelligence is discussed 
in the context of the assessment and management of credit risk, market 
risk, operational risk, and compliance.
Chapter 4 presents a thematic analysis of extant literature on the 
somewhat controversial area of high-frequency trading and discusses key 
themes in extant literature including the impact of high frequency trad-
ing (HFT) on market liquidity, trading strategies and speed, implications 
for market structure changes, and the relationship between the “script-
ability” of corporate disclosure and short-term information advantage. 
Asymmetric information and the use of new data science techniques is 
a common theme in many of the chapters. Chapter 5 deals with emerg-
ing uses cases in InsurTech and specifically how large and continuous 
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datasets are transforming general insurance markets and their business 
processes, modifying policyholder behaviour, and streamlining claims 
management. The authors illustrate how machine learning, artificial 
intelligence and blockchain are creating and helping to capture new 
value in the insurance market.
A common theme in each segment of financial service sector are the 
barriers to entry created by regulation. Indeed, the lending, insurance, 
and stock markets are all characterised by regulatory requirements that 
are complex to understand and costly to implement for incumbents and 
new entrants alike. With over US$100 billion spent by banks on regu-
latory compliance in 2016 alone, RegTech solutions represents a sig-
nificant market opportunity in itself by (a) identifying the impacts of 
regulatory provisions on business models, products and services, func-
tional activities, policies, operational procedures and controls; (b) ena-
bling compliant business systems and data; (c) helping control and 
manage regulatory, financial and non-financial risks; and (d) perform-
ing regulatory compliance reporting. Chapter 6 explores the drivers of 
RegTech adoption and the risks and challenges inherent in this adoption. 
It presents a timely focus on the lack of standardisation and interopera-
bility in RegTech data and systems and the need for open standards and 
semantic technologies in order to avoid a digital Tower of Babel in the 
financial sector.
Chapters 7 and 8 focus on the future of payment and money. The 
European Union required its member states to implement the new 
Payment Service Directive (PSDII) in January 2018. This directive has 
the potential to drastically reimagine the relationships between con-
sumers and their banks and the structure of the banking and payments 
sector. Driven by the Internet and mobile banking and the need for 
more efficient and effective support for cross-border payment services, 
PSDII seeks to level the competitive playing field by reducing the var-
ious exemptions from payment services regulation and to permit two 
new innovative arrangements: “account information service providers” 
and “payment initiation service providers”. Chapter 7 presents the back-
ground and detail of PSDII and the implications for banks, credit card 
issuers, merchant acquirers and new FinTech operations, not least tech-
nology firms such as Apple, Google, PayPal etc. While Chapter 7 reima-
gines the role of banks in the payment sector, Chapter 8 discusses the 
reconceptualisation of money in the digital age. This chapter explores 
the characteristics of money and the affordances of digital money which 
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make it something very different—frictionless, anonymous, transparent, 
non-denominated and dataful. Furthermore, the authors discuss the con-
cept of money as opportunities for social encounters in transactions with 
very real social impacts.
The final two chapters focus on the related topic of cryptocurrencies 
and blockchain. Following on from this discussion on the future of pay-
ment and money, Chapter 9 focuses on cryptocurrencies as two distinct 
flavours of digital token—native coins and crypto tokens. While native 
coins are well known as a new form of digital money such as bitcoin, 
crypto tokens are less well known. They represent a form of “digital 
vouchers” that allow the token holders to get access to almost any type 
of service and assets from monetary rewards, or commodities to loyalty 
points to even other cryptocurrencies. As well as discussing the differ-
ences between these token based models, Chapter 8 explores the emer-
gent start-up token funding model of Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs), 
which allows entrepreneurs to bypass the traditional capital market by 
issuing crypto tokens out of thin air. Blockchain, or distributed ledger 
technology, is one of the most hyped technologies in recent years and 
no FinTech book would be complete without a wider discussion on it. 
Chapter 10 discusses the current challenges and opportunities that 
blockchain poses for financial services firms and its potential impact on 
four main financial activities: (1) payments and remittance, (2) credit and 
lending, (3) trading and settlement, and (4) compliance.
The ten chapters in “Disrupting Finance” are by no means exhaustive 
nor were they intended to be. Rather the collection of topics in this book 
were collated to be a primer and signpost for FinTech. The financial ser-
vices sector is a dataful one—it comprises data and generates data. It is 
unsurprising therefore that technologies that enable the exchange, vali-
dation, and analysis of this data faster and in more complex ways domi-
nate the FinTech discourse today. Blockchain, deep learning and artificial 
intelligence are not only challenging how we conceive financial services 
but introduce new avenues for research not just in finance and computer 
science but in ethics, sociology and law, to name but a few.
Dublin, Ireland  
Malibu, USA  
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Abstract  Crowdfunding is one of the funding sources that entrepre-
neurs are increasingly being exposed to above and beyond venture capi-
tal and angel funding. After introducing the most popular crowdfunding 
types, this chapter proceeds to present and compare the evolution of the 
phenomenon across three macro regions: Europe, USA, and Asia-Pacific. 
Furthermore, the chapter offers an overview of the state-of-the-art of the 
crowdfunding literature, highlighting creators’ and funders’ incentives 
and disincentives for starting or engaging in crowdfunding projects, the 
characteristics of a successful campaign, and the contextual factors that 
explain the evolution of the phenomenon across countries. The chapter 
closes providing suggestions for future work in this area.
Keywords  Crowdfunding · Geographic markets · Crowdfunding 
platforms · Successful crowdfunding campaign characteristics
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1.1  the crowdfunding Phenomenon: an overview
Crowdfunding can be defined as “an open call, essentially through the 
Internet, for the provision of financial resources in order to support ini-
tiatives for specific purposes” (Belleflamme et al. 2014, p. 588). Mollick 
(2014), narrowing the definition in an entrepreneurial context, defines 
crowdfunding as the efforts by entrepreneurial individuals and groups–
cultural, social, and for-profit–to fund their ventures by drawing on small 
contributions from a relatively large number of individuals using the 
Internet. Crowdfunding draws inspiration from the concept of microfi-
nance (Morduch 1999) and crowdsourcing. It represents a unique form 
of fundraising where capital seekers (project proponents) are linked with 
capital givers (investors) through a crowdfunding intermediary (plat-
form) (Haas et al. 2014).
During the past five years different forms of crowdfunding have 
emerged. Based on the risk of funding for investors, we can distinguish 
between investment and non-investment crowdfunding models. Within 
these two groups, according to the right of crowdfunders in the projects’ 
outcome, crowdfunding platforms can further be categorised as follows:
Investment models:
• Lending-based crowdfunding: funds are paid back and funders have 
the right to receive a contractually agreed interest payment. This 
model is further categorised into two major submodels–(1) peer-
to-peer lending (P2P) which is characterised by direct interaction 
between the two parties (see Chapter 2), and (2) social lending, 
usually used for entrepreneurial projects at local level.
• Equity-based crowdfunding: funds are provided in exchange for 
company’s shares. Investors have the right to receive returns on 
investments if the company performs well.
Non-investment models:
• Reward-based crowdfunding: funds are provided in exchange for 
non-monetary benefits. Common benefits include a small gift 
(reward) or a reservation for a product which is still under produc-
tion (pre-order).
• Donation-based crowdfunding: funds are provided for philanthropic 
or sponsorship reasons with no expectation of remuneration.
1 DECIPHERING CROWDFUNDING  3
Crowdfunding platforms can also be categorised at a macro level. 
Generalist platforms enable crowdfunding for any area of interest while 
vertical (or thematic) platforms focus on crowdfunding for projects 
within a specific field or sector.
Lastly, crowdfunding platforms can be distinguished based on the dif-
ferent funding mechanisms adopted. Platforms can regulate the pledge 
levels, the minimum investment amounts, and decide whether to adopt 
an “all or nothing” or “keep it all” funding principle (Gerber et al. 2012; 
Mollick 2014; Cumming et al. 2015). The “all or nothing” funding 
approach allows project proponents to receive funding only if the cam-
paign achieves 100% of the target (Belleflamme et al. 2010; Cumming 
et al. 2015; Haas et al. 2014). If the target amount is not met, inves-
tors receive their money back. On the other hand, the “keep it all” fund-
ing approach allows project proponents to receive any collected amount 
(Gerber et al. 2012).
1.1.1  The European Market
Since its inception, the crowdfunding market in Europe has experi-
enced exponential regional and country level growth (Cambridge Centre 
for Alternative Finance 2018). Overall the market volume increased by 
41% annually, from €5.431 billion in 2015 to €7.671 billion in 2016. 
This growth was driven by dramatic growth in the UK market (account-
ing for 73% of the entire European market alone), and the fast expan-
sion of alternative finance markets in smaller European countries like 
the Nordics, the Iberian Peninsula, and the Baltics. The second largest 
European market is France, accounting for 22% of the European crowd-
funding market in 2016, followed by the German market (15.6%).
In 2016, P2P lending was the most popular crowdfunding invest-
ment model in Europe. P2P consumer and business lending accounted 
for 33.8% (€696.81 million) and 17% (€349.96 million), respectively of 
the total crowdfunding market. In contrast, equity-based and reward-
based crowdfunding experienced a decline in 2016, each accounting 
for approximately 10% of the market. Donation-based platforms grew 
modestly in 2016 however only represent 1.6% of the market share.
The further development of the crowdfunding market is challenged 
by risk factors perceived by prospective investors. In the investment 
models and reward-based model, for instance, two main risks highlighted 
by potential investors are (1) the risk of fraud, e.g. the possibility that 
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the product or project announced during the campaign may be false or 
non-existent and thus the fundraiser could attempt to use the funds col-
lected from the backers for other (personal) purposes; and (2) the risk of 
platform collapse due to malpractice by fundraisers (Cambridge Centre 
for Alternative Finance 2018). Other risks, such as the loan default or 
late repayments to investors, in the case of lending-based crowdfunding, 
as well as changes in local and/or EU regulation were perceived as less 
critical for investors (Cambridge Centre for Alternative Finance 2018). It 
is noteworthy that in the UK, unlike the general EU outlook, cybersecu-
rity was viewed as a major risk factor and the impact of Brexit was not a 
major concern (Cambridge Centre for Alternative Finance 2017c).
1.1.2  The US Market
In the United States, one of the world’s largest and most innovative 
countries for alternative finance, the total volume raised via crowdfund-
ing in 2016 was US$34.5 billion. Regulatory interventions, such as the 
signing of JOBS ACT, in April 2012, have significantly contributed to 
the development of the crowdfunding market. Specifically, the Tittle 
III of the JOBS ACT brought big changes within the entrepreneur-
ial finance landscape, alleviating the burden of entrepreneurs’ in raising 
finance, allowing fundraising from large number of investors through 
approved intermediary portals.
Like in the European market, P2P lending is the dominant crowd-
funding model in the United States, accounting for 61% of the market 
in 2016, followed by the equity-based model which delivered US$549 
million to approximately 637 businesses and reward-based crowdfunding 
(US$551 million) (Cambridge Centre for Alternative Finance 2017b). 
Data also reveals a slight drop in equity-based crowdfunding com-
pared to 2015, which seems to be related to regulatory ambiguity, also 
a feature of the EU market. Among the non-investment models, dona-
tion-based crowdfunding expanded a great deal in 2016 with US$224 
million raised, while reward-based crowdfunding suffered a decline from 
2015 to 2016, but still continues to attract significant funds from crowds 
(Cambridge Centre for Alternative Finance 2017b).
According to investors’ risk perceptions, in the United States the risk 
of fraud involving high-profile campaigns and business failure rate were 
viewed as the greatest risks to the crowdfunding industry (Cambridge 
Centre for Alternative Finance 2017b).
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1.1.3  The Asia-Pacific Market
Another area of interest for the development of the crowdfunding 
market is the Asia-Pacific region with the key regional markets being 
China, Oceania, and South Asia. China is the market leader accounting 
for 99.2% of the total Asia Pacific crowdfunding market. In 2016, the 
total volume of transactions in China was US$245.38 billion, an annual 
growth of 136% compared to 2015. Like the EU and the US, P2P lend-
ing represents the main segment of interest with 56% of the total market 
in China (Cambridge Centre for Alternative Finance 2017a).
Outside of mainland China, Australia has shown high growth rates, 
reaching US$609 million in total volume in 2016, followed by Japan 
(US$400 million), and South Korea (US$376 million). P2P lending 
in the Australian market accounts for about 60% of the total market 
(Cambridge Centre for Alternative Finance 2017a). In South Asia, the 
prominent country active in the alternative finance industry is India, with 
a total of $124 million collected in 2016. From 2013 to 2016 Indian 
activity was mainly concentrated in P2P lending, accounting for about 
60% of the market. Equity-based and donation-based crowdfunding each 
accounted for around 15% of the total crowdfunding market volume, 
representing US$32.3 million of funds raised (Cambridge Centre for 
Alternative Finance 2017a). A distinctive aspect of the Indian economy 
is the lack of access to bank credit for the majority of the population. In 
fact, only 10% of the 1 billion inhabitants have access to it. The growth 
of crowdfunding, allowing people to connect via the Internet and access 
financial services that are not available elsewhere, could benefit a huge 
portion of the population.
Overall, the latest statistics suggest that over the course of the past 
three years in the three main macro-regions, Europe, USA, and Asia-
Pacific, the alternative finance market doubled its volumes and is con-
tinuing to growth impressively. P2P crowdfunding and reward-based 
crowdfunding are consistently the most popular models in all markets.
1.2  crowdfunding state-of-the-art
Although crowdfunding is a relatively new method of funding for start-
ups and small ventures, it has become an increasingly relevant means of 
alternative financing. Researchers and scholars have started to investi-
gate this phenomenon in the attempt to construct a theoretical model 
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that could fully explain the dynamics behind crowdfunding, focusing on 
two main aspects: (1) the incentives and disincentives for starting or tak-
ing part in crowdfunding projects (see, e.g., Gerber et al. 2012; Agrawal 
et al. 2014; Allison et al. 2015) and (2) factors associated with success-
ful campaigns (see, e.g., Agrawal et al. 2011; Mollick 2014; Colombo 
et al. 2015; Giudici et al. 2018).
Investigating initiators’ incentives for starting a crowdfunding project, 
research shows that fundraisers consider crowdfunding as an opportunity 
(1) to finance their company at a lower cost of capital; (2) to receive pub-
lic attention; and (3) obtain feedback on the product or service offered 
(Gerber et al. 2012; Agarwal et al. 2014; Belleflamme et al. 2014). 
Crowdfunding platforms are easily accessible and thereby represent an 
opportunity for entrepreneurs to test the marketability of the project 
and receive suggestions. Nevertheless, embracing crowdfunding entails 
a great deal of public exposure and information disclosure (Agarwal 
et al. 2014). If creators are unable to collect the necessary funds from 
the crowd they will face the threat of not only reducing their chances of 
receiving future investments but also that others may steal their ideas.
Funders, on the other hand, finance crowdfunding campaigns to sup-
port an innovative idea, to help others to realise their dreams, to gain 
early access to new products, and to be part of a community (Zhang 
2012; Agarwal et al. 2014). The exchange of resources, followed by con-
tinuous interactions among members (both supporters and creators) of 
these platforms, generates a sense of belonging to a community where 
individuals share similar views and beliefs. Nonetheless, funders face some 
disincentives in engaging in crowdfunding projects. Early-stage compa-
nies that generally approach crowdfunding are inherently risky and often 
funders and creators are overoptimistic about projects outcomes (Mollick 
2014). Moreover, crowdfunding is a fertile ground for fraudulent behav-
iours. Creators could provide false information to promote their company 
and information asymmetries are very high (Agarwal et al. 2014). Lastly, 
in crowdfunding, virtual meetings replace real-life encounters, making it 
more challenging for the crowd to understand what businesses and what 
intermediary can be trusted (Schwienbacher and Larralde 2010).
1.2.1  Investment Models
Although it represents the greatest share of the crowdfunding market, 
there is a relatively small literature on lending crowdfunding. Lending 
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crowdfunding is best suited for ventures that have built a viable prod-
uct and generates some initial revenue, demonstrating early traction 
(Paschen 2017). Scholars have analysed the role of networks within 
peer-to-peer lending crowds and their effect on crowdfunding cam-
paigns’ performance. Network relations provide larger proportions of 
loans, lending four times more than strangers. Investors with preexist-
ing network ties also respond to loan requests on average 59.5% sooner 
than strangers (Horvát et al. 2015). These results are in line with extant 
research on other crowdfunding models highlighting the importance of 
relations and network in online fundraising success (Agrawal et al. 2011; 
Mollick 2014; Colombo et al. 2015; Butticè et al. 2017).
Scholars have further investigated the lending behaviour in P2P 
crowdfunding platforms. Cummins et al. (2018), comparing lend-
ing practices of non-banking institutional investors and retail investors, 
found that institutional investors generally outperform retail investors, 
achieving higher returns upon repayments and having a lower likelihood 
of loan default than retail investors. Along the same lines, Kgoroeadira 
et al. (2018), investigated whether P2P small business lending has dif-
ferent characteristics than traditional small business lending. Unlike 
traditional lenders, P2P online lenders, in deciding whether or not 
to lend money to businesses, focus more on entrepreneurs’ personal 
characteristics—e.g. person’s credit score, employment, picture, etc.—
than business characteristics. This suggests that entrepreneurs should 
approach online markets, tailoring their pitch as personal rather than 
focusing on firm characteristics, since the latter are the main determi-
nants of securing funding.
Similarly, while equity crowdfunding has reached significant invest-
ment volumes, the number of research studies on the area is relatively 
small. One of the first studies tackling the equity crowdfunding phenom-
enon was conducted by Ahlers et al. (2015) examining the impact of 
project quality (human capital, social capital, and intellectual capital) and 
perceived level of uncertainty on the success of a campaign. The authors 
found that while entrepreneur’s human capital was relevant in attracting 
a higher number of investors and capital, social, and intellectual capi-
tal did not appear to be key success factors. They also highlighted the 
importance of providing detailed information about the company—e.g. 
financial roadmaps, risk factors, etc.—to prospective backers to reduce 
information asymmetry. Nevin et al. (2017), focusing on the role of 
social media activities in equity-crowdfunding campaign success, show 
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that being active on social media, engaging with the crowd, and under-
standing social media selectivity—using different social media according 
to the target audience—positively impact the outcome of a crowdfund-
ing campaign. Lynn et al. (2017) provide insights on the crowdfunding 
network on Twitter—comprising multiple subcommunities, hubs, and 
influencers–illustrating the geographical concentration of crowdfunding 
in specific areas or communities and highlighting the importance of the 
social media use during crowdfunding campaigns.
Looking at the post-equity funding performance of crowd-backed 
start-ups in the UK, Signori and Vismara (2018) found that 18% of them 
were not active anymore, whereas 35% raised further funding from either 
traditional investors (9%) or follow-on crowdfunding offering (25%). 
Lastly, taking a qualitative perspective, the study by Di Pietro et al. 
(2018c) illustrates how entrepreneurs leveraging investor networks gen-
erated in the course of equity-based crowdfunding campaigns, contrib-
utes to the success of start-up firms. Crowd investors can provide firm 
founders with knowledge related to the product, strategy, and market as 
well as network ties with industry players and other stakeholders.
1.2.2  Non-investment Models
Agrawal et al. (2011) conducted one of the first studies investigating 
how online reward-based crowdfunding platforms reduce investors’ costs 
related to early-stage financing (e.g. collecting initial information, moni-
toring, providing inputs, etc.) and eliminate most of the distance-related 
economic frictions. Their study shows that Family and Friends (F&F) 
investors are mostly local and invest in the project in the early phases of 
the funding process, whereas non-F&F investors are more geographi-
cally disperse and willing to fund as the capital raised increases. Mollick 
(2014), taking a broader perspective, focused on the role of the founders 
themselves in determining the success (or failure) of their online reward-
based campaigns. The perceived quality of the underlying project, which 
can be signalled, for example, by including videos, providing frequent 
updates, and avoiding spelling errors, together with the founders’ social 
network size, increase the chances of success of a crowdfunding cam-
paign. The effects of geography on the success of the project were also 
considered, in terms of proximity to funders, supporting Agrawal et al. 
(2011) findings.
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Colombo et al. (2015), investigating reward-based crowdfunding 
from a social capital perspective, show that during the first stages of the 
campaign, when the level of uncertainty concerning the proposed pro-
jects is high, the founders’ relationships within the crowdfunding com-
munity are necessary to spread information and attract early backers. The 
relationships and social contacts developed among founders and backers 
within the same online platform—internal social capital—appears to be 
crucial in attracting both early-capital and early-backers, which are strong 
predictors of a campaign’s success. Internal social capital, reducing the 
information asymmetry between founders and backers, triggers imitat-
ing behaviours of other investors that feel more confident in endorsing 
the proposed project. Along this line, Butticè et al. (2017) showed that 
serial projects’ proponents in reward-based crowdfunding platforms were 
able to build internal social capital by launching several successful cam-
paigns, increasing their chances of succeeding also in their subsequent 
campaigns. By supporting the same project throughout its whole crea-
tive process, backers become part of a virtual community sharing com-
mon views and goals and this creates an emotional connection with other 
members of the group and with the entrepreneur as well.
The importance of social capital in reward-based crowdfunding and, 
in general, the characteristics of the geographic area where project’s pro-
ponent reside were also examined by Giudici et al. (2018). Their study 
demonstrates that local altruism—the level of altruism shared by people 
living in the founder’s city—represents a key success factor for crowd-
funding projects and this effect is strengthened by the entrepreneur’s 
personal social networks, supporting the findings of Mollick (2014), and 
local relations among residents. More recently, Di Pietro et al. (2018a), 
looking at the characteristics of the geographic area where investors 
reside, suggest that local religiosity can play a significant role in enhanc-
ing the fundraising of cross-regional crowdfunding projects.
On the topic of donation-based crowdfunding, scholars have 
focused their attention mainly on the determinants of funding behav-
iours (Gleasure and Feller 2016), considering the benefits that donors 
achieve through donations. In some cases, financial benefits are gained 
in the form of tax deductibility as suggested by Meer (2014), but more 
frequently social benefits represent the main reward for donors. From 
this perspective, the way in which projects are described and the ano-
nymity of users influence the propensity and the amount of donations 
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(Smith et al. 2013; Burtch et al. 2015). Di Pietro et al. (2018b), analys-
ing crowdfunding donations collected in Italy by Mary’s Meals Charity 
over a 15-month period, illustrate that (lower) digital divide, i.e. access 
to infrastructure such as broadband connection, and user’s digital liter-
acy, i.e. habitual use of Internet, enhance funder’s propensity to use a 
crowdfunding platform for donation purposes. The findings also support 
the hypothesis that the use of social media, in particular Facebook shar-
ing, positively influences donations.
Overall, research in both investment and non-investment crowdfund-
ing models illustrate that (1) funding is not geographically constrained 
although geographical proximity matters since most of the capital 
flows to the same regions (e.g. Agrawal et al. 2011; Lynn et al. 2017; 
Cambridge Centre for Alternative Finance 2018); (2) funding propensity 
grows with collected capital, highlighting the importance of friends and 
family as well as entrepreneurs’ internal social capital as they invest early 
in the funding cycle (e.g. Agrawal et al. 2011; Mollick 2014; Colombo 
et al. 2015; Butticè et al. 2017); and that (3) funding is influenced by 
the characteristics of the local area in which entrepreneurs and investors 
live (e.g. Di Pietro et al. 2018a; Giudici et al. 2018).
1.3  new research trends: the language 
of crowdfunding
Recent studies are exploring the relevance of linguistic style in entrepre-
neurial finance, a relatively nascent research area. It is widely accepted 
that the way entrepreneurs articulate their business is vital for fundrais-
ing and legitimacy purposes. Prior research highlights storytelling as a 
means for entrepreneurs to establish venture legitimacy and gain stake-
holder support. Specifically, Gorbatai and Nelson (2015) focus on the 
linguistic features of crowdfunding platforms to test the effect of lan-
guage on the outcome of alternative financing campaigns and the rela-
tionship between linguistic content and gender. The authors suggest 
that the three types of language most likely to be successful in crowd-
funding campaigns are positive, vivid, and inclusive, while business lan-
guage would be less rewarding for the outcome of a campaign. Davis 
et al. (2017) support the idea that product originality and passion dis-
played by entrepreneurs in their pitches strengthen entrepreneurs’ ability 
to collect funding. Similarly, Parhankangas and Renko (2017) compare 
the linguistic style of commercial and social entrepreneurs’ pitches, 
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finding that whereas language style is of little importance to commercial 
entrepreneurs, social entrepreneurs need to pay more attention to how 
they deliver their pitches: the use of concrete language, precise terminol-
ogy, and an interactive style, are fundamental for the success of a social 
crowdfunding campaign. The perception that an entrepreneur conveys to 
potential investors is of fundamental importance since the financing pitch 
is often made before or during the development stage, that is, before the 
audience can actually see the finished product. Future research can build 
on these very preliminary findings and explore the role of communica-
tion and storytelling in crowdfunding in much greater depth.
Another important question to address in future research is related to 
factors that help us understand cross-country and cross-regional differ-
ences in the development of crowdfunding. In fact, despite a significant 
variation in entrepreneurial financing activity across countries (Reynolds 
2011; Cambridge Centre for Alternative Finance 2018), the theoretical 
explanations of the antecedents and processes are limited (Baker et al. 
2005). Drawing from cognitive psychology theories, recently Di Pietro 
et al. (2018d) show that linguistic structures may help in explaining dif-
ferences in entrepreneurial finance market dynamics across nations and 
cultures. More interdisciplinary research is needed to discover underlying 
mechanisms that will help us to understand international differences of 
the crowdfunding phenomenon.
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Both online P2P lending platforms and lenders seek to minimise the 
impact of information asymmetries through a variety of mechanisms. 
This chapter discusses the structure of online P2P lending platforms and 
reviews how the disclosure of hard and soft information, and herding can 
reduce information asymmetries. The chapter concludes with a discus-
sion of further avenues for research.
Keywords  P2P lending · Online P2P lending · Information 
asymmetry
2.1  introduction
It is widely agreed that small businesses play a critical role in economic 
growth, regardless of country size or development, by providing employ-
ment and income to a broad range of citizens, supporting a wider 
eco-system of firms, and fostering innovation (OECD 2017a). Their via-
bility, sustainability, and growth depend on access to strategic resources, 
not least finance. The supply and sourcing of financing is a perennial 
strategic challenge for small businesses the world over, exacerbated by 
their innate characteristics and market inefficiencies. Due to under- 
collateralisation, limited or no credit history, and lack of sophisticated finan-
cial statements (and the expertise to produce such statements), a higher 
level of default risk is typically attached to small businesses and as a result 
access to credit is limited (Bhide 2003; OECD 2013). This situation per-
sists despite a consistent decrease in the costs of financing in recent years, 
partly as result of the aforementioned characteristics of small business but 
also as a result of supply-side lending policies by traditional credit sources 
during the recent recession (Mills and McCarthy 2014; OECD 2017b).
Digital technologies are transforming the business models and dra-
matically increasing access to markets for small businesses. In the same 
way, it is also transforming how these businesses access finance and from 
whom. This chapter explores online peer-to-peer (P2P) lending, a form 
of crowdfunding (see Chapter 1) that bypasses conventional interme-
diaries, processes, and requirements to connect borrowers and lenders 
(Yum et al. 2012). Information asymmetry is a key issue in P2P lend-
ing that can result in moral hazard or adverse selection (Akerlof 1970) 
and ultimately impact the viability and success of individual P2P lend-
ing platforms. Both P2P lending platforms and lenders seek to minimise 
the impact of information asymmetries through a variety of mechanisms, 
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most notably by supplementing hard information with soft information, 
and herding. The remainder of this chapter discusses the structure of 
online P2P lending platforms in greater detail. Extant literature on infor-
mation asymmetries and online peer-to-peer lending platforms is then 
discussed. The chapter concludes with a discussion of further avenues for 
research.
2.2  online Peer-to-Peer lending Platforms
Online P2P lending platforms represent a convergence of P2P lending 
and collective financing, enabled by an Internet-based platform. Both 
P2P lending and collective financing are not new ideas in themselves. 
New venture financing, in particular, often mobilises existing peers based 
on family, friendship, or professional social relationships with the entre-
preneur(s) (Berger and Udell 1998; Kotha and George 2012; Robb and 
Robinson 2014). This type of funding is often referred to as insider or 
informal funding in contrast to formal finance, whether intermediated 
from an equity or debt perspective (Berger and Udell 1998). Similarly, 
collective financing has a long history. Haas et al. (2014) cite the funding 
of the Statue of Liberty’s pedestal in the nineteenth century as an early 
example of collective financing. In contrast, online P2P lending platforms 
harness the power of the Internet to enable an online marketplace for 
microcredit funding that acts as an intermediary to connect individuals or 
businesses wishing to obtain a loan (borrowers) with individuals and insti-
tutions wishing to fund loans (lenders). Lenders may not necessarily have 
existing social relationships with the entrepreneurs, management, or the 
business, and are more likely strangers with no preexisting relationship. 
They may be individuals or organisations established to provide credit on 
a formal basis. As such, online P2P lending platforms may, and increas-
ingly do, allow traditional credit institutions such as banks to invest.
Online P2P lending marketplaces are two-sided networks where 
a P2P lending platform enables interactions between the demand (the 
borrower) and supply (the lender) sides of the network.1 As well as 
recruiting potential borrowers and lenders (market-making), the P2P 
lending platform sets the rules or terms of engagement between bor-
rowers and lenders in the platform. Typically, registered borrowers post 
1 For the remainder of this chapter, ‘P2P lending’ refers to online P2P lending.
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their funding requirements on the platform and provide a relatively lim-
ited amount of information for due diligence purposes. The amount of 
information potential borrowers are required to submit varies among 
different platforms. For individuals, this might include detail on income, 
employment, other debt, purpose of loan, and a personal statement; 
for businesses, this typically includes financial accounts, some form of 
statement of historic trading, along with details of the lending propo-
sition. In some marketplaces, additional information or verification can 
be requested (see later discussion on groups). The P2P lending platform 
then makes a decision to list the loan request or not. The P2P lending 
platform collects and scores prospective borrowers individually or as a 
pool, typically using a proprietary credit scoring mechanism. The poten-
tial loan requests are then offered to the prospective lenders through the 
platform. The prospective lenders then can decide to make offers (bids) 
to meet the full or partial loan requirements at a specific interest rate, if 
any.2 Depending on the platform’s functionality, such bids can be made 
by the prospective lenders manually (and independently), in groups, or 
using automated rule-based tools for portfolio management offered by 
the platform. By allowing lenders to invest in multiple small loans or 
small parts of a loan, the platform offers them the opportunity to diver-
sify their loan portfolio and associated risk. The loan is funded when the 
minimum loan requirements are met, i.e. loan amount and interest rate. 
Finally, once the loan has been granted, the platform facilitates the loan 
processing and repayments and continues to collect and analyse the data 
relating to the loan and borrower for use in future credit scoring. P2P 
platforms mainly generate income from (1) origination fees from the 
borrower deducted at loan disbursement, (2) repayment fees charged to 
the lender when the borrower pays a monthly statement, and (3) addi-
tional charges such as late fees, loan part trading fees etc.
While the P2P lending platform undertakes a variety of functions 
including market-making, loan processing, and community-building 
activities, they do not, as a rule, participate in lending decisions (Meyer 
2007; Wang et al. 2009).3 As they do not make lending decisions 
2 In some social lending platforms, the interest rate can be zero e.g. kiva.org.
3 A variant of online peer-to-peer lending platforms, balance sheet business lending and 
balance sheet property lending, has emerged in recent years and involves the platform 
entity providing loans directly to businesses. It accounts for a very small proportion of the 
sector. This has been excluded from this chapter as there is typically no market for the loans 
per se and the platform and lender are one and the same.
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(or collect deposits as in traditional banks), they have much lower trans-
action and intermediation costs than conventional credit institutions–key 
drivers of interest margins (Maudos and Guevara 2004). Operating costs 
are minimised through the use of online automated systems, operating 
outside the banking regulatory system, and not carrying the loans on 
their books thus avoiding liabilities for loans (Serrano-Cinca et al. 2015). 
These lower costs are transferred across to both the supply and demand 
sides of the P2P network. Accordingly, borrowers are attracted to P2P 
lending platforms by transparency, rapid decision-making, the promise of 
non-collateralised loans often at competitive interest rates (Sviokla 2009; 
Wang et al. 2009; IOSCO 2017) and lenders are attracted by lower 
transaction costs, risk diversification, access to market, and higher poten-
tial returns (Morse 2015; IOSCO 2017).
Given the strong incentives for all stakeholders in the P2P lending 
value network, it is unsurprising that the P2P lending segment has expe-
rienced rapid and substantial growth since the launch of what is con-
sidered the first online P2P lending platform, Zopa.com, in 2005. P2P 
lending platforms may be categorised in a variety of ways including busi-
ness model (profit/not-for-profit), number of borrowers per loan (one-
to-one/one-to-many), borrower type (consumer/business) or loan use 
(e.g. real estate financing). P2P lending is still at a relatively early stage 
of development and analyst reports on market sizing is characterised by 
regional focus, definitional ambiguity, and significant variances. Table 2.1 
provides a summary of the size of the overall market and main segments 
by region.
The rapid growth of P2P lending has been justified through two main 
arguments–financial intermediation theory and market equilibrium the-
ory (Serrano-Cinca et al. 2015). The financial intermediation hypothe-
sis suggests that as P2P lending platforms are more cost efficient than 
traditional credit institutions and therefore have lower intermediation 
costs, they are more attractive to both lenders and borrowers for the 
reasons discussed earlier. The market equilibrium hypothesis recognises 
that if markets function efficiently, supply and demand should be in equi-
librium. However, a credit rationing problem exists, particularly in eco-
nomic downturns, in that some prospective borrowers may not receive 
loans even if they are willing to pay higher interest rates. Proponents 
of the market equilibrium hypothesis argue that P2P lending platforms 
solve this credit rationing problem and bring the credit market towards 
equilibrium.
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2.3  information asymmetries and Peer  
to Peer lending Platforms
As discussed previously, except in a limited number of instances, for 
example, balance sheet business lending and balance sheet property 
lending, loans are granted by lenders and not the platform per se; the 
platform operator transfers the credit risk to the lenders. Addressing 
information asymmetries is a major theme of P2P lending platform 
research. As in the overwhelming majority of investment decisions, P2P 
lenders are at a disadvantage to the borrower with regard to the loan 
decision. The borrower has near-complete information while the lender 
has only what is presented by the P2P lending platform. As such, plat-
form operators must design mechanisms into their platform and process 
to reduce these asymmetries while not demotivating either potential bor-
rowers or lenders with unnecessary barriers to participate. Such mech-
anisms include provision point mechanisms (all or nothing), general 
platform rules, feedback systems, crowd due diligence, and safeguard 
funds. The provision of data and associated analysis and, in particular big 
data as online P2P lending marketplaces reach sufficient scale, is a criti-
cal component of differentiating P2P lending platforms but also reduc-
ing information asymmetries (Yan et al. 2015). A key mechanism in all 
P2P lending platforms is some form of categorisation of a loan, typically 
proprietary, based on some platform assessment of the creditworthi-
ness of the borrower represented by a credit grade (if not a credit score) 
Table 2.1 Size of the P2P lending market by region
Notes All figures are reported in USD/billions
Sources Cambridge Centre for Alternative Finance (2017a, b, 2018a, b)
Region Total market size P2P consumer lending P2P business lending
2015
The Americas 28.70 18 2.6
Asia Pacific and China 108.85 52.78 39.99
Europe 1.108 0.398 0.23
Middle East and Africa 0.242 0.010 0.023
2016
The Americas 35.2 21.1 1.3
Asia Pacific and China 244.43 137.02 58.51
Europe 2.171 0.733 0.368
Middle East and Africa 0.36 0.033 0.031
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representing the likelihood that the borrower will repay their debt. Such 
scores are derived from mandatory information disclosures from pro-
spective borrowers such as credit history and personal data, but also 
supplemental voluntary information disclosures including more detailed 
biographical data, photographs, and in some cases, peer endorsements 
(Yan et al. 2015). Both conventional and non-standard information has 
been explored by researchers in terms of their contribution to key out-
comes of the lending process, e.g. loan funding, final interest rate level, 
and default.
The importance of the credit grade as a signal is underlined by extant 
research which suggests, unsurprisingly, that higher credit grades are 
predictive of successful loan funding and lower risk of default (Greiner 
and Wang 2010; Emekter et al. 2015). A significant focus of research 
has been on so-called hard information which is easy to compare across 
borrowers and categories of borrowers. In addition to credit grade, 
debt-income ratio, bank account verification, and borrower debt level 
have been found to be significant for predicting funding probability and 
final interest rate (Greiner and Wang 2010; Serrano-Cinca et al. 2015). 
Despite this, it should be noted that Freedman and Jin (2008) suggest 
that exposure to credit grades rather than actual credit scores adversely 
effects loan decision making. In a similar vein, recent research suggests 
that credit grades may not represent accurate estimates of borrowers’ 
creditworthiness, and that the accuracy of hard information for P2P 
lending decision-making is improved with further information disclosure 
(Serrano-Cinca et al. 2015; Tao et al. 2017; Zhu 2018).
Soft information in the context of P2P lending research typically 
refers to information about the borrower and their individual situation 
(Dorfleitner et al. 2016). Soft information is often viewed as a means 
to addressing information asymmetry and associated adverse selection 
in P2P lending platforms (Weiss et al. 2010; Gao et al. 2016; Prystav 
2016). Iyer et al. (2009) suggest that screening through soft infor-
mation, in this case, the number of friend endorsements and the loan 
purpose, is relatively more important when evaluating lower-quality 
borrowers. This is consistent with Prystav (2016) who found that bor-
rowers with poorer relative credit ratings will be ignored if not for soft 
information. Gao et al. (2016) also identify that loan purpose is taken 
into account by lenders but they also note that they may be deceived 
by such information. Several studies have examined the narrative descrip-
tions provided in loan listings. Research by Pötzsch and Böhme (2010) 
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suggests that communicating soft information relating to the borrower’s 
education, profession, and qualifications had a small but significant 
effect. Research by Herzenstein et al. (2011b) suggest that borrower 
claims about themselves (identities) in narratives that focus on trustwor-
thiness or success increase the likelihood of loan funding but have less 
predictive loan performance than other identities, e.g. borrowers claim-
ing economic hardship. Furthermore, borrowers who claim more iden-
tities in narratives both have increased likelihood of loan funding and a 
reduced final interest rate. Similarly, Michels (2012) suggests that vol-
untary information disclosures, over and above those required by the 
platform, even when unverified, results in an increase in bidding activity 
by prospective lenders and a reduction of interest rates. Dorfleitner et al. 
(2016) compared two European P2P lending platforms, and found that 
description text, and specifically spelling errors, text length, and the sen-
timent intensity of keywords, predicted funding probability on the less 
restrictive of the two platforms examined. Gao et al. (2016) show that 
the presence of well-established features that influence reader behaviours 
(readability, positive tones, and deception cues) in narrative texts of loan 
listings all meaningfully relate to loan repayment.
Many researchers have explored the extent to which lenders are 
rational or perceptual in their decision-making on P2P lending plat-
forms. Research on the Prosper.com platform by Herzenstein et al. 
(2008) suggests that prospective borrowers who provided a photo 
affected loan success negatively but found while demographic attrib-
utes, such as race and gender do affect likelihood of funding success, 
their influence was minor compared to other factors. Pope and Sydnor 
(2011) examining the same platform found evidence of racial dispari-
ties with loan listings featuring pictures with ‘blacks’ 25–35% less likely 
to receive funding than pictures featuring ‘whites’. Similarly, Ravina 
(2012) reports that after hard information is taken into account, more 
attractive prospective borrowers have a higher likelihood of loan fund-
ing and lower interest rates and that consistent with Pope and Sydnor 
(2011) identifies disparities between ‘blacks’ and ‘whites’. Again using 
photographs of borrowers from Prosper.com, Duarte et al. (2012) found 
that borrowers who appear more trustworthy have higher probabili-
ties of having their loans funded, have better credit scores and default 
less often. Age-based research would seem to be conclusive. Gonzalez 
and Loureiro (2014) found that loan success is sensitive to relative age 
and attractiveness. Furthermore, they found that (a) attractiveness had 
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no effect where perceived age might signal competence, and (b) when 
the lender and borrower were of the same gender, attractiveness might 
negatively impact loan success. Similarly, research on Chinese borrower 
perceptions by Chen et al. (2016) suggests that borrowers perceived hav-
ing a shared birthplace, location or occupation with lenders increased the 
‘ease of funding’. Burtch et al. (2014) note that location proximity and 
cultural differences in borrower and lender country of origin impact loan 
funding.
In many, but not all, P2P lending platforms operate auctions where 
the loan is only funded on a ‘fund it all’ basis, i.e. there must be suffi-
cient bids to fund the loan amount requested loan in its entirety. This 
is sometimes referred to as the “rule of full funding” (Herzenstein 
et al. 2011a). As per other financial markets, where there is asymmetric 
(or imperfect) information, investors tend to herd (Bikhchandani and 
Sharma 2000). Bikhchandani and Sharma (2000, p. 280) define herding 
as follows:
an individual can be said to herd if she would have made an investment 
without knowing other investors’ decisions, but does not make that invest-
ment when she finds that others have decided not to do so. Alternatively, 
she herds when knowledge that others are investing changes her decision 
from not investing to making the investment.
Bikchandani and Sharma (2000) differentiate between two types of 
herding–intentional and spurious. The former occurs when one set 
of investors copies another set of investors behaviour intentionally, i.e. 
the mimicry is post hoc; the latter occurs when investors behave simi-
larly whether they are aware of the others investors’ behaviour or not. 
Intentional herding may be rational or irrational. Rational herding is 
based on the observation of publicly visible investment choices or actions 
by one or more investors and therefore involves some form of observa-
tional learning and information cascades. In contrast, irrational whereas 
irrational herding is based on irrational beliefs or sentiment and is typi-
fied by momentum-investment strategies.
In the context of P2P lending, lenders may be particularly prone 
to herding due to the transparent nature of the platforms. Indeed this 
transparency and access to data also makes such platforms a fertile space 
for academic research. Berkovich (2011) analyses data from Prosper.
com and his findings suggest that there is evidence of herding as per 
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the model in Berkovich and Tayon (2009). Herzenstein et al. (2011a) 
examine strategic herding behaviour by lenders, again on Prosper.com. 
They identify that lenders are likely to herd in active auctions up until 
the loan is fully funded at which point, herding behaviour decreases. 
Interestingly, Herzenstein et al. (2011a) find that there is a positive asso-
ciation between strategic herding and loan repayment and suggest that 
such behaviour therefore benefits lenders individually and collectively. 
Zhang and Liu (2012) explore Prosper.com data also and conclude that 
the lenders engage in both rational and irrational herding based on the 
evidence of observational learning. Zhang and Liu’s study is noteworthy 
as they observed counterintuitive herding effects, e.g. low credit scores 
amplified herding effects whereas favourable borrower characteristics 
seem to dampen herding effects. They also found that rational herding 
outperformed irrational herding in predicting loan performance.
Lee and Lee (2012) explore herding behaviour on a Korean P2P 
lending platform, Popfunding.com. Again, they find strong evidence 
of herding behaviour including a diminishing marginal effect of the 
observed herding behaviour as per Herzenstein et al. (2011a). More 
recently, Zhang and Chen (2017) investigate herding on a Chinese P2P 
lending platform. Again they find evidence of herding and in this case are 
able to identify both rational and irrational herding behaviour.
As a final related point, it is worth noting research relating to bor-
rower groups within P2P lending platforms. In some P2P lending plat-
forms, such as Prosper.com, it is common for borrowers to form groups 
comprising other borrowers, who may also in themselves act as lenders. 
Group leaders may set membership criteria that can require additional 
information from members over and above that required by the P2P 
lending platform and which may only be available to group leaders or 
the group. This group-specific private information is not available to all 
participants in the P2P lending platform. Given their status in groups, 
group leaders may wield considerable influence through endorsements 
or leading bidding. Research is inconclusive on groups (Lee and Lee 
2012). Everett (2015) suggests that membership in a group with pri-
vate information or enhanced monitoring is associated with lower default 
rates however not necessarily lower interest rates (Everett 2015). Everett 
(2015) suggests this private information disclosure, while solving an 
information asymmetry problem for some lenders, introduces a hold-up 
problem for some borrowers. Everett (2015) finds that consistent with 
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extant literature, the interest rate often depends on the social relationship 
with the prospective borrower and the quality of the credit rating with 
more professional lenders seeking higher economic rents through higher 
interest rates. Notwithstanding this, Chen et al. (2016) find that group 
membership and the borrower’s credibility and trust within that group 
yielded inconsistent results, however, the degree of group inclusiveness 
had a negative impact on, his/her funding and repayment performance.
Borrower groups may also play a role in herding. For example, group 
leader endorsements and bidding can initiate cascades leading to herd-
ing. Regarding the impact of group leader actions on loan funding, 
Kumar (2007) suggests group leader endorsement can increase the like-
lihood of loan funding success. However, the impact of group leader 
behaviour on interest rates is less conclusive. For example, while Berger 
and Gleisner (2010) suggest that active bidding by the group leader with 
others, and in itself, may result in lower interest rates, Freedman and Jin 
(2008) suggest that in certain instances group leader actions will increase 
the average interest rate.
2.4  conclusions and future  
directions for research
In this chapter, we provided an overview of online P2P lending platforms 
and discussed the extant literature on how information asymmetries are 
reduced through various platform mechanisms and the lenders them-
selves, including information disclosure, herding and relatedly in-platform 
groups. Peer-to-peer lending as a subset of the wider crowdfunding and 
FinTech domain is experiencing rapid adoption worldwide and is the 
dominant segment of most alternative finance markets. While there is a 
substantial literature base on information asymmetries and P2P lending, 
the increasingly global adoption of P2P lending, the proliferation of new 
platforms and marketplaces, and the evolution of new technologies pro-
vides a fertile ground for future research which we will discuss briefly.
Researchers have suggested that understanding the behaviour, and in 
particularly the ‘inner life’, of investors requires a greater appreciation of 
the both the socio-economic and technical context in which investment 
takes place (Hirsto 2011; Zwick and Schroeder 2011). For example, US 
data prior to 2008 operated under a different regulatory environment 
when the SEC required registration under the Securities Act of 1933 
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resulting in changes to platform operation. Similarly, different countries 
operate under different levels of regulation and oversight. While there 
has been a small number of European studies and an increasing base 
of literature from China, the majority of early research has a US-focus. 
There is little truly comparative work examining the impact of local 
socio-economic forces, culture, language, and other aspects of national 
identity on borrower and lender behaviour on domestic and interna-
tional P2P lending platforms.
The number of P2P lending platforms has increased dramatically since 
2005. In China alone, media reports suggest over 2000 P2P lending 
platforms were active in the market in February 2018. Today, there are 
P2P lending platforms of every hue; they each have different features, 
functionalities, and affordances that impact the operation of the market. 
As with geo-cultural focus of early research, early P2P lending research 
focused on available datasets such as Prosper.com. Whether extant find-
ings are generalisable across all platforms and take into account platform 
idiosyncrasies is worthy of further exploration.
The role and impact of information disclosure, hard and soft, has 
been the focus of much of the academic research to date. In this era of 
big data and API-fication, platforms are increasingly looking to integrate 
third-party data sources into P2P lending platforms. Yan et al. (2015) 
discuss the potentially transformational role such big data can have in 
reducing information asymmetry through reduced signalling and search 
costs. While highlighting the benefits of increased data volumes and vari-
ety, they warn that such volumes and velocity of data will only reduce 
information asymmetries where the quality of the data analysis and sub-
sequent analysis is relatively high. Related technologies such as machine 
learning, deep learning and artificial intelligence similarly can contrib-
ute to loan decision-making and reducing information asymmetries but 
provide their own unique challenges and may result in unexpected con-
sequences, not least diluting or removing the human element in P2P 
lending.
This chapter primarily focuses on information disclosure and herding 
as a means of reducing information asymmetries in P2P lending. Due to 
the large number of platforms operating today, there is greater heteroge-
neity in the structural mechanisms for reducing information asymmetries 
including provision point mechanisms, platform rules, contractual agree-
ments, etc. The heterogeneity, scale, and global footprint of P2P lending 
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and the strategic necessity of reducing information asymmetries to 
ensure the efficient operation of P2P lending platforms ensure a fervent 
space for scholarly inquiry and impact.
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3.1  introduction
Artificial intelligence (AI), and the machine learning techniques that form 
the core of AI, are transforming, and will revolutionise, how we approach 
financial risk management. Everything to do with understanding and con-
trolling risk is up for grabs through the growth of AI-driven solutions: from 
deciding how much a bank should lend to a customer, to providing warning 
signals to financial market traders about position risk, to detecting customer 
and insider fraud, and improving compliance and reducing model risk. In 
this chapter we detail current machine learning and AI techniques being 
used and current applications of those techniques. We further envisage the 
future role for fully AI solutions as the natural next step after the widespread 
adoption of machine learning in helping the organisation to manage risk.
An example of ZestFinance serves to illustrate the potential for AI and 
machine learning in risk management. ZestFinance was founded by a for-
mer Chief Information Officer of Google and in 2016 partnered with 
Baidu, the dominant search engine in China, to improve Baidu’s lend-
ing decisions in the Chinese market. Baidu was particularly interested in 
making small loan offers to retail customers buying products from their 
platform. Unlike most developed countries, the risk with lending in the 
Chinese market is that less than 20% of people have credit profiles or 
credit ratings. Lending to people who have either ‘thin’ credit profiles, 
or no credit profiles, is inherently risky as there is no history to draw on 
to check borrower reliability. ZestFinance (with permission) taps into 
the huge volume of information on members held by Baidu such as their 
search or purchase histories to help Baidu decide whether to lend. They 
use thousands of data points per customer and are still able to make lend-
ing decisions on new applications in seconds. A reported trial in 2017 of 
their system led to a 150% increase in total small-item lending by Baidu 
with no increase in credit losses in the space of just two months.1
The exact nature of how ZestFinance makes these decisions is not 
disclosed except under the broad umbrella of machine learning and AI, 
but essentially what they use as a base is a core machine learning set of 
1 https://www.technologyreview.com/s/603604/an-ai-fueled-credit-formula- 
might-help-you-get-a-loan/.
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techniques around clustering and decision trees, and possibly deep learn-
ing. Thus a search history indicating accessing gambling websites would 
cluster a potential borrower into a higher risk group. While on the other 
hand, a history of online spending that supports the applicant’s reported 
income in their application to borrow, or maybe even data indicating 
upward career mobility, might cluster someone into a group of lower 
risk borrowers. The actual clusters will be significantly more refined than 
the simple examples given above. This approach crosses the line from 
machine learning to AI due to the automated nature of the lending 
decision-making process.
The ZestFinance example illustrates the essence of how AI and 
machine learning can improve risk management. A standard credit score 
is largely a linear calculation of a small number (about 50) positive or 
negative numerical characteristics about a person and thus misses out 
on a huge amount of additional personal information that can help to 
either reduce negative risk or accept positive risk. This new information 
is often atypical and non-numerical; the type of data which machine 
learning is innately suited to analysing. Our chapter thus expands on this 
idea of how AI and machine learning can improve risk management— 
particularly around the techniques being used to make decisions based 
on such large volumes of atypical data. The next section briefly details, in 
a non-technical manner, the core machine learning techniques which can 
be applied to improve risk management. The remainder of the chapter is 
devoted to the actual application of AI and machine learning to various 
forms of risk management, finishing with a forward-looking perspective 
on what is next for the role of AI in risk management and some chal-
lenges that need to be addressed.
3.2  machine learning and ai techniques  
for risk management
A first step is defining what we mean by AI and machine learning, and 
this is not necessarily a straightforward distinction. In a glib sense the 
public relations and fundraising functions of startups tend to use the 
more attractive AI term when they most often mean machine learning, 
but even in research there is a reasonably fluid distinction. AI is most 
commonly viewed as intelligence demonstrated by machines, with 
intelligence being defined with reference to what we view intelligence 
as in humans (Turing 1952, cf. Shieber 2004). As it matters to risk 
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management we are normally particularly interested in artificial super- 
intelligence; that is machines that can demonstrate a risk management- 
specific intelligence higher than human intelligence in this field. To 
compare the two terms in a more technical manner, we can say machine 
learning is a core technique of AI involving learning from data, but that 
AI often involves additional techniques and requirements. For example, 
as noted by Bostrom (2014), a full AI solution would be automated in 
terms of data identification, data testing, and making decisions based on 
the data testing. In practice, AI might involve additional techniques in 
addition to machine learning, such as including hard-coded and logic 
rules. Machine learning on the other hand normally involves manual data 
identification and testing by the data scientist, and human decisions as to 
how to apply the outputted information. Given the lack of technolog-
ical and organisational readiness for pure AI, and the reality that most 
claimed AI is in fact machine learning, in this section we outline the core 
machine learning techniques applied to risk management. In the follow-
ing section and especially the last section, we move our discussion more 
towards AI as the logical next step to follow from the widespread usage 
of machine learning techniques.
Machine learning falls into two broad categories of supervised and 
unsupervised machine learning. In supervised learning you have input 
data that you wish to test to determine an output. This is similar to how 
in traditional statistics terms you have a range of independent variables 
that you test to determine relationship with the dependent variable. In 
unsupervised learning, you only have input data and wish to learn more 
about the structure of the data. Table 3.1 shows the distinction between 
these two categories as well as the main techniques within each category. 
A category of note that crosses both supervised and unsupervised learn-
ing is deep learning, which is viewed as the closest towards AI, and to 
which we turn at the end of this section.
Regression machine learning is the closest group of techniques to 
that usually applied in traditional determination of the causal relation-
ship between variables. In simple terms, we might describe a traditional 
linear regression equation for a credit lending risk assessment as perhaps 
the dependent variable being the risk of loan non-repayment, which is 
then sought to be explained by a range of independent variables that 
should influence the risk of loan non-repayment. These independent var-
iables might, for example, include financial measures such average non- 
repayment rates, whether the person is full-time employed, whether they 
have a good credit history, and whether they own property.
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Regression machine learning differs from traditional regression in that 
it uses regression techniques that allow for large numbers of variables to 
be used as independent variables and then automatically discarded if they 
lack explanatory power. This is a necessary feature due to the large range 
of data that is available to the data scientist. It also reduces the extent 
of theorising needed to determine suitable independent variables. Thus, 
LASSO regression zero weights independent variables with low explan-
atory power, while Ridge regression gives lower weights to variables in 
a model that are highly correlated with other variables in a model. In 
both cases the outcome is a reduced model that allows the data scien-
tist to move from large numbers of potential explanatory variables to a 
smaller subset. A LARS regression works in the opposite direction to a 
LASSO and Ridge, by initially zero-weighting all variables and only add-
ing variables that are shown to have explanatory power. Hu et al. (2015) 
provide an interesting application of this set of techniques by applying a 
LASSO regression technique, among others, to the development of an 
automated investment trading advice system based on stock trend anal-
ysis and showing this method has improved trading performance com-
pared to traditional methods.
Table 3.1 Categories of machine learning techniques (Source van Liebergen 2017)
aSince unsupervised methods do not describe a relation between a dependent and interdependent varia-
ble, they cannot be labelled linear or non-linear




Regression • Principal components
• Ridge






Neural networks and deep 
leaning









Clusteringa Clustering methods: K- and X-means, hierarchical principal 
components analysis
Deep learning
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Principal Component Analysis (PCA) and partial-least squares regres-
sions are quite similar in that they both aim to reduce the number of 
variables by combining variables and extracting common factors. PCA is 
the more popular of the two as it is widely used in traditional statistics 
and therefore better understood. A simple example of PCA is that for a 
set of potential variables to be used to determine credit repayment risk 
consisting of: (1) owns a house, (2) owns a car, and (3) has significant 
savings: a common factor might be extracted from these that could be 
termed ‘asset ownership’. A more applied example is provided by Zhong 
and Enke (2017) who use PCA to reduce 60 correlated economic and 
financial measures to a smaller set of factors and then apply a set of neu-
ral network machine learning techniques to forecast the US S&P 500 
index. This latter example is a common use of PCA in machine learning: 
that it is used as a first step for dimension reduction and then a more 
advanced machine learning technique is applied to learn from the PCA 
components.
The other main category of supervised learning is ‘classification’, with 
support vector machines (SVM) and decision trees being the most pop-
ular techniques within this group. The outcomes and visuals of decision 
trees are easily understood in practice and therefore amenable to expla-
nation to non-data scientists. A famous application of the decision tree 
technique is to Titanic survival prospects. Starting with the initial tree 
trunk statistic that 62% of passengers died and 38% survived the Titanic 
disaster, we can build a decision tree to classify groups that had a greater 
or lesser chance of survival. Thus, a first classification of whether a pas-
senger is male or female shows that only 19% of males survived while 
74% of females survived. We can branch out the tree even further by, for 
example, looking at age groups beneath the first male–female division, 
and this shows that despite only 19% of males surviving, male boys under 
the age of 6 had a 67% survival chance.
This classification approach of creating sub-groups then helps to 
understand what characteristics determine outcomes. In practice decision 
trees for machine learning have many more challenges than in the Titanic 
example, particularly around the issue of overfitting to existing data and 
thus determined sub-groups having poor predictive power with new data 
and in new situations. SVM are more complex in formulation than deci-
sion trees but have the same essential end goal of creating groups based 
on input characteristics to classify and predict outcomes. In the case of 
SVM the approach is to map characteristics on a plane and classify groups 
3 MACHINE LEARNING AND AI FOR RISK MANAGEMENT  39
based on similarity of where they are on this plane. As a financial risk 
example, Nazemi et al. (2018) apply a SVM approach to predict financial 
loss to holders of bonds that have defaulted (normally some proportion 
of loss is recoverable from firm assets after bond default) and are able to 
demonstrate the superiority of the approach compared to more conven-
tional methods.
Turning now to unsupervised learning, we first have clustering 
machine learning techniques which have some similarity with SVM in 
that they involve mapping characteristics on a plane. The technique dif-
fers in that it is not trying to predict outcomes but instead create sim-
ilar groups. Email ‘spam’ detection, for example, is usually based on a 
clustering approach—if an email looks like other emails that are deemed 
spam then it is likely to also be spam. K-means clustering is the most 
popular approach, although other methods such as X-means and hierar-
chical clustering are growing in popularity. We’ll focus on K-means clus-
tering to describe the general technique. In K-means a number of cluster 
groups the data scientist wishes to arrive at is predetermined (although 
in practice a range of the number of groups is tested), characteristics are 
mapped on a plane and a dividing line (not necessarily straight) is drawn 
that best distinguishes between groups. The idea of the iterative process 
behind the technique is to maximise the difference in means between 
determined groups.
Deep learning and neural networks2 are viewed as being at the fore-
front of machine learning techniques and are often classified separately to 
the machine learning techniques already described. Indeed deep learning 
can be both supervised and unsupervised forms of learning depending 
on the purpose to which it is being applied. The intuition behind deep 
learning is to more accurately model complex relationships between var-
iables and ultimately to better mimic human decision-making. To that 
extent these techniques represent the closest to actual AI techniques, 
albeit still missing some of the data identification and automation fea-
tures necessary for true AI. Heaton et al. (2017) provide a detailed 
analysis of the recent application of deep learning to finance, as well as 
highlighting the potential of the approach.
A key feature of deep learning is the addition of ‘hidden layers’ 
after the input data stage that allow multiple and combined influences 
2 While subject to some debate, it is worth thinking of deep learning as a newer term of 
neural networks, and the terms can in practice be used interchangeably.
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between input variables to be determined by the modelling (Goodfellow 
et al. 2016). As the input data progresses through the hidden layers var-
iables are combined and recombined into newer factors weighted on 
influence from the prior layer. Thus, for example, a simple economic 
forecasting model fed with the input variables of GDP growth, unem-
ployment rate, exchange rates, government budget deficit, might then 
recombine in hidden nodes into new factors. A random example at the 
first layer of one such recombination (performed by the deep learning 
model, not by the researcher) might be 0.2*GDP growth + 0.4*exchange 
rates. As each hidden layer progresses these recombinations could 
become more and more abstract if that helps with the task set the model.
The addition of hidden layers between input and output is what cre-
ates the perceived problem with deep learning—that the process is a 
‘black box’—in that it is not always clear how inputs have been recom-
bined to create a predicted output. This has obvious implications for use 
in risk management, where the very presence of a black box at the centre 
of decision-making can be its own source of risk in a firm.
3.3  machine learning and ai aPPlications  
for risk management
In this section, we provide details and analysis of actual applications of AI 
and machine learning to various areas of risk management. We categorise 
risk management using common distinctions in financial risk manage-
ment, namely: credit risk, market risk, operational risk, and add a fourth 
category around the issue of compliance.
3.3.1  Application to Credit Risk
Credit risk is economic loss that emanates from the failure of a counter-
party to fulfil its contractual obligations (e.g., timely payment of inter-
est or principal), or from the increased risk of default during the term 
of the transaction. Traditionally, financial firms have employed classical 
linear, logit, and probit regressions to model credit risk (Altman 1968). 
However, there is now an increased interest by institutions in using AI 
and machine learning techniques to enhance credit risk management 
practices, partially due to evidence of incompleteness in traditional tech-
niques. The evidence is that credit risk management capabilities can 
be significantly improved through leveraging AI and machine learning 
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techniques due to its ability of semantic understanding of unstructured 
data.
The use of AI and machine learning techniques to model credit risk 
is not a new phenomenon though it is a growing one. Back in 1994, 
Altman and colleagues performed a first comparative analysis between 
traditional statistical methods of distress and bankruptcy prediction and 
an alternative neural network algorithm, and concluded that a com-
bined approach of the two improved accuracy significantly (Altman et al. 
1994).
It is particularly the increased complexity of assessing credit risk that 
has opened the door to machine learning. This is evident in the growing 
credit default swap (CDS) market where there is a lot of uncertain ele-
ments involving determining both the likelihood of an event of default 
(credit event) and estimating the cost of default in case a default takes 
place. Son et al. (2016) use daily CDS of different maturities and dif-
ferent rating groups from January 2001 to February 2014 to show that 
nonparametric machine learning models involving deep learning outper-
form traditional benchmark models in terms of prediction accuracy as 
well as in proposing practical hedging measures.
The areas of consumer lending and SME lending involve large 
amounts of potential data and are increasingly relying on machine learn-
ing to make better lending decisions. The example of ZestFinance in the 
opening section is an example of this, but there are a wide number of 
similar firms operating in this space. There is substantial empirical sup-
port for the effectiveness of machine learning. In consumer lending, 
Khandani et al. (2010) propose a machine-learning technique based on 
decision trees and SVM that, when tested on actual lending data lead to 
cost savings of up to 25%. More recently, Figini et al. (2017) show that 
a multivariate outlier detection machine learning technique improves 
credit risk estimation for SME lending using data from UniCredit Bank.
3.3.2  Application to Market Risk
Market risk is the risk that emanates from investing, trading, and gener-
ally from having exposure to financial markets. Kumar (2018) provides 
a structural overview of how machine learning can help in market risk 
management, noting the benefits at each stage from data preparation, to 
modelling, stress testing, and providing a validation trail for model expla-
nation (see also Financial Stability Board 2017).
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Trading in financial markets inherently involves the risk that the 
model being used for trading is false, incomplete, or is no longer valid. 
This area is generally known as model risk management. Machine learn-
ing is particularly suited to stress testing market models to determine 
inadvertent or emerging risk in trading behaviour. Woodall (2017) 
describes a variety of current use cases of machine learning for model val-
idation, including the French investment firm Nataxis which at the time 
of writing was running over 3 million simulations a night using unsuper-
vised learning to establish new patterns of connection between assets and 
investigating further any simulations that emerged from the testing that 
showed ‘errant’ patterns compared to average estimates. Woodall also 
notes how Nomura uses machine learning to monitor trading within the 
firm to verify that unsuitable assets are not being used in trading models. 
An interesting current application of model risk management is the firm 
yields.io which provides real-time model monitoring, model testing for 
deviations, and model validation, all driven by AI and machine learning 
techniques.
Another area of focus within the category of market risk of impor-
tance to large trading firms is understanding the impact of their trad-
ing on market pricing. Day (2017) explores how large trading firms are 
using AI, and particularly clustering techniques, to avoid the costs of try-
ing to trade into and out of large positions in illiquid markets. He pro-
vides a quote from Capital Fund Management, one of the largest hedge 
funds in France with $11 billion under management, claiming that up to 
two-thirds of their profit from trades can be lost due to market impact 
costs. Machine learning techniques significantly help with this issue by 
identifying connections between assets that are not easily observable and 
thus allow entering desired positions through a series of related assets 
rather than taking a large position in a single asset. Cluster analysis par-
ticularly helps in this regard (Calvalcante et al. 2016), as can deep learn-
ing models (Heaton et al. 2017).
One future direction is to move more towards reinforcement learning, 
where market trading algorithms are embedded with an ability to learn 
from market reactions to trades and thus adapt future trading to take 
account of how their trading will impact on market prices (Hendricks 
and Wilcox 2014). Another interesting direction is proposed in 
Chandrinos et al. (2018), based on tests using foreign exchange market 
trading data, where a combination of neural networks and decision tree 
techniques are used to provide real-time warnings to traders of changes 
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in underlying trading patterns while trading. Wu and Olson (2015, 
Chapter 5) also examine the use of machine learning to provide warn-
ing signals to traders and demonstrate the benefits of SVM as a suitable 
technique.
3.3.3  Application to Operational Risk
Operational risk management entails the firm seeking to identify the 
risk of direct or indirect financial loss emanating from a host of poten-
tial operational breakdowns (Moosa 2007). These risks can be internal to 
the institutions (e.g., inadequate or failed internal processes, people, and 
systems), or from external events (e.g., frauds, vulnerable computer sys-
tems, a failure in controls, operational error, a procedure that has been 
neglected, or a natural disaster). Given the increase in quantity, variety, 
and complexity, of operational risk exposures, especially for financial 
firms, this has introduced a path towards AI and machine learning based 
solutions (Choi et al. 2017).
AI can assist institutions at various stages in the risk management pro-
cess ranging from identifying risk exposure, measuring, estimating, and 
assessing its effects (Sanford and Moosa 2015). It can also help in opting 
for an appropriate risk mitigation strategy and finding instruments that 
can facilitate shifting or trading risk. Thus, use of AI techniques for oper-
ational risk management, which started with trying to prevent external 
losses such as credit card frauds, is now expanding to new areas involving 
the analysis of extensive document collections and the performance of 
repetitive processes, as well as the detection of money laundering that 
requires analysis of large datasets.
The detection of financial fraud is another commonly referenced risk 
management use case for machine learning and AI. Here, banks attempt 
to control financial fraud through evaluating the best ways to protect 
their systems, their data, and ultimately their clients. AI’s ability to intro-
duce better process automation can accelerate the pace of routine tasks, 
minimise human error, process unstructured data to screen out relevant 
content or negative news, and determine individuals’ connectedness to 
evaluate risky clients and networks. This same network analysis can also 
be used to monitor employees and traders. Clustering and classifica-
tion techniques can be used to establish behaviour-based trader profiles, 
where combinations of trade data, electronic and voice communica-
tions records enable banks to observe emerging patterns of behaviour to 
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predict latent risks and detect links between employees. It also enables 
banks to generate and prioritise alerts based on types of suspicious activ-
ity and the level of risks involved. Ngai et al. (2011) provide an excellent 
overview of the core AI techniques used in the financial fraud detection, 
and note the main techniques applied as being decision trees and neural 
networks.
As a practical application, five of the biggest banks in the Nordics have 
recently joined together to establish a joint anti-money laundering infra-
structure—known as the Nordic KYC Utility. An AI-based infrastruc-
ture will help comply with regulations and requirements related to KYC 
(Know Your Customer) regulations and avoid the imposition of fines 
by regulators. Similarly, HSBC is introducing AI technology, developed 
by data analytics firm Quantexa, to monitor their anti-money launder-
ing processes. There are practical efforts in fraud prevention too. For 
example, a joint venture of Royal Bank of Scotland and Vocalink in the 
UK is creating a machine learning system to scan transactions by small 
and large business customers to identify and circumvent false invoices 
and potential instances of fraud. A study by Colladon and Remondi 
(2017) using real data from 33,000 transactions of an Italian factoring 
firm shows the effectiveness of such analysis in fraud detection (see also 
Demetis 2018).
3.3.4  Application to RegTech
Compliance with risk management regulations is a vital function for 
financial firms, especially post the financial crisis. While risk management 
professionals often seek to draw a line between what they do and the 
often-bureaucratic necessity of regulatory compliance, the two are inex-
tricably linked as they both relate to the overall firm systems for manag-
ing risk. To that extent compliance is perhaps best linked to enterprise 
risk management, although it touches specifically on each of the risk 
functions of credit, market, and operational risk.
RegTech, an analogous area to FinTech focused on compliance dis-
cussed further in Chapter 6, has thus arisen to assist firms in the increas-
ing demands of meeting compliance. In this area AI and machine 
learning is starting to play a significant role driven by the sheer volume of 
data that needs to be assessed as well as the non-conventional nature of 
this data. While much of the role of AI and machine learning in RegTech 
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relates to topics already discussed in prior sections, the key advantage 
of machine learning in a pure RegTech sense is the ability for contin-
uous monitoring of firm activities. Arner et al. (2016) note this ability 
for real-time insights and therefore avoiding compliance breaches rather 
than having to deal with the consequences of breaches after they have 
occurred. Other advantages noted are the ability to free up regulatory 
capital due to the better monitoring, as well as automation reducing 
some of the estimated $70 billion that major financial institutions spend 
on compliance each year.
A key player in this field is IBM following their acqui-hire purchase of 
Promontory (a 600-staff RegTech startup), and they now offer a range 
of AI-driven solutions for reducing RegTech costs, demonstrating the 
widespread industry interest in the area not just confined to startups. For 
example, real-time voice conversation analysis to being used to ensure 
compliance through a combination of IBM’s Watson AI expertise and 
Promontory’s domain-specific expertise. This involves translating voice 
conversations to text and then classifying this text using natural language 
processing into categories that identifies potential non-compliance. 
Other applications of machine learning include the automatic read-
ing and interpretation of the implications of regulatory documentation, 
again using natural language processing, as a London-based Waymark 
currently offers to financial institutions.
3.4  the challenges and future of machine  
learning and ai for risk management
There are some significant practical issues that need to be addressed 
before AI and machine learning techniques for risk management can 
claim its full potential. The most important of these is the availability of 
suitable data. Although machine learning packages for Python and R can 
easily read all types of data from Excel to SQL and can perform natural 
language processing and process images, the speed with which machine 
learning solutions have been proposed has not kept pace with firms’ abil-
ities to suitably organise the internal data they have access to. Data is 
often held in separate silos across departments, perhaps on different sys-
tems, and perhaps with internal political and regulatory issues restricting 
the sharing of data. Important data might not even be recorded as data 
but rather kept as informal knowledge of the firm.
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Another issue is the availability of skilled staff to implement these new 
techniques. A survey of the top 1000 firms in the United States on AI 
implementation in their firms found that their biggest concern in the 
implementation of AI was the readiness and ability of staff to under-
stand and work with these new solutions (Wilson et al. 2017). Training 
a skilled cohort of staff is something that will take time, although 
Goldman Sachs, among other firms, has recently attempted to bypass 
this problem by developing a campus with space for 7000 workers in 
India where prevalence of these skills is more present.
There are also practical issues over how accurate machine learning 
solutions actually are. The range of testing approaches available within 
machine learning is growing rapidly, and that is a good thing, but it is 
also driven by the evident limitations of the previous methods and the 
need to overcome those limitations. This suggests that firms cannot 
simply ‘apply’ a machine learning risk management solution, but rather 
that it is a continuous process requiring a constant evaluation of whether 
their particular machine learning solution is currently considered best 
practice. When it comes to AI, where there is some or full automation 
of process from data gathering to decision-making, the need for human 
oversight will become even more pressing. The case of Knight Capital 
in 2012 serves to illustrate this risk, with their stock trading automation 
through algorithms resulting in a loss of $440 million in the space of just 
45 minutes.3 As AI starts to automate lending and credit risk decisions 
it will be imperative to ensure that such risks can be controlled before 
handing over control.
This last point serves to introduce the final major issue around trans-
parency and ethics which AI-driven solutions need to further address. 
Transparency is especially an issue for the increasingly popular deep 
learning method of machine learning as the models work on hidden lay-
ers between the input data and the output decision. A black box system 
of this type of not conducive to effective risk oversight and can cause 
regulatory compliance issues especially around demonstrating model 
validity. A more hypothetical issue related to this is that models used by 
different firms might converge on similar optimums for trading causing 
systematic risk as well as loss to the firm. There are also broader ethi-
cal issues. For example, discrimination against race in lending decisions is 
3 http://fortune.com/2012/08/02/why-knight-lost-440-million-in-45-minutes/.
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widely legislated against, as are increasingly discrimination based on gen-
der and sexuality. Normally these restrictions are incorporated as hard-
coded rules in AI and machine learning techniques concerning credit risk 
and lending decisions. However as deep learning becomes more popu-
lar it becomes much harder to police that the model is not inadvertently 
making decisions based on indirect proxies for these red lines. This is 
especially the case as more and more atypical data is incorporated in risk 
management. These ethical aspects are only likely to increase in signifi-
cance over time.
Leaving these important issues aside for now, it is worth consid-
ering the future role for AI and machine learning in risk management 
from a more positive angle. One obvious conclusion is that the time- 
consuming and costly nature of risk management will diminish signifi-
cantly. For example, BBVA, the second largest bank in Spain, has 8000 
of their 137,000 staff working in compliance. They are investing heavily 
in AI solutions to reduce this compliance cost base. The ability of AI and 
machine learning to automate repetitive tasks and to organise, retrieve, 
and cluster non-conventional data such as documents is naturally going 
to confer cost benefits on firms that move more into this area.
AI will also increasingly deliver accurate real-time information on all 
types of risks being taken by the firm. As data organisation becomes 
more orientated towards use by AI, real-time advice will become a per-
vasive presence. The following step from real-time knowledge of risks 
being taken is pre-emptive notice of risks. To some extent this is the holy 
grail of an AI-driven risk management system—to be able to accurately 
know in advance firm risks, be they market, operational, or credit risk. 
The techniques of machine learning offer this ability in the way that tra-
ditional statistical techniques could never hope to. Thinking even further 
ahead there is no technological impediment to a truly AI risk manage-
ment system that will automatically intervene to prevent unwarranted 
risks, to immediately unwind dangerous exposures, and to dynamically 
adjust the risk appetite of the firm based on the system’s estimate of the 
broader risk environment. Although that then will present its own risks 
which will in turn have to be managed, keeping risk management profes-
sionals happily employed (albeit in a fast-changing environment) for the 
foreseeable future.
We thus conclude on a positive note (albeit with some issues to 
consider), about how machine learning and AI is transforming the 
way we carry out risk management. The issue for the established risk 
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management functions in organisations to now consider is if they wish 
to avail of these opportunities, or if instead it will fall to current and new 
FinTech firms to seize this space.
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presented. This analysis highlights that the effects of HFT on market 
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disclosure and HFT short-term information advantage, are key themes. 
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The analysis also suggests that many open questions remain unanswered 
including more recent HFT trading strategies and complex techniques 
applied to analyse the content of both voluntary and mandatory corpo-
rate disclosure. As capital markets evolve, HFT’s speed may no longer 
be sufficient to maintain competitiveness. The chapter concludes with a 
discussion of future trends and areas for research on HFT.
Keywords  High-frequency trading · Literary review · Market quality · 
Regulation · Corporate disclosure scriptability
4.1  introduction
In the last years, investment in financial technology (FinTech) grew by 
201% around the world; total venture capital investments only grew by 
63% in the same period (Aldridge and Krawciw 2017). According to 
Informilo.com, in 2015 payment services, online loans, data analytics and 
automated investing have resulted in the fastest-growing areas for big 
data in finance. Specifically, investment automation and other new related 
technologies have transformed the structure of capital markets. Reducing 
market-wide latency, the introduction of both co-location services and 
fast trading platforms enable new sophisticated investors to enter into the 
market. Therefore, using high speed and high-performance computing, 
sophisticated tools and algorithms, algorithmic traders (AT) rapidly trade 
securities in the main stock exchanges around the world. These changes 
and the behaviour of market participants attract considerable attention 
by both the academic community and policymakers. Many papers discuss 
the role played by AT in capital markets as well as their trading strategies 
and consequences for market quality. Similarly, market regulators have 
expressed concerns about the growing participation of ATs and the costs 
associated with monitoring their activities.
This chapter provides a review of the High-frequency trading (HFT) 
literature based on 11 years of publications, discusses HFT consequences 
on capital markets, and suggests future research directions. Following 
a similar approach adopted by prior studies (Massaro et al. 2016), this 
chapter aims to answer three questions:
• What are the major themes that have been discussed in HFT 
research field?
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• What are the main issues and critique on HFT activity?
• What is the future of HFT research?
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. The next section 
considers the differing approaches to defining HFT by both regulators 
and scholars and presents an overview of common datasets used to inves-
tigate HFT activity. This is followed by a summary of the methodology 
used for the literature review and associated data collection. The results 
of the literature review are then presented. The chapter concludes with a 
discussion of the findings and directions for future research.
4.2  high-frequency trading: definition and data
In general, total trading activity can be classified into two main cate-
gories: algorithmic trading (AT)  and non-algorithmic trading activity 
(NAT) depending on whether or not market participants use algorithms 
to make trading decisions without human intervention (ESMA 2014). 
The European Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID II)  
provides two different definitions of the concepts HFT and AT, where the 
former is a subset of the latter. Specifically, AT is defined as “[…] trad-
ing in financial instruments where a computer algorithm automatically 
determines individual parameters of orders, such as whether to initiate 
of an order or how to manage the order after its submission, with lim-
ited or no human interaction” (MiFID II 2014, p. 384). This does not 
include any system that is only used for the purpose of routing orders 
to one or more trading venues or for the processing of orders involving 
no determination of any trading parameters or for the confirmation of 
orders or the post-trade processing of executed transactions (MiFID II 
2014). Moreover, the MiFID II (2014, pp. 384–385) defines HFT as “an 
algorithmic trading technique that is characterized by an infrastructure 
that minimize network and other type of latencies using specific facilities 
as co-location, proximity hosting or high-speed direct electronic access 
and by a system determination of order initiation, generation and execu-
tion without human intervention for trades or orders”.
The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission takes a broader 
approach in defining HFT as “professional traders acting in a proprietary 
capacity that engage in strategies that generate a large number of trades 
on a daily basis” (SEC 2010, p. 45). Similarly, the Australian Securities 
and Investments Commission emphasises HFT’s ability to generate large 
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numbers of orders, many of which are cancelled rapidly and to hold posi-
tions for very short time horizons (ASIC 2010).
Although there is no common definition of HFT, several regulatory 
agencies and scholars do attempt to identify two main features and trading 
strategies of HFT, namely: (i) the automation of the trading process, and 
(ii) the high speed of transactions and submission (cancellation) of orders.
Different methods have been applied to classify HFT activities. For 
example, the definition used by SEC (2010) allows the identification 
of HFT activities but fails to detect large blocks of HFT. Some scholars 
instead detect such blocks by focusing on the evidence of high trading vol-
ume and balance inventory (Kirilenko et al. 2017) or on complex trading 
strategies characterised by “series of submissions, cancellations, and execu-
tions that are linked by direction, size and timing, and which are likely to 
arise from a single algorithm” (Hasbrouck and Saar 2013, p. 656).
Given that only a few datasets (such as E-Mini Data and NASDAQ 
data) allow the identification of HFT, most studies are based on proxies to 
detect HFT activity and highlight the effects of HFT on capital markets. 
The current HFT datasets available can be classified into five categories:
• Data for equity trading on NASDAQ;
• Data on trading in the E-Mini;
• Data that CFTC and SEC staff used to prepare their report on the 
market disruption that occurred in 2010 (Flash Crash);
• A variety of datasets made available to researchers by exchanges and 
regulators that require proxies to identify HFT activity.
According to Boehmer et al. (2018) and Hendershott et al. (2011), mes-
sage traffic can include new order submissions, modifications or order 
cancellations. Hence, the main proxies used by researchers are trading 
volume (Clark-Joseph 2013; Baron et al. 2017; Kirilenko et al. 2017), 
raw messages, the ratio of both trading volume and number of messages 
(Hendershott et al. 2011), and the ratio of messages and total transactions.
4.2.1  Methodology
This section explains the methods for selecting and reviewing the arti-
cles examined in this study. Following the methodology used in Massaro 
et al. (2016) and similar approaches used by prior studies, a dataset of 
articles was constructed. The dataset counts HFT articles published in 
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the main accounting and finance journals featured in the Scopus database 
by Elsevier for the 11-year period from 1 January 2007 to 15 May 2018. 
In order to be included in the sample, articles must mention the terms 
“high-frequency trading” or “algorithmic trading” in the title, abstract or 
keywords. Those papers that did not meet the required conditions were 
discarded, reducing the list of articles to 265 articles (either published or 
forthcoming on 15 May 2018). Author details, article title, year of publica-
tion, SCOPUS citations, affiliation of authors and location were collected.
Firstly, the articles were classified based on whether they were published 
in generalist or specialist journals. 87 articles were published in general 
journals, while 178 articles were published in specialist journals. The latter 
category includes journals whose scope focuses specifically on HFT activ-
ity e.g. Algorithmic Finance Journal, on trading issues and structures of 
financial markets e.g. Journal of Finance, Journal of Financial Economics, 
Journal of Financial Markets, Journal of Empirical Finance and others.
Secondly, the selected articles were classified by examining their cita-
tions to measure the academic impact of each article and to provide 
insights into the evolution of the literature (Table 8.1). The journals 
were further categorised by ABS Journal Ranking (or not) and the main 
topics covered in each article were identified.
4.2.2  Descriptive Statistics
This section reports some descriptive statistics to provide a clear picture 
of the evolution of the HFT literature. The first article that refers to the 
“activity of algorithmic trading” was published in 2007 (Prix et al. 2007) 
and describes the systematic patterns in the submission and cancellation 
of certain Xetra orders.1 Figure 4.1 shows the evolution of the volume of 
papers published in generalist or in specialist journals ranked by Scopus 
in the chose time period. A sharp increase in the articles is evident from 
2010, following the “Flash Crash” in May of that year, which signalled 
the start of increased academic discussion of the consequences of HFT 
activity on capital markets.
However, the largest number of contributions was published in the 
four years between 2013 and 2017 in which not only specialist jour-
nals but also generalist journals published articles (123 and 58 articles, 
1 The advantage of “the predatory traders” over uninformed traders has been discussed 
for the first time by Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005).
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respectively) noting the consequences of HFT activity on capital markets 
as well as the impact of new regulation, released by different countries, 
to limit their presence.
An examination of author affiliation allows the identification of the 
institutions in which researchers conducted their studies on HFT. This 
analysis suggests that the leading institutions publishing in the field of 
AT research include The University of Toronto, The University of 
California Berkeley, The University of Oxford, The University of Sydney, 
The University of Washington and Imperial College London. The major-
ity of studies were developed in USA (30%), UK (14%), France (7%) and 
Australia (7%) (Fig. 4.2).


















































































































































































































Fig. 4.2 Absolute frequency of articles by Scholars’ location on the final sample
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Analysis of the research quality of HFT publications suggests that 
since the appearance of the seminal paper of Hendershott et al. (2011), 
21 articles were published in ABS 4* Journals (Journal of Finance, 
Journal of Accounting Research, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 
Journal of Financial Economics, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Review 
of Economic Studies, Review of Financial Studies), 5 articles were pub-
lished by ABS 4 journals and another 103 articles by ABS 3 journals 
(Tables 4.1 and 4.2) AT research is not only topical but is considered a 
priority by the major high-quality journals.
4.3  results
4.3.1  Thematic Analysis
A thematic analysis was performed to identify and classify the 
main themes discussed in the literature (Clarke and Braun 2013). 
Furthermore, a citation analysis based on the Scopus index (Dumay 
2014) was used to identify articles and authors that have the most impact 
in HFT research (Garfield 1977). Table 4.3 presents the distribution of 
a subsample of 168 articles that have been classified by topic. Only the 
articles published on the highest rated ABS-ranked journals 4*, 4, 3 and 
2 (with at least 1 citation) have been included in the subsample. The 
table reports both frequency and sum of citations by topic. The latter 
table suggests four main research paths i.e.
1.  effects on market quality and price discovery,
2.  trading strategies,
3.  impact of financial markets structure, regulation and co-location, and
4.  HFT reaction to corporate disclosure.
The most cited articles discuss both about effects of HFT on market qual-
ity (1098 citations related to the 34.5% of articles in the sample) and the 
trading strategies implemented (259 citations related to 36 articles).
4.3.2  Impact of HFT
4.3.2.1 Effects on Market Quality
In the last years, several studies have examined the consequences of 
HFTs on market quality by investigating both various dimensions of 
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Table 4.2 Distribution of articles included in Scopus database and in the top 
ABS ranked journals (4*−4−3)
Journals N % ABS 
ranking
Quantitative Finance 19 7.17 3
Journal of Financial Markets 17 6.42 3
Financial Review 12 4.53 3
Journal of Financial Economics 9 3.40 4*
Journal of Banking and Finance 9 3.40 3
Journal of Futures Markets 7 2.64 3
Journal of Finance 5 1.89 4*
Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions 
and Money
5 1.89 3
Annual Review of Financial Economics 3 1.13 3
European Journal of Finance 3 1.13 3
International Review of Financial Analysis 3 1.13 3
Journal of Accounting Research 2 0.75 4*
Review of Financial Studies 2 0.75 4*
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 2 0.75 4
Applied Econometrics 2 0.75 3
European Financial Management 2 0.75 3
Finance and Stochastics 2 0.75 3
Journal of Business Ethics 2 0.75 3
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 2 0.75 3
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 2 0.75 3
Journal of Empirical Finance 2 0.75 3
Journal of Financial Econometrics 2 0.75 3
Mathematical Finance 2 0.75 3
Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting 2 0.75 3
Journal of Accounting and Economics 1 0.38 4*
Quarterly Journal of Economics 1 0.38 4*
Review of Economic Studies 1 0.38 4*
Business Ethics Quarterly 1 0.38 4
Journal of Economic Perspectives 1 0.38 4
Journal of Economic Theory 1 0.38 4
Financial Analysts Journal 1 0.38 3
Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments 1 0.38 3
International Journal of Finance and Economics 1 0.38 3
Journal of Financial Services Research 1 0.38 3
Journal of International Money and Finance 1 0.38 3
Articles in ABS 4*, 4, 3 ranked journals 129 48.68 –
Articles in ABS 2,1 ranked journals and other journals 136 51.32 –
Total articles 265 100
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price discovery, short-term volatility and stock liquidity (Hasbrouck 
and Saar 2013; Malinova et al. 2013; Menkveld 2013; Conrad et al. 
2015). Specifically, researchers found that the introduction of HFT has 
been accompanied by a reduction in trading costs (Angel et al. 2015; 
Jones 2013) and by an improvement in price efficiency (Carrion 2013; 
Brogaard et al. 2014; Chaboud et al. 2014).
Examining the NYSE automated quote dissemination in 2003, the 
seminal paper of Hendershott et al. (2011) measures the causal effect 
of AT on liquidity, and demonstrates that AT activity narrows spreads, 
reduces both adverse selection and trade-related price discovery. Other 
studies highlight how HFT’s market share has boomed over the number 
of years. Examining the role of AT in liquidity supply in 30 DAX stocks 
on the Deutsche Boerse, Hendershott et al. (2011) find that AT repre-
sent 52% of market order volume and 64% of nonmarketable limit order 
volume. Similarly, Hagströmer and Nordén (2013) report that mar-
ket markets constitute the lion share of HFT trading volume (63–72%) 
and limit order traffic 81–86% of NASDAQ-OMS Stockholm Exchange. 
These results demonstrate that AT consume liquidity when it is cheap 
(narrow bid-ask spread or other proxies such as effective spread, per-
centage spread or higher depth) given that it is less likely to submit new 
orders, to cancel their orders and more likely to initiate trades. Similarly, 
Table 4.3 Absolute and percentage frequency of articles by topic and by 
Scopus citations
Topics Frequency % Citations %
Market quality 58 34.5 1098 91.3
Trading strategies and speed 36 21.4 259 21.5
Financial markets structure 14 8.33 134 11.1
Regulation and co-location 11 6.15 74 6.16
Price discovery 10 5.95 113 9.4
Flash crash 5 2.98 42 3.49
Financial disclosure 3 1.79 46 3.83
Transaction costs 3 1.79 26 2.16
Dark market fragmentation 2 1.19 11 0.92
Investors strategies 2 1.19 39 3.24
Order-to-trade 3 1.79 9 0.75
Disposition effect 1 0.6 6 0.5
Hawkes processes 1 0.6 6 0.5
Other 19 11.3 238 19.8
Total 168 100 1202 100
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Yao and Ye (2018) find that HFT liquidity supply is larger for stocks for 
which the spread is constrained to be large because of tick size. Jarnecic 
and Snape (2014) describe the HFT provision of liquidity on an on- 
going basis which robust to fast versus slow and volatile markets resolv-
ing in this way the temporal liquidity imbalances.
Other studies examine HFT consequences around specific events such 
as earnings announcements (EPMs) (Frino et al. 2017), short sale-ban 
(Brogaard et al. 2017), predictable trades (Bessembinder et al. 2016) 
and extreme price movements (EPMs) (Brogaard et al. 2018), generally 
confirming the liquidity improvement.
Using the September 2008 short sale-ban, Brogaard et al. (2017) dis-
entangle the separate impact of short selling by HFTs and non-HFTs. 
They suggest that non-HFTs increase liquidity (as measured by bid-ask 
spreads) while HFTs’ short selling has the opposite effect by adversely 
selecting limit orders which decrease liquidity during extremely volatile 
short-sale ban period. Brogaard et al. (2018) investigate the activity of a 
common endogenous liquidity providers (ELPs), such as HFTs, around 
EPMs discovering that on average HFTs provide liquidity not only dur-
ing normal market conditions but also around a market stress such as 
EPMs.
Other studies have focused on HFT strategies and their influence on 
market quality. For example, Hagstromer and Nordén (2013) examine 
the tick-size changes and find that the activity of market-making HFTs 
mitigates intraday price volatility (or short-term volatility for Boehmer 
et al. 2015), and thus can contain the deterioration of market quality.
4.3.2.2 HFT’s Trading Strategies and Speed
The SEC’s Concept release on Equity Market Structure recognised not 
only that the advent of HFTs is one of the most significant market struc-
ture developments in recent years (SEC 2010) but identified the exist-
ence of four types of short-term HFTs trading strategies—passive market 
making, arbitrage, structural and directional.
“Passive market making” involves the submission of non-marketable 
resting orders that provide liquidity to the marketplace at specified 
prices. Following this strategy, HFT orders are not executed immediately 
but rest on an order book and prices are updated frequently to reflect 
market conditions. In this way HFTs generate a great number of order 
cancellations or modifications as orders are updated and earn a spread 
between bids and offers. This passive strategy decreases effective spread 
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as demonstrated by Menkveld (2013). Similarly, the “arbitrage strat-
egy” does not depend on directional price movements but on price con-
vergence seeking to keep the differences between related products or 
markets.
If HFTs follow “structural strategies”, they attempt to find the weak-
ness in the market structure to take advantage of the other participants. 
In fact, given HFT can access market data in real time, the lower latency 
allows them to establish prices both on the seller and buyer side. In 
contrast, “directional strategies” involve establishing a short position in 
anticipation of a price move up or down. The Concept Release (SEC 
2010) requested comment on two types of directional strategies, order 
anticipation and momentum ignition, that “may pose particular prob-
lems for long-term investors” and “may present serious problems in 
today’s market structure”.
Regarding HFT speed, Menkveld (2016) estimates that algorithms 
have a response time in the order of microseconds (one microsecond is 
10−6). Therefore, even if HFT effects on the market are known, both 
in terms of less adverse-selection cost, tighter bid-ask spread (higher 
liquidity), frequent quote updates between trades and higher price dis-
covery between the quoted updates, and a higher trade probability 
(Brogaard et al. 2018), the main concerns of regulators remain whether 
their speed represents a barrier that limits retail investor trading activ-
ity. Moreover, regarding the open question regarding whether HFTs are 
better informed agents, few studies (Goettler et al. 2009; Aït-Sahalia and 
Saglam 2013) find a liquidity improvement when market makers become 
more informed about fundamental value. Agents arrive randomly and, 
conditional on the state of the limit-order book, they can choose to 
send either a limit or a market order. Other studies discussed HFT speed 
to cancel their outstanding limit order after news (Hoffmann 2014), 
an endogenous strategy that post limit orders at less aggressive prices, 
reducing the trade rate.
Finally, observing the price competition in a limit-order market 
Bongaerts et al. (2016) discover that the increase of HFT has as the final 
effect a general improvement of liquidity.
4.3.2.3 Market Structure, Co-location and Regulation After the Flash Crash
On 6 May 2010, the US financial markets experienced the Flash Crash. 
Nearly one trillion US dollars’ worth of equity vanished in minutes result-
ing from a large automated selling program being rapidly executed in 
the E-mini S&P 500 stock index futures market (Kirilenko et al. 2017). 
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Although HFTs were blamed for this systemic intraday event, an investi-
gation of the FINRA Dataset shows that 6 out of 12 HFTs reduced their 
trading activity in the market “sometime after the crash which caused a 
decline in overall market liquidity. Hence, High-frequency traders did 
accelerate the rate of crash” (Chung et al. 2016, pp. 17–18).
The Flash Crash highlighted for the first time both the changes 
in trading speed and in the market’s structure, a new arena where the 
low-frequency traders (LFTs) can only fail to defend themselves from 
predatory HFTs strategies (Goldstein et al. 2014). It remains still unclear 
if it is the presence of a weak financial market structure that generates 
negative events (like the Flash Crash) or whether the latter can be caused 
by HFT activity. In this respect, Conrad et al. (2015, p. 290) discuss 
“[…] while dislocations are harmful to market integrity, it is important 
to recognize that some discontinuities have always occurred in markets 
(even before the age of electronic trading), just as flickering quotes have 
existed well before the advent of high-frequency quotation…if liquid-
ity provision is not mandated by law, liquidity providers can always exit 
without notice, exposing marketable orders to price risk”.
Some Scholars argue that exchanges have modified their market struc-
ture (Menkveld and Yueshen 2017) to attract more high-frequency trad-
ers by, among other things, permitting “algorithmic traders to co-locate 
their servers in the market’s data centre” (Hendershott et al. 2011). This 
co-location reduces latency and permits HFT to more quickly adjust their 
quotes as market conditions change and to decrease bid-ask spreads and 
increase market depth in the period following the introduction of these 
new facilities (Frino et al. 2014). Using colocation services as a proxy for 
AT and HFT, Aitken et al. (2014) examine the impact of changes in AT 
and HFT on trade size across 24 stock exchanges around the world. Mixed 
results on AT and HFT effects on the average trade size (used to identify 
AT and HFT start dates) were found. The study also demonstrated, for the 
first time, that even if the introduction of co-location facilities leads to the 
presence of HFT, the “colocation dates” do not properly measure effective 
AT and HFT (Aitken et al. 2014) that may enter into the market a few 
months before or after the co-location launch (Frino et al. 2017).
While on one hand the main stock exchanges seek to attract a larger 
number of HFT, both reducing the low latency and introducing new 
trading platforms, on the other hand many regulators around the world 
are trying to limit the massive volume of messages (orders), as submis-
sions and cancellations, made by high-frequency traders. More recently, 
many regulators have attempted to discourage the HFT activity by 
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introducing a specific tax to limit high volumes of messages and can-
cellations despite the lack of agreement on the negative effects of this 
legislation on capital market quality. On 1 August 2012, the French 
government introduced a financial transaction tax applicable on can-
celled orders made by high-frequency traders where all orders cancelled 
or modified within half-second time span are taxed. The tax of 0.01% is 
applied on modified or cancelled orders of French HFT when OTR is 
greater than five (Chung et al. 2016), even if in this case it did not have 
any negative on market quality, both in term of trading volume, volatil-
ity, spreads and depth (Colliard and Hoffmann 2017).
Similarly, on 1 March 2013 Italy introduced the iFTT (Italian 
Financial Transaction Tax) imposing tax on (1) the transfers of the own-
ership of shares and other participating financial instruments, (2) transac-
tions in derivative financial instruments and other transferable securities, 
and (3) HFT (MEF 2013). The initiative was launched by the Italian 
Securities and Exchange Commission (CONSOB) which introduced 
the iFTT with the specific goal of containing the rapid placement and 
cancellation of orders. In fact, a recent study suggests that orders’ can-
cellations “can generate a misleading representation of the actual depth  
of the order book, creating favourable conditions for market manip-
ulation” (Friederich and Payne 2015, p. 215). The iTFF was the first 
order-to-trade ratio tax (OTR) to attempt to reduce the perceived 
harmful behaviours of HFT2 but the new regulation resulted in lower 
average Italian OTRs (Caivano et al. 2012) and a negative effect on mar-
ket liquidity (Friederich and Payne 2015).3 Despite these findings, the 
taxation of HFT is set to continue. Norway, Germany and Canada have 
introduced OTR to limit HFT activity (Malinova et al. 2013; Haferkorn 
and Zimmermann 2014).
4.3.3  HFT Reaction to Corporate Disclosure
Recently Allee et al. (2018) demonstrated the effect of the “scriptability” 
of firm disclosures on capital markets. Scriptability represents the relative 
2 The tax became effective in Borsa Italiana on April 2012 and it intended to charge a fee 
to HFT with OTF higher than 100:1, 500:1 or 1000:1 (see Grant and Rachel 2012).
3 Opposite results have been found by Capelle-Blancard (2016).
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ease with “which a computer program or a computer programmer can 
transform the large amounts of unstructured data contained in various 
firm disclosures into usable information (Bloomfield 2002)”. The general 
assumption here is that “more scriptable” filings allow HFT (and other 
sophisticated investors) gain a short-term information advantage to react 
and trade quickly and increase the information asymmetry immediately 
following disclosures; bid-ask spreads increase by 20–25% in the 30–60 
seconds following Form 4 filings (Rogers et al. 2017). Similar results 
have been found by Frino et al. (2017) that demonstrate that spreads 
increase at the time of the event and decrease in the following minutes.
4.4  conclusion and future research directions
The advent of HFT and the introduction of co-location services and 
other facilities irredeemably changed market structures around the 
world. Consequently, transaction costs have decreased sharply—by over 
50% for both retail and institutional investors (Menkveld 2016). Several 
studies discuss the consequences of HFT activity on market quality and 
find a rise in both trading volume and in the number of orders (trades), 
as well as large increases in the number of submissions (messages) and 
cancellations. However, the lack of identification codes (in the main 
financial dataset available) does not allow the disentanglement of trading 
activity by different type of investors (institutional vs. retail investors). As 
a result, both the number of orders and the number of submissions or 
cancellations (messages) are commonly used to build proxies that allow 
the detection of HFT activity thereby allowing scholars to detect the 
consequences of HFT activity in the main financial markets.
Studies of the impact of HFT suggest that information asymmetry 
between buyers and sellers is reduced over the time and, even if very 
often HFT are accused of arbitrage, many empirical studies demonstrate 
a general improvement in market liquidity (as measured by reduction of 
spreads or increases in depth) and a general reduction of the intraday 
price volatility. These results ultimately suggest that any regulatory action 
introduced to curtail this activity may have serious negative implications 
for liquidity and market participants (Frino et al. 2017), as demonstrated 
recently both in France and in Italy (Friederich and Payne 2015).
The large volume of papers published on the topic of AT and HFT 
indicate a clear academic interest in the potential contributions and 
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limitations of HFT activity. However, many open questions remain 
unanswered:
• It is not clear if the systemic risk is embedded in electronic trading 
or really caused by HFT.
• The HFT strategies are still partially undiscovered given that the 
majority of studies use proxies to detect their activity rather than 
identifiers. Consequently, the latter information might provide a 
clear evidence of the real impact of the different trading strategies 
on market quality.
• Only a few studies highlight the effects of HFT activity around spe-
cific events like earnings announcements (Frino et al. 2017), news 
(Scholtus et al. 2014) or macro-news announcements (Bernile et al. 
2016) but how do HFTs react around other specific events like 
mergers and acquisitions or social media releases? What is the effect 
of their activity on market quality in such cases?
• How do HFTs react to narrative accounting disclosure? Given that 
the corporate disclosure is moving towards “machine readable” 
reports, how can firms anticipate HFT trading strategies at the time 
of disclosure?
Firms and investors should take into consideration that with the advent 
of HFTs the speed of dissemination of information (earnings, good or 
bad news, buy or sell quotes and trades) has changed, capital markets 
have evolved, and complex algorithms may soon become obsolescent.
In 2009 and 2010, HFT techniques were considered a goldmine for 
sophisticated investors that know how to deploy them against human 
competitors, however ‘dumb’ competitors got wise and began to employ 
similar strategies to defend their wealth stores (Financial Times 2017). 
According to Tabb Group, the US market makers reported $1.1 bil-
lion in revenue in 2016, compared with $7.2 billion in 2009. This phe-
nomenon demonstrates a slowdown in the world of HFT with lower 
profitability. As HFT speed no longer accrues a significant competitive 
advantage, sophisticated investors are now trying to capture a compet-
itive advantage in predicting markets through quantitative models and 
artificial intelligence (AI) throwing up new challenges and opportunities 
for investors, policymakers and scholars alike.
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as enticing desirable policyholder behaviour and streamlining claims 
management. We then discuss how artificial intelligence is improving 
traditional insurance processes from the first point of contact to claims 
management. We also examine the use of artificial intelligence as a means 
of interacting with prospective clients and existing policyholders. Finally, 
we explain how blockchain technology can transform the structure of the 
insurance market to a peer-to-peer format.
Keywords  InsurTech · Insurance · Telematics · P2P insurance
5.1  introduction
It appears that the age-old business of insurance is finally in the throes of 
change. Incumbent insurance companies are under threat not only from 
tech giants such as Amazon entering the market (Seekings 2017), but 
also from agile start-up entities, that are leveraging the power of tech-
nology to innovate their way to market share. This utilisation of tech-
nology to improve efficiency and savings in underwriting, risk pooling 
and claims management from the current insurance model has come 
to be known as “InsurTech”, deriving inspiration from the more well- 
established concept of “FinTech”.
This chapter starts off by describing the process and challenges of a 
traditional insurer. This is followed by a discussion of future develop-
ments in InsurTech. These developments are then discussed in light of 
the big data paradigm, artificial intelligence (AI) techniques and distrib-
uted ledger infrastructures (also known as blockchains or distributed 
ledge technologies [DLT]).
5.2  how does insurance work?
The business of insurance involves risk transfer from the policyholder to 
the insurer. The insurer pools similar risks in homogenous groups and 
pays out any claims from the collected premiums and sometimes from 
own reserves. The consequence of such risk pooling is a lower variabil-
ity of outcomes and less likelihood of extreme payouts. For example, 
consider the probability of a delayed flight as 10% and the cost incurred 
being €100 if this happens. If ten individuals on separate independent 
flights pool their risk, the probability of all of them having a delayed 
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flight and hence paying out €100 each is 0.00000001%.1 In a typical sce-
nario, the insurer would charge above €10 (the fair price) as a premium 
to cater for claims, contingency, management costs and profits.
The insurer goes through the process of underwriting on being 
approached to provide cover, that is assessing whether the risk should 
be taken on board and at what price and then in the event a claim is 
notified, a claims management process is initiated. Two main challenges 
faced by insurers are ‘adverse selection’ and ‘moral hazard’. The latter 
refers to the policyholder changing attitude following attainment of 
insurance cover (e.g., not locking the doors of a property as knowing 
the property is insured). ‘Adverse selection’ is typically the outcome of 
asymmetrical information whereby a policyholder ends up being pooled 
(and priced) in a specific risk group despite having a riskier profile. 
This may have been the case whereby the insurer does not use particu-
lar information in pricing risk or this information was possibly withheld. 
Throughout this chapter we discuss how technology is enabling insurers 
to price policyholders actuarially fair and reduce moral hazard by con-
trols or gentle prompting.
5.3  the big data Paradigm
In today’s world, data is becoming an indispensable commodity, lead-
ing industries to transform their business processes and value chains into 
data-driven ones. In the insurance industry, one can relate to this “phe-
nomenon” by observing how historic insurance models became more 
adaptive by making provisions for this ever-growing flow of data through 
various heterogeneous (unstructured/semi-structured) sources such as 
sensors or social media. This is often called Big Data, which is charac-
terised by the 5 dimensions (5Vs): Volume (how much), Velocity (how 
fast), Variety (different kinds), Veracity (truthfulness and trustworthi-
ness) and Value (the worth of data).
This proliferation of data, or “big data”, has allowed the InsurTech 
businesses and more forward-thinking established insurance companies 
to harness a unique selling proposition and competitive advantage over 
1 On the other side of the scale, the probability of no one having a delayed flight is 
90.438% which is lower than 99%.
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other market participants. We now examine three different areas in which 
big data has impacted the insurance world, to date: Telematics, Wearable 
Technology and the Internet of Things (IoT).
5.3.1  Telematics
A key consideration of insurance is to ensure that it charges adequate 
premiums by pricing its products appropriately. Within the automo-
tive insurance industry, insurers have, for a long time, proxied the risk 
of policyholders making an accident related claim via rating factors such 
as drivers’ age, gender,2 postcode, car model and claims experience. 
The underlying assumption is that these rating factors are predictive of 
the likelihood of claim. For example, a young driver with a sports car 
is deemed to be more likely to be involved in an accident than a 
middle-aged driver in a sedan and thus is priced accordingly. This pricing 
mechanism is problematic in the sense that some of the young drivers in 
question may actually be a much lower risk, in terms of driving ability, 
irrespective of their car type and age status. This mispricing can lead to 
adverse-selection where the low-risk individuals move out of the insured 
pool and seek cover elsewhere, eventually leading to what is known as 
the adverse-selection spiral. Telematics seeks to overcome this issue by 
using on-board technology to monitor and assess the driving behaviour 
of each individual driver, thus moving insurance from a pooled pricing 
model to a more individual specific model where the underlying risk is 
more closely monitored (Barbara et al. 2017).
The telematics technology devices (also known as a “black box”) can 
pick up diverse driving metrics such as location, time of day, mileage, driv-
ing frequency, behaviour around hazardous zones, speed, rates of acceler-
ation and braking habits. These metrics can then be considered in a more 
accurate and individualised pricing model, which ultimately allows the 
previously trapped pooled policyholders to break free from their features 
such as age and prove their worth as safe drivers that are a good risk and 
unlikely to have an accident and hence claim. Not all policyholders are 
bound to profit from this as pricing accuracy may lead in certain individu-
als being priced out of the market, as the previously good risks that were 
subsidising their premium, are now priced on a more personalised basis.
2 Although it is now illegal to base any insurance pricing on gender with the European 
Union.
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5.3.2  Wearables
Wearables are typically viewed as being those of a wrist-borne nature 
(e.g., FitBit and the Apple watch), however, the technology is now gen-
erating masses of data from a variety of sensors embedded in devices 
(e.g., medical technology) to fashion items such as jewellery, clothing 
and shoes. These devices are becoming more affordable to the general 
public, and similar to the uptake of telematics, insurers are benefiting 
from this surge of available data to improve upon their pricing models.
Potential wearable derived biometric information includes those from 
physical activity (e.g., number of steps, time spent sitting, miles cycled), 
cardiovascular measures (heart rate, heart rate variability, ECG, blood 
pressure), sleep data (quantity and quality), body temperature, galvanic 
skin response, blood sugar and even pollution exposure. It should come 
as no surprise, therefore, that the main insurance interest from wearable 
data comes from health long-term care insurers and to a lesser degree 
life insurance companies.
In a similar fashion to telematics, wearables provide the insurer with a 
means to determine, or at least get closer to, the true underlying risks of 
the insured policyholder. The opportunities for wearables, in the insur-
ance world, potentially go beyond that of refinement of current mor-
bidity and mortality models. They also provide the insurer with a means 
by which they can improve their marketing efforts (e.g., providing free 
wearables as has already been done in the UK [Stables 2016]), reduce 
customer churn through greater engagement and touch points (e.g., 
from monthly premium discounts) and potentially even motivate healthy 
behaviour change as well as alerting customers to health concerns (and 
hence reducing moral hazard).
Whilst the opportunities for insurance companies in this space do 
indeed appear to be great, the nascent nature of wearables for insurance 
purposes means that there are many issues and considerations to over-
come before their use becomes mainstream. Chief amongst these issues is 
the accuracy of pricing models and reliability of the devices.
5.3.3  Smart Homes and the Internet of Things (IoT)
The network of physical devices embedded with sensors and connec-
tivity, allowing the transmission and communication of data has come 
to be known as IoT. Applications range from smart home devices  
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(e.g., smoke alarms, thermostats and fridges) to environmental monitor-
ing (e.g., examining air and water quality) and has permeated the market 
to such an extent that forecasts suggest that by 2020 IoT will consist of 
as many as 30 billion objects (Nordrum 2016) and will have a global 
market value of $7.1 trillion (Hsu and Lin 2016).
As per telematics and wearables, IoT also facilitates the provision 
of a multitude of new data sources of interest to the insurance world. 
And again, as per telematics and wearables, the opportunities to use this 
data extend beyond pricing power (e.g., discounts to customers that 
lock their sensor-based windows and doors when away from the house). 
Smart home devices, for example, allow the insurer to potentially move 
towards being proactive in terms of managing risks. The traditional 
insurance model has been one of zero intervention prior to a claims 
assessment, but the data from IoT smart home sensors opens the poten-
tial for a new type of customer interaction. A relationship whereby the 
insurance company now takes an active role in engaging with the cus-
tomer between the point of sale and claim. For example, the data from a 
sensor monitoring water pressure could be used to alert the policyholder 
of a leakage problem before substantial damage occurs.
5.3.4  Big Data: Trustworthiness and Privacy Concerns
In Big Data, veracity is one of the main Big Data dimensions. Whilst in 
the past this was frequently overlooked as long as data was being har-
vested from multiple heterogeneous sources, veracity is nowadays a more 
pressing issue (e.g., due to an increase in public discourse on fake news). 
Simply put, veracity deals with data uncertainty due to inconsistencies 
and deliberate deception. These problems create obfuscated data, hinder-
ing accurate and correct future analysis and understanding of data and 
leading to potential insurance fraud.
A second issue in harvesting data from multiple sources is privacy. 
Personal data might have been generated (e.g., GPS location from 
mobile device) or harvested (e.g., social networks) from multiple heter-
ogeneous sources. Ethically, data owners (including insurers) should ask 
the consent of their customers prior to use this data for analysis purposes. 
Furthermore, businesses with customers in Europe have to comply with 
the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) which looks after 
the privacy and protection of an individual, addressing problems such 
as how personal data can be used in this data-driven technological age 
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(EU 2016). It will be interesting to follow how insurers may use social 
credit schemes, which monitor also social circles to create a ‘credit score’ 
(Gapper 2018), in their underwriting processes in light of these issues.
5.4  artificial intelligence
Insurers have already started embracing the use of AI techniques to make 
sense out of the big raw data and obtain useful insights. Techniques 
such as deep learning, neural networks and natural language processing, 
amongst others, are helping in improving business operations and as a 
natural consequence customer’s satisfaction.
5.4.1  Machine Learning and AI in the Underwriting Process
It is very likely that all underwriters will be using machine learning and 
AI as predominant technologies behind their underwriting decisions over 
time. Workflows of Big Data processing techniques and AI algorithms 
enable underwriters to process and understand far more data than tradi-
tional processes as well as provide more accurate underwriting predictive 
assessments. With more predictive models, underwriters can apply more 
adequate premiums and thus enabling underwriters to reduce their loss 
ratios.
Motor insurance premiums are traditionally charged for a pre- 
determined amount for a period of twelve months. This buffet-style 
approach, where you pay the same amount irrespective of use, would 
not apply if priced via a telematics device (Azzopardi and Cortis 2013) 
as explained in the earlier section. This device enables data between the 
insured vehicle and the insurer’s central management system to be sent 
instantly. This means that with the help of AI techniques, insurance com-
panies develop a system of adaptive continuous pricing, instead of having 
a one-off yearly payment.
Traditional life insurance underwriting involves an under-
writer asking a specific set of questions to predict life events of the 
proposer/s. Lapetus Solutions, a US-based InsurTech start-up, have 
developed an AI system and is currently partnering with life underwrit-
ers to provide quotations using facial analytics technology. This system 
comprises sensory analytics as well as dynamic questioning. To receive 
a quotation, the client just needs to send a self-portrait photograph 
(a “selfie”) and this technology will use the image provided to examine 
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the individual’s physical features and determine the health status, dis-
ease susceptibility and longevity (Lapetus Solutions 2017). From the 
photo provided, the facial analytics technology in this system examines 
a considerable number of regions on the face in order to provide data 
to underwriters relating to Body Mass Index (BMI), estimated age and 
smoking indication. Furthermore, the system scientifically formulates 
specific questions that vary depending on the responses provided. These 
will provide more insight and veracity into the individual longevity as 
opposed to the standard questions normally found in life insurance pro-
posal forms. The advantage of such system is that the whole process only 
takes a few minutes to complete.
The insurance industry has also started to adopt the use of AI in 
health and accident insurance. Innovations such as implanted sensors and 
wearables that make use of AI provide insurers with valuable data regard-
ing the insured’s health. This AI technology would also be advising and 
educating customers about bad lifestyle choices which may ultimately 
lead to lower costs for both policyholders and insurers.
5.4.2  AI in Claims Management Process
Presently, AI is also taking over administration associated with run 
of the mill claims. In one particular case in Japan, an AI system has 
replaced a team of 30 employees calculating payouts for policyholders 
(McCurry 2017).
This is not all doom and gloom from an employment perspective as 
developments may lead to claims handlers dealing with the more chal-
lenging claims rather than the tedious ones. For example, Lemonade, a 
start-up property insurance company, has developed an automated claims 
process and filing a new claim became relatively easy. The smartphone 
application will ask the policyholder some generic questions to gather 
basic information on the claim. The insured does not have to complete 
a claim form but provide a summary of the claim such as what property 
was damaged, through the smartphone camera. The data provided will 
be analysed by the AI and run through 18 anti-fraud algorithms. Non-
complex claims are approved within seconds whilst complicated claims 
are handed over to humans in the claims department.
The use of technology is not only pointing out but also easing the 
management of complex claims such as, making use of drones to take 
aerial photos of significant property damage and image analytics to quan-
tify the extent of the damage (Cognizant 2017).
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Fraud is reported to represent 10% of all claims in Europe (Insurance 
Europe 2013). Rather than relying on experienced humans to detect 
fraud, insurance companies are opting for AI to investigate certain dis-
honest patterns. An Australian tech company developed an AI fraud 
investigation system that provides support to insurance companies in the 
detection of fraudulent claims. Whilst the scope of this AI technology 
is to assist claims handlers in preventing fraud, it also reduces adminis-
tration costs for insurance companies. The system can investigate social 
media accounts, criminal records, property and vehicle history and other 
documentation submitted with the claim, thus enabling more time for 
the claims department to analyse results and close claims in a timely man-
ner. Similar services that weed out possible fraudulent policyholders at 
underwriting stage are available in the market (e.g., ThreatMetrix).
5.4.3  AI in Customer Interaction
The insurance industry is seldom considered as the most innovative with 
respect to customer services. Despite this view, some insurance compa-
nies started to make some progress and introduced the use of chatbots 
in their day-to-day operations in a similar fashion to other industries. 
Chatbots are an AI system that are normally linked with messaging appli-
cations such as Facebook Messenger, with the main purpose of interact-
ing with existing and prospective clients, thus acting as a virtual customer 
service representative. These chatbots would interact with clients by 
determining which insurance products would be most appropriate based 
on their requirements and answer queries using natural language.
Having chatbots that are powered by AI enables digital interaction 
with policyholders and prospective clients simpler and faster than with 
a human element. In recent years, insurance intermediaries have also 
invested in chatbots, for example, to provide real-time insurance quo-
tation comparisons through messaging applications. Such chatbots can 
also provide clients with recommendations as to what insurance product 
would best suit their needs.
5.5  distributed ledger technologies
Distributed Ledger Technologies provide opportunities for disruptive 
developments within the insurance industry. DLTs can be beneficial to 
current insurers in their processes but could also create a competitive 
form of peer to peer insurance networks.
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5.5.1  Improving Current Processes Using DLTs
DLTs aim to transform the process of verifying not only transactions 
(like in cryptocurrencies) but also verification of identities and smart 
contracts.
Mainelli and von Gunten (2014) summarise the effect of DLTs for 
insurance within four domains: identity, time, space and mutuality. Using 
DLTs through the identity checking can improve the underwriting and 
Know Your Customer requirements for an insurer (Mainelli and Smith 
2015; Mainelli and von Gunten 2014). These are particularly useful for 
a product, individual or data that has gone through a chain of custody 
or changes. Identity improvements could also potentially limit mul-
tiple claims for the same incident. For example, in the case of a travel 
delay, the policyholder would not be able to claim twice for the same 
incident.
Consider an alternative scenario whereby health and financial trans-
actions are shared over a DLT. At the policyholder’s permission, the 
insurer may be able to quote a premium for health insurance without 
the need to provide the data from scratch by filling in forms. Moreover, 
creating models of this personal data and analysing it together with 
external data (e.g., from personal wearables provided by the insurance 
company), this enables real-time adjustments to coverage and pricing, 
hence reducing the time cycles of insurance products. Conversely, DLTs 
may lead to a lengthening of time as transactions recorded on DLTs can-
not be erased or changed, altering the general perception of longer term 
contracts.
Whilst the current insurance business model is localised as each insur-
ance product is developed by country, market and region; DLTs are 
distributed over a network of computers. This may increase the space 
‘covered’ by insurance worldwide. For example, Lorenz et al. (2016) 
argue that DLTs may be particularly useful in microinsurance within 
emerging markets, citing the example of crop insurance for farmers. 
Any such coverage may be automated as claims are paid automatically 
due to weather conditions without the need of an on-the-ground evalu-
ation. The rewards of DLTs within claims management are not restricted 
to esoteric insurance practices. The implementation of a smart contract 
would imply an immediate payment on the delivery of parts following a 
motor vehicle damage claim (Mainelli and von Gunten 2014).
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5.5.2  P2P Insurance
The diminishment of space may result in the generation of more peer-
to-peer (P2P) insurance practices. This would act like a mutual, being 
Mainelli and von Gunten’s (2014) fourth domain of possible effect of 
a DLTs on insurance. This may lead to a reshaping of the insurance 
industry for particular coverages in the same manner that AirBnB and 
Uber/Grab have disrupted their respective industries. Mainelli and von 
Gunten (2014) explain that P2P networks may lead to some insurance to 
function like a Protection and Indemnity Club (P&I Club) rather than 
a mutual. Considering the example of a delayed flight, costing €10 per 
person each, a group of ten independent individuals may be able to cre-
ate a mutual coverage. In a P&I Club format, they would pass some pro-
cess to join, pay a certain amount per year (say €10) and be ready to add 
supplementary funds should this not be enough. For example, if a total 
of two claimed, then the claim costs would be €200, meaning that every 
participant should pay in an additional €10. If no one claimed, a profit of 
€100 is shared between the participants (€10 each).3
We also envisage the possibility of a similar P2P structure through 
DLTs with reinsurance added to cover in case that the total premiums do 
not cover the claims. This would replace the need to add funds should 
the reserves not be enough to pay out claims.
5.6  conclusion
Insurers have been accused of being slow to adapt to new technologies 
as 50–70% of insurers’ IT budget is spent on running costs rather than 
research and development (Acord and Equinix 2014). It is clear that 
Big Data is already and has further potential to revolutionise the insur-
ance business. Areas such as telematics, wearables and IoT are provid-
ing a plethora of data which, when combined with advances made in AI, 
are enabling a much more personalised product to be developed for the 
consumer. Furthermore, a very different customer relationship is start-
ing to emerge, from these data sources, allowing the insurer to engage 
more meaningfully with policyholders. Consequently, big data is likely to 
3 We are ignoring management costs or investments profits for simplification purposes.
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continue to transform the industry on a large scale for the foreseeable 
future. DLTs, the IoT and AI are starting to disrupt the insurance mar-
ket as we know it today. The extent to which disruption occurs and how 
exactly the disruption will happen remains to be seen. However, it seems 
InsurTechs will play an increasing role as the digital innovation in the 
insurance world unfolds.
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6.1  introduction
RegTech is information technology (IT) that (a) helps firms manage 
regulatory requirements and compliance imperatives by identifying the 
impacts of regulatory provisions on business models, products and ser-
vices, functional activities, policies, operational procedures and controls; 
(b) enables compliant business systems and data; (c) helps control and 
manage regulatory, financial and non-financial risks; and (d) performs 
regulatory compliance reporting. In reference to the previous generation 
of RegTech (and FinTech) Law Professor Kenneth Bamberger points out 
that:
While these technology systems offer powerful compliance tools, they also 
pose real perils. They permit computer programmers to interpret legal 
requirements; they mask the uncertainty of the very hazards with which 
policy makers are concerned; they skew decision-making through an 
“automation bias” that privileges personal self-interest over sound judg-
ment; and their lack of transparency thwarts oversight and accountabil-
ity. These phenomena played a critical role in the recent financial crisis. 
(Bamberger 2009, pp. 669–670)
As Bamberger notes, in the rush to embrace new technologies, the 
downside risks are either ignored, played down, or transferred. This is 
apparently so with RegTech, as Patrick Armstrong, Senior Officer for 
Financial Innovation at the European Securities and Markets Authority 
(ESMA), warned “it is not without risks” and financial institutions must 
take care to “delegate tasks, not responsibility…for compliance and risk 
management activities. Instead the ultimate responsibility remains with 
the regulated financial institution” (McNulty 2017). There is a dearth 
of IS research in this new important area of study; however, research in 
other disciplines is also deficient. Few academic researchers have adopted 
a critical stance (Packin 2018), while others fail to question the risks 
associated with this new paradigm (Arner et al. 2016), including the real 
possibility of creating a digital Tower of Babel (Butler 2017). This is, per-
haps, the major issue confronting the financial industry.
The industry has, according to Andrew Haldane, created a Tower of 
Babel, which refers to the absence of a “common language” in the finan-
cial industry, and the existence of heterogeneous terms and concepts 
to describe similar business objects, processes, and products (Haldane 
2012). This problem permeates the industry down to individual financial 
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institutions, where products, concepts, and terms have different mean-
ings in and across business functions and communities of practice. The 
emergence of FinTech and RegTech will do little to solve fundamental 
problems if the industry ends up with a digital Tower of Babel that simply 
digitises the status quo. The essential issue of arriving at shared business 
and regulatory terminological dictionaries, thesauri, and taxonomies is 
a huge challenge and a significant obstacle for RegTech. Only then will 
the issue of semantic interoperability be addressed—that is, the capacity of 
information systems to exchange data with unambiguous, shared mean-
ing. “Semantic interoperability ensures that these exchanges make sense— 
that the requester and the provider have a common understanding of the 
“meanings” of the requested services and data” (Heiler 1995, p. 271). 
However, even if a “common language” did exist in a financial institu-
tion, we are still left with what Bamberger (2009) termed the problem 
of “translation”—that is the gap between the meanings accorded to 
business concepts by business professionals and the intended behaviours 
of automated processes, and the meanings recorded by systems analysts 
and software engineers in data stores and the behaviours embedded in 
software code. Bamberger demonstrated how the “translation problem” 
resulted in financial, risk and compliance applications and systems that 
masked risk, led users into a false sense of security, and provided erro-
neous signals to business managers resulting in poor decision-making on 
key issues.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. First, we discuss 
the business drivers for the adoption of RegTech, which incorporates a 
regulatory perspective. Then we present our empirical case study. We fin-
ish by discussing the implications of our research and offer concluding 
comments.
6.2  business drivers of regtech
The costs of regulatory compliance for the financial industry represent 
the primary drivers for RegTech adoption. Research published by The 
Trade indicates that banks spent over $100 billion on regulatory com-
pliance in 2016 alone and this cost is rising (McDowell 2017). Bain & 
Co. estimates that governance risk and compliance (GRC) expenditure 
accounts for 15–20% of “run the bank cost” and 40% of “change the bank 
costs” (Memminger et al. 2016). Looking at specific regulations, Dodd 
Frank has cost $36 billion to date, while MiFID II has cost a €2.5 billion 
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to date—the latter cost is sure to rise significantly. Thus, given the exist-
ing trend, it is estimated that the cost of regulatory compliance will rise 
from 4 to 10% of revenue in financial institutions by 2022.
At a practical level, it is the volume of regulations that is driving 
costs. Take, for example, that over 50,000 regulations were published 
between 2009 and 2012 in the G20. Furthermore, over 50,000 regula-
tory updates were published in 2015 alone, 100% up on 2012. The scale 
of the paper mountain for firms is breath-taking: The FCA Handbook 
stands over 2 metres high; the US Dodd Frank Act has generated over 
22,000 pages of provisions; the EU’s MiFID II has approximately 
30,000 pages of related texts in approximately 1.5 metres paragraphs. 
Each week sees an average of 45 new regulatory-related documents 
issued (JWG 2017). Thus, the volume, variety, velocity, and complex-
ity of regulation is challenging firms. Figure 6.1 captures graphically the 
current approach to regulatory compliance and reporting. Information 
overload, multiple communication paths, information siloes, and manual 
data curation all increase the risk of information loss and reduced empiri-
cal fidelity while driving significant cost.
Fig. 6.1 Information overload, complexity, silos, and loss
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Another driver is the relative complexity of financial institutions in 
terms of their business models, legal entity structures, processes, prod-
ucts, services, and markets served. Monitoring, interpreting, and com-
plying with the current and planned regulations is a challenge, even for 
the largest banks. For smaller firms the costs and complexity may become 
prohibitive (Walker 2018). The move from people-based solutions to 
RegTech is reflected in the fact that the aforementioned costs are being 
expended on consultants, professional services, and IT vendors (Marenzi 
2017).
The final drivers are information and data related. Unpublished 
research from a 5-year-long empirical study by the authors on the issue, 
involving UK and US regulators and financial institutions, indicates that 
financial institutions are challenged by their inability to understand:
1.  Regulatory requirements and compliance imperatives;
2.  The impacts of such regulations on functional activities, policies, 
and procedures;
3.  The changes that are required to business processes and activities;
4.  The risks associated with financial products and related business 
models;
5.  The implications for IT systems in terms of data governance and 
analytics; and
6.  How to meet consumer needs, while protecting their rights.
It was in this context that RegTech was first identified as a separate, but 
emerging industry sector in the financial industry, in the UK Treasury’s 
2015 Budget Report and subsequently explored comprehensively in the 
UK’s Government Organisation for Science (Walport 2015). UK regula-
tors took note of this new perspective on technology-based solutions for 
the myriad of problems facing the financial industry and have responded 
accordingly. In 2016, for example, and in the context of the FCA’s 
Innovation Hub and its Project Innovate, the FCA identified a number 
of candidate FinTech and RegTech solutions and how they might be 
used.
Given the significant challenges facing both regulators and the reg-
ulated, Christopher Woolard, Director of Strategy and Competition 
at the FCA, identified several use cases for and capabilities of RegTech 
(Woolard 2016) viz.
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1.  First, making the business of complying with reporting require-
ments simpler.
2.  Second, technology that drives efficiencies in regulatory com-
pliance by seeking to close the gap between the intention of reg-
ulatory requirements and the subsequent interpretation and 
implementation within firms.
3.  Third, technology that simplifies and assists firms in managing and 
exploiting their existing data, supporting better decision-making 
and finding those who are not playing by the rules easier.
4.  Finally, technologies and innovations that allow regulation 
and compliance processes to be delivered differently and more 
efficiently.
The above conceptualisation indicates a role for several new technologies 
including artificial intelligence (AI), blockchain/distributed ledger tech-
nologies (DLT), machine learning, natural language processing (NLP), 
and data analytics. However, it was clear from several presentations at the 
European Central Bank Data Standards for Granular Data Conference 
2017 that the sine qua non for the success of RegTech would be the use 
of open standards and semantic technologies (Palmer 2017). A stand-
ards-based approach would be necessary to address the core issues of 
the translation and Tower of Babel problems (Bamberger 2009; Haldane 
2012; Butler 2017).
6.3  regtech in focus: digital  
regulatory rePorting
The need for an industry-wide standards-based approach to regulatory 
compliance and reporting, articulated in the position paper of Butler 
(2017) on open standards for RegTech, found purchase with both UK 
regulators and the financial industry. The Bank of England and the FCA 
subsequently hypothesised that standards-based RegTech could help 
automate, and make more efficient and cost-effective, the task of regula-
tory reporting by financial institutions. To confirm their hypothesis, the 
UK regulators instituted a Technology Sprint—in this case the RegTech 
Sprint.
The remainder of this chapter presents a short case study of the 
RegTech Sprint. This was undertaken by the Bank of England and the 
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FCA in conjunction with over 50 participants from across the financial 
industry in the UK. The Sprint took place during the last two weeks of 
November 2017. Participants included regulators from the FCA, Bank 
of England, industry firms Santander, Credit Suisse, Hitachi Vantara, 
Lombard Risk, Model Drivers, Regnosys, JWG-RegDelta, Governor 
Software, law firms Linklaters and Burgess Salmon, academics from Yale, 
and the GRC Technology Centre at University College Cork.
The primary objective of the RegTech Sprint was to provide a 
Proof of Concept (PoC) that demonstrated the feasibility of the 
straight-through processing of regulations and semi-automated regu-
latory reporting—this process is termed Digital Regulatory Reporting. 
Figure 6.2 presents the key activities that realised this objective.
The first step in Digital Regulatory Reporting is to digitise the regu-
latory provisions. As indicated in Fig. 6.2, the FCA currently publishes 
its Handbook of Regulations in HTML and PDF formats. Key con-
cepts are linked using Hypertext. In the case of the FCA, specific FCA 
concepts are defined in the Handbook Glossary. In its current form, 
the Handbook provisions and rules are not readily machine-readable or 
machine-executable. The first part of the PoC was to investigate how 
AI could be employed to process regulatory provisions and provide 
Regulatory Alerts.
Fig. 6.2 Digital Regulatory Reporting
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6.3.1  Phase 1: Digital Regulatory Alerts
RegTech vendor RegDelta has developed taxonomies of regulatory top-
ics using the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C)’s Simple Knowledge 
Organisation System (SKOS)1 and AI to semantically tag regulatory pro-
visions to indicate their scope and application so alerts could be gener-
ated. SKOS is based on the W3C’s Resource Description Framework 
(RDF),2 and is one of the three foundational Semantic Web technolo-
gies, the other two being SPARQL and the Web Ontology Language 
(OWL).3 SKOS enables organisation to transcend the limitations of 
business glossaries to create taxonomies and thesauri that are both 
human- and machine-readable. Semantic tagging of regulations is but 
the first step in the regulatory compliance process and the SKOS name-
space helps address the Tower of Babel problem. This is an example of 
the straightforward application of AI and semantic technologies to help 
manage the volume and complexity of regulations by having a machine 
answer the what and which questions. That is, what are the themes in 
regulatory provisions and which activities and products do they target. 
While this process helps partially digitalise regulatory provisions, Sprint 
participants recognised that the source regulations would have to be 
redrafted and captured in RDF, if the objective was to be achieved. This 
task fells to the SmaRT application.
6.3.2  Phase 2: Making Regulations Digital
The core semantic technologies in SmaRT are based on W3C and indus-
try standard semantic technologies. SmaRT applies the Semantics of 
Business Vocabulary and Business Rules (SBVR) standard proposed by 
Object Management Group. SBVR enables business subject matter 
experts to capture and express their vocabularies and rules in a system-
atic way according to the precepts of first-order deontic-alethic logic. 
The SmaRT application applies its Mercury implementation of SBVR 
Structured English to capture the meaning of the tagged regulatory pro-
visions in vocabularies (alethic logic, indicating a necessity, possibility, 
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obligations, prohibitions, permissions, etc.). This approach helps for-
malise regulatory and legal knowledge in the form of vocabularies (a la 
SKOS) and rules explicitly expressed to identify whether a regulatory 
provision prohibits certain behaviours, processes or products, or per-
mits them, or obliges firms to behave in a certain way towards custom-
ers, and so on. SmaRT regulatory knowledge is persisted in an RDF 
Knowledge Base to make it machine-readable and machine-computable. 
AI-based inference and reasoning capabilities are provided by the SmaRT 
Ontology expressed in OWL.4 An OWL ontology permits granular 
semantic querying (using SPARQL) and reasoning to identify new or 
consolidate existing knowledge—it helps bring semantic interoperability 
to traditional data systems.
In order to achieve the objective of the Sprint, the Bank of England 
and the FCA chose to use the Supervision Reporting Requirements pro-
visions in the FCA Handbook (Sup 16.12) along with supplementary 
definitions supplied by regulators from the Bank of England. Sup 16.12 
instructs financial institutions how to report relevant financial data to the 
UK supervisory authorities—the Bank of England and the Prudential 
Regulatory Authority (PRA) in this case. The problem with the FCA 
Handbook, and indeed regulatory rules in general, is that they tend to 
be ambiguous, drafted in legalese, with links to parent and related leg-
islation, references to financial and technical standards, and links to rele-
vant guidelines.
During the Sprint, the SmaRT application enabled legal and financial 
industry experts to transform complex legislation in Sup 16.12, related 
regulatory rules, and other texts containing standards and guidelines, into 
a human-readable regulatory natural language (RNL) This standards- 
based RNL is captured by SmaRT using a combination of human 
knowledge and expertise, augmented by AI and Machine Learning 
technologies, such as those in RegDelta, and presented to users in an 
HTML- and XML-based web interface.
Thus, Sprint participants encoded the regulatory provisions into 
SmaRT’s vocabulary and rules in a human-readable format. However, 
they are also automatically persisted in a machine-readable format in the 
SmaRT Regulatory Knowledge Base in RDF. As indicated, SmaRT cap-
tures the relationships between concepts in RDF triples (e.g. investments 
4 https://www.w3.org/OWL/.
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firm manufactures financial products). The SKOS namespace is limited 
to expressing taxonomic and related categorical relationships. SmaRT’s 
namespace is much richer. In Fig. 6.3, the relationship RAG must sub-
mit FSA001 is captured as an RDF triple. Triples are declarative axioms 
and the building blocks of SmaRT rules. SmaRT rules are represented 
as RDF/Turtle graph pattern.5 Thus expressed, data can be checked 
for consistency or compliance with such rules. Standard W3C technol-
ogies such as SPARQL,6 SPIN,7 and SHCL8 are employed for this pur-
pose. SPARQL (SPARQL Protocol and RDF query language), is, as 
its name indicates, the W3C query language for the Semantic Web and 
siloed and distributed networked systems. For example, SPARQL can 
be used to enable querying and integration of siloed financial and risk 
data for regulatory reporting and risk management. Rules such as those 
present in Fig. 6.3 are the constituent elements of complex regulatory 
provisions expressed in a human-readable format in HTML and in a 
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machine-readable format as an RDF graph pattern. The closest analogue 
to this approach is the relationship between Wikipedia and DBpedia.9 
The human-readable Wikipedia content is expressed in HTML and ren-
dered into web page in a browser; however, DBpedia captures Wikipedia 
content and data in RDF, with concepts modelled in an ontology. Thus, 
information contained in related/linked Wikipedia pages can be queried 
(using SPARQL), extracted, federated, integrated, relationships uncov-
ered or inferred, and new knowledge created.
6.3.3  Phase 3: Performing Digital Regulatory Reporting
The knowledge embedded in the SmaRT RDF-based vocabulary was used 
by software engineers from Hitachi, Regnosys, and Lombard Risk to map 
firm-specific data concepts in the anonymised customer account data sup-
plied by Santander to equivalent concepts in the Regulatory Knowledge 
Base. The RDF-based rule graph patterns were employed to create 
SPARQL queries to extract compliant data on retail customer accounts. 
Using the SPARQL Inference Notation (SPIN) framework, rules can be 
graphed and executed. A software application was created to automate this 
process. This was then used to extract the required data, transform and load 
it, and then perform the required calculations and populate relevant cells in 
the FSA 001 Balance Sheet form for submission to the Bank of England.
The major achievement in executing the PoC came when the rule 
governing customer account reporting was changed. Once the rule 
change was captured in SmaRT and expressed in RDF, the software 
application executed over the changed rule (as an RDF graph pattern) 
and then populated the appropriate fields in FSA 001 form with the 
required data. No change in the software algorithm was required. This 
was a major development and provided the PoC.
6.3.4  Phase 4: Creating Meta-Data Models  
for Semantic Interoperability
Referring back to Fig. 6.2, Model Drivers (ModelDR) demonstrated a 
key benefit of the above approach to solving the semantic interoperabil-
ity problem discussed earlier. ModelDR semantic modelling application 
9 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DBpedia.
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was able to create ontology-based meta-data models, based on SmaRT 
vocabularies and rules, that will help scale up the findings and make 
Digital Regulatory Reporting a reality in the Enterprise. During the 
Sprint, the ModelDR application was integrated with SmaRT in order 
to demonstrate how SMEs could capture domain knowledge (here 
on regulatory provisions) and use this as an input to semantic models 
expressed in OWL—such models may be used for data virtualisation (see 
Kontchakov et al. 2013). Such models are currently being built at great 
cost by major banks. The ability to have business professionals partic-
ipate in this process is argued to make this process more efficient and 
help address the aforementioned translation problem and make semantic 
interoperability possible. This approach also helps scale up the PoC to a 
working enterprise-wide solution.
6.4  discussion and imPlications
While Know Your Customer (KYC), Anti-money Laundering (AML), 
and the financial crime problem spaces are, perhaps, the most mature 
areas in the application of RegTech, Enterprise Data Management is, 
perhaps, the most important area for the application of RegTech and 
the lens through which all RegTech solutions should be viewed. The 
rationale for this assertion is simple and straightforward—financial enter-
prises have become more or less fully digitised and almost all people, 
business objects and processes are represented in and through data, be 
it structured or unstructured. Regulations themselves are unstructured 
data—although, regulators are seeking to bring structure to regulatory 
provisions and rules. In the area of conduct risk, for example, predictive 
analytics and machine learning are being used to identify insider (cyber)
threats, suspicious activity (fraud and financial crime), insider trading, 
and employee misconduct, all based on data captured from phone calls, 
emails, business transactions, and so on. Unfortunately, the approaches 
being taken by multiple vendors using proprietary approaches, and 
applying technologies as diverse as AI, machine learning, NLP, DLT, 
biometrics, cryptography, cloud computing, and open APIs, may result 
in a digital Tower of Babel, as semantic interoperability a major issue for 
the industry.
The traditional approach employed in Bamberger’s Technologies of 
Compliance, whether GRC or RegTech, is to transform and map regu-
latory provisions, compliance imperatives and rules into software code. 
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This approach is evident in early RegTech solutions in the AML/
KYC/Financial Crime domains. Thus, financial institutions adopting 
such technologies face a “black box” solution, with an attendant regula-
tory risk that a client will, for example, be on-boarded in breach of gov-
erning regulations. This might happen if a regulatory rule is not properly 
encoded or if all permutations and combinations are not accounted or 
tested for. Depending on the gravity of the breach, a financial institu-
tion could find itself with a hefty fine or risk of being put out of busi-
ness. In the course of our research, lawyers critical of RegTech put this 
argument forward and criticised the often unquestioning acceptance of 
vendor claims by financial institutions as to the abilities of their soft-
ware applications to automate or support decision-making around KYC 
and client on-boarding. RegTech vendors cite Intellectual Property (IP) 
considerations for their unwillingness to disclose what is in their black 
boxes (Tyler 2017). What is required here by financial institutions and 
regulators is provenance between the original provisions/rules and their 
instantiation in computer algorithms. The RegTech Sprint PoC provides 
evidence of the utility of a human- and machine-readable intermediate 
language in ensuring faithful translation between the source regulations, 
the interpreted provisions, and their representation in the software that 
underpins technologies of compliance.
Echoing Kenneth Bamberger’s argument presented at the beginning 
of this chapter, Packin (2018, p. 194) warns of the downside to RegTech 
and argues that its adoption “requires a carefully tailored design of the 
technology, a joint effort of the regulators and the private sector and some 
shifts in corporate thinking.” Evidence from the RegTech Sprint indicates 
that this is underway. However, the RegTech genie is out of the bottle and 
a major problem facing the industry is the growing number of proprie-
tary RegTech solutions from multiple vendors, none of which are aligned 
around a common model or infrastructure. It has been brought to our 
attention by executives from Globally Systemic Important Banks (GSIBs 
or GSIFIs) that the last thing they want is to have multiple FinTech and 
RegTech solutions, from multiple vendors, adding to the proliferation 
of applications across their institutions and to the burgeoning “spaghetti 
pots” of code and data.
The FCA is advocating the adoption of open source technologies 
and open semantic standards, such as those developed by the W3C, to 
link and make machine-readable and machine-executable structured and 
unstructured data across heterogeneous sources. Hence, its focus is on 
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XML/RDF (and also Turtle and JSON-LD), ontologies (in OWL), and 
related standards, such as the SBVR, and its extensions, to express regu-
latory vocabularies and rules in order to underpin the semantic interop-
erability of systems.
It is also clear from our experience that large financial institutions are 
beginning to address the core problems of data governance and data 
virtualisation using semantic technologies that enable interoperabil-
ity between systems. SBVR is being used by major banks to help map 
regulatory concepts on to business concepts. Ontologies are being used 
as meta-data models hosted in RDF triple stores as knowledge bases 
for data extracted from heterogeneous relational data stores and other 
sources. This semantic approach to data virtualisation uses SPARQL to 
field federated queries over the distributed meta-data/data in relational 
data stores. The operational data stays where it is, with the data of inter-
est returned from multiple data sources, integrated using the ontologies 
(as meta-data models), with further analysis and processing performed 
in an RDF triple store. This approach takes on an AI dimension when 
inferencing engines or reasoners are employed to add knowledge to a 
knowledge base. A semantic reasoner or rules engine consists of algo-
rithms that infer logical conclusions from a set of asserted axioms or facts 
expressed in RDF/OWL. From a data perspective, previously unknown 
or unrecognised relationships across heterogeneous data sets can be 
asserted, thus adding more knowledge. Successful ontology-based solu-
tions already exist in a wide variety of domains from defence and intelli-
gence, to capital markets, to regulatory compliance (Palantir 2018).
From a business perspective, this approach enables regulatory seman-
tics (vocabularies and rules underpinning regulatory provisions and com-
pliance imperatives) to be mapped to business semantics (vocabularies 
and rules expressed in business policies, operational standards, controls 
through to meta-data repositories/data dictionaries). It also permits 
the disambiguation, extraction, and integration of heterogeneous firm- 
specific data for regulatory compliance reporting and risk management. 
Capturing business semantics in a knowledge base is the sine qua non 
of good data governance. An example here is the Model Knowledge 
Base referred to in Fig. 6.1. Linking a model knowledge base like this 
with a regulatory knowledge base and integrating both with a busi-
ness knowledge base can enable straight-through processing of regula-
tions and automated regulatory compliance reporting of both financial 
data and non-financial data. Interestingly, industry bodies like the IFRS 
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Foundation/International Accounting Standards Board are using seman-
tic technologies and ontologies to make their standards and reporting 
XBRL taxonomies both human- and machine-readable. So too are the 
ISO20022/SWIFT initiatives in their efforts to enhance its financial 
messaging standard. Thus, a point of convergence is not too far off, and 
firms across the financial industry need to ensure that they are in a posi-
tion to capitalise on the very real benefits offered by semantic technolo-
gies for FinTech and RegTech.
6.5  conclusion
This chapter draws on recent field research to demonstrate the prom-
ise and potential of RegTech. However, it adds a cautionary note that 
the full benefits of RegTech will only materialise if the pitfalls of a frag-
mented Tower of Babel approach are avoided (Butler 2017). Semantic 
standards are the key to all this.
It is clear that the benefits of RegTech go well beyond straight-
through processing of compliance reporting of financial data, such as 
balance sheet reporting and the quantification of organisational or sys-
temic financial risk. We have argued that one of the benefits of the appli-
cation of semantic standards is data governance, through the ability to 
create machine-readable meta-models that enable data virtualisation 
across heterogeneous data stores. This approach may make the enterprise 
data warehouse a thing of the past. However, it also enables an enhanced 
data-driven approach to the management of non-financial risk and asso-
ciated regulatory compliance reporting. Here, data from siloed, hetero-
geneous databases can be virtualised and ontologies and/or predictive 
analytics/machine learning algorithms and AI applied to identify insider 
or cyber threats, suspicious activities, financial fraud by customers/ 
clients, and a wealth of other applications. Readers will begin to realise that 
in this context RegTech can be applied across industry sectors, and not just 
the financial industry, as non-financial risks, such as operational risk and 
employee misconduct, consumer protection are not industry specific.
The financial industry spends more on IT and data than any other, 
over $360 billion per annum according to Gartner. Given the fundamen-
tal problems, it faces with regulatory compliance, which is costing the 
industry over $100 billion per annum, and the persistent problem of data 
governance, management, and analytics, it seems absurd to see financial 
institutions chasing will-o’-the-wisp solutions or technologies which 
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may turn out to nothing more be fads, with little practical application or 
impact. Our previous research revealed that as of late 2016, the indus-
try Chief Data Officers had yet to go beyond CDO 1.0 (Governance) 
to reach CDO 2.0 (Analytics) (Butler 2017). The point here being that 
the industry still finds difficulty in realising the benefits of data analyt-
ics, and this has major implications for RegTech, as it still has not solved 
the problems of data governance. Likewise, while it is clear that AI, 
machine learning, and robotics have significant implications for FinTech 
and, particularly, RegTech domains, the real benefits of AI, in terms of 
unsupervised learning, are still some way off. Nevertheless, it is clear 
that ontologies, machine learning, and NLP technologies are being used 
effectively. That said, it is clear that AI will do little to address the fun-
damental issue of “natural stupidity” in financial engineers and quants 
(Wilmott and Orrell 2017) or in financial experts and senior managers, 
whether in banks or general business organisations (Kahneman 2012), or 
in those responsible for systematic misconduct and fraud in the banking 
system (Vaughan and Finch 2016).
RegTech holds much promise for regulators and firms in the finan-
cial industry to fully benefit from the power that digitalisation offers—to 
solve a big problem for a relatively small effort. However, a considered, 
collaborative approach by all stakeholders is required if that promise is 
to become a reality. As societal stakeholders, IS researchers have a role 
to play in this, in that there is much the discipline can offer in helping 
practitioners develop and express a “common language” in human- and 
machine-readable formats.
Acknowledgements  SmaRT was developed under the Enterprise Ireland 
Commercialisation Fund, co-funded by the Irish Government and European 
Regional Development Fund (ERDF) under Ireland’s European Structural and 
Investment Funds Programme 2014–2020.
references
Arner, D. W., Barberis, J., & Buckey, R. P. (2016). FinTech, RegTech, and 
the reconceptualization of financial regulation. Northwestern Journal of 
International Law & Business, 37, 371–414.
Bamberger, K. A. (2009). Technologies of compliance: Risk and regulation in a 
digital age. Texas Law Review, 88, 669–739.
Butler, T. (2017). Towards a standards-based technology architecture for 
RegTech. Journal of Financial Transformation, 45, 49–59.
6 UNDERSTANDING REGTECH FOR DIGITAL REGULATORY COMPLIANCE  101
Haldane, A. G. (2012). Towards a common financial language. Securities 
Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA) “Building a Global 
Legal Entity Identifier Framework” Symposium, New York. Available at: 
http://www.bis.org/review/r120315g.pdf. Last accessed 17 August 2018.
Heiler, S. (1995). Semantic interoperability. ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR), 
27(2), 271–273.
JWG. (2017). RegDelta: Part of our MiFID II solution. Available at: https://
jwg-it.eu/insight/mifid-programme-planner/. Last accessed 25 October 
2017.
Kahneman, D. (2012). Thinking, fast and slow. England: Penguin Books.
Kontchakov, R., Rodriguez-Muro, M., & Zakharyaschev, M. (2013). Ontology-
based data access with databases: A short course. In Reasoning web: Semantic 
technologies for intelligent data access (pp. 194–229). Berlin and Heidelberg: 
Springer.
Marenzi, O. (2017). Capital markets and investment banking 2017–2018 fore-
cast. Available at: http://www.opimas.com/research/193/detail/. Last 
accessed 25 October 2017.
McDowell, H. (2017). Banks spent close to $100 billion on compliance last year. 
The Trade News. Available at: https://www.thetradenews.com/Sell-side/
Banks-spent-close-to-$100-billion-on-compliance-last-year/. Last accessed 17 
August 2018.
McNulty, L. (2017). Top regulator: City firms must bear responsibility for 
RegTech risks. Financial News. Available at: https://www.fnlondon.com/
articles/city-firms-must-bear-responsibility-for-regtech-risk-20170516. Last 
accessed 25 October 2017.
Memminger, M., Baxter, M., & Lin, E. (2016). Banking RegTechs to the rescue? 
Available at: http://www.bain.com/publications/articles/banking-regtechs-
to-the-rescue.aspx. Last accessed 17 August 2018.
Packin, N. G. (2018). RegTech, compliance and technology judgment rule. 
Chicago-Kent Law Review, 93, 193–220.
Palantir. (2018). Our solutions. Available at: https://www.palantir.com/solu-
tions/. Last accessed 17 August 2018.
Palmer, J. (2017). The data journey: Finding and fixing the bumps & holes in the 
road. Data Standards for Granular Data Conference, European Central Bank.
Tyler, T. (2017). RegTech and FinTech’s impact on the regulated sector. Available at: 
http://www.aidcompliance.com/regtech-fintechs-impact-regulated-sector/. 
Last accessed 17 August 2018.
Vaughan, L., & Finch, G. (2016). The fix: How bankers lied, cheated and colluded 
to rig the world’s most important number. New York: Wiley.
Walker, O. (2018). M&A in asset management sector climbs to 8-year high. The 
Financial Times. Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/2f1e77f2-f80c-
11e7-88f7-5465a6ce1a00. Last accessed 17 August 2018.
102  T. BUTLER AND L. O’BRIEN
Walport, M. (2015). FinTech futures: The UK as a world leader in financial tech-
nologies. London: UK Government Office for Science.
Wilmott, P., & Orrell, D. (2017). The money formula: Dodgy finance, pseudo sci-
ence, and how mathematicians took over the markets. Wiley.
Woolard, C. (2016). Innovation in RegTech. Available at: https://www.fca.org.uk/
news/speeches/london-fintech-week-2016-innovation-regtech. Last accessed 
17 August 2018.
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons 
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits any noncommercial 
use, sharing, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you 
give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the 
Creative Commons license and indicate if you modified the licensed material. You 
do not have permission under this license to share adapted material derived from 
this chapter or parts of it.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the 
chapter’s Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line 
to the material. If material is not included in the chapter’s Creative Commons 
license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds 




Payment Service Directive II  
and Its Implications
Alan Brener
Abstract  The EU required member states to implement the new 
Payment Services Directive (PSD II) by January 2018. The European 
Banking Authority (EBA) will provide important final guidance on areas 
such as security during 2018, which will need to be implemented over 
the following couple of years. The increase in mobile and Internet bank-
ing and the failure of the original 2007 first Payment Services Directive 
(PSD I) to develop cross-border payment services encouraged the 
development of the revised Directive. The EU also took the opportu-
nity to assist the development of new payment services, which may, in 
due course, disintermediate some of the traditional payment arrange-
ments including, for example, those provided by credit card companies, 
and to reduce the cost of payments services for, primarily, businesses. It 
will pose challenges for banks and present opportunities for both new 
FinTech operations and large firms such as Apple and Amazon. The full 
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benefits of the new Directive will only be gained if a critical mass of cus-
tomers see the value of the new services and trust the firms and processes 
involved.
Keywords  Payment service · European Union · Single market · 
Customer protection · PSD II · FinTech
All banks do is really data, so when you open that data up to third parties 
it allows for the first time a separation between the person that manages 
the customer relationship and the person that provides the balance sheet 
services. (Antony Jenkins, Financial Times, 12 January 2018)
7.1  introduction
The new Payment Services Directive II (PSD II) is on the face of it, 
another technical piece of legislation. However, it is much more. It has 
been described as the EU firing the “starting gun for banks vs. fin-tech 
fight over payments” (Reuters 2017). It is both “another step towards a 
digital single market in the EU” and a move to introduce more competi-
tion into the EU’s payments market and to break the banks’ control over 
customer transaction information (Dombrovskis 2018).
A number of existing businesses may be disrupted by the devel-
opments encouraged by PSD II. These include credit card issuers and 
merchant acquirers, providing opportunities for new FinTech com-
panies and very large firms such as Amazon, Apple, etc. There will be 
opportunities for firms that specialise in “account to account” transfers 
(A2A) and those who, for example, collect individual customer spend-
ing information, analyse the data and market it. Moreover, other juris-
dictions are looking at EU legislative innovation which they may emulate 
(Yap 2017).
Payment services have largely avoided EU regulation until recently. 
However, regulation can “when drafted and applied correctly … be an 
effective tool for creating incentives to increase innovation, economic 
development and competition” (Romānova et al. 2018, p. 21). This 
chapter looks at how the original view has changed with, initially, the first 
Payment Services Directive (PSD I); why PSD I was judged less than 
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successful and the EU’s attempt to get ahead of and, to a certain extent, 
guide the development of both markets and technologies which are fast 
changing through PSD II.
7.2  background
In 2007 the EU published its first attempt at payment services regulation— 
the PSD I.1 EU member states were required to implement the Directive 
in 2009. It was a maximum harmonisation Directive (i.e. EU states cannot 
exceed the terms of the Directive by, for example, imposing additional 
restrictions).
The central issue was that the payments systems within the EU were 
organised along national lines and fragmented. The aims of the Directive 
were to align these to help facilitate the EU single market in goods 
and services and to support greater competition in payment services 
(Donnelly 2016). Specifically, its objectives were to assist in the devel-
opment of the Eurozone’s cross-border payment system known as the 
Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA); to regulate payment businesses to 
encourage non-banks to enter the payments market; to increase services 
for customers by setting maximum payment processing times and stand-
ardised terms and conditions and to increase customer protection so that 
the latter would have greater confidence in the market.
Fundamental to this were provisions to ensure non-discrimination 
so that any payment service provider competing in the internal market 
could use “the services of the technical infrastructures” of incumbent 
payment systems providers on matching terms.2
The Directive was seminal, in that it set the foundations for future 
work to improve competition and innovation both within national 
jurisdictions and across the borders of EU states. It sought to break the 
associations of banks which, for example, in the UK had steered the 
payments systems. That it did not fully succeed is not to diminish the 
Directive’s ground-breaking role as new technologies rapidly over-took 
legislation and existing market practices.
1 2007/64/EC, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX: 
32007L0064&from=EN.
2 Ibid., PSD I, Recital 16.
106  A. BRENER
7.3  eu initiated review of the effectiveness  
of Psd i
The importance of the Directive is evidenced by the fact that rela-
tively shortly after it came into effect, the EU organised an independ-
ent review (“the impact study”) of its effectiveness.3 The final report of 
the impact study prepared by London Economics and iff (in association 
with PaySys) was submitted in 2011. Its key findings addressed passport-
ing, fees and charges for payment services, market fragmented and what 
are known as “one-leg” transactions (i.e. where funds are sent from an 
EU state to a non-EU jurisdiction). These issues are considered in more 
detail below.
The impact study praised the way the Directive had helped develop 
a single market in EU payment services and had increased transparency 
within the payments market and had also increased the speed at which 
they were executed. All this was seen as aiding business efficiency. No 
longer were electronic payments allowed to march at the speed of the 
slowest piece of paper through the payments’ clearing system. However, 
there were still significant failures.
7.3.1  Main Findings of Impact Study
The impact study found little evidence of innovation in the market struc-
ture. There had been very few new entrants since the Directive came into 
force in 2009. Moreover, payment services firms had not grasped the 
opportunity to operate across EU borders using passporting privileges 
under the Directive.
PSD I required businesses offering payment services, whether within 
a single EU jurisdiction or across EU member state borders, to be 
authorised by their local or “home” state regulator. By late 2012 there 
were only 568 authorised payment institutions (APIs). Of these some 
40% carried on the business of money remittance (i.e. sending money 
to non-EU states; often used by migrant workers). In spite of PSD I, 
there remained very wide differences between the structures of payment 
3 Study on the impact of Directive 2007/64/EC on payment services in the internal 
market and on the application of Regulation (EC) No. 924/2009 on cross-border pay-
ments in the Community, Final Report, http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/payments/
docs/framework/130724_study-impact-psd_en.pdf.
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services providers across the various EU jurisdiction with no obvious 
explanations. 85% of the APIs existed before the Directive so there is no 
evidence of much new competition entering the market.
Additionally, the impact study found that the use of passporting for 
payment services varied greatly between jurisdictions but even when this 
legislative facility was employed, firms only operated in a small number 
of EU states besides their home nation. The process of obtaining a pass-
port was seen as lengthy and complex. Reasons given for this included a 
lack of harmonisation of customer protection and anti-money laundering 
measures. The impact study also indicated that APIs that also provided 
credit to customers were subject to two separate regulators. It recom-
mended that a single regulator supervise both the provision of credit and 
payment services.
One of the aims behind PSD I was to ensure equal charges for 
both domestic and cross-border payments within the EU for sums of 
€50,000 or less. However, the impact study found mixed results. In 
some instances, this had resulted in higher fees for both types of trans-
action and the introduction of new charges. Some EU states also per-
mitted differential charges for different payment instruments reflecting 
the increased charges on merchants for credit card transactions. These 
charges could exceed the actual costs card companies imposed on mer-
chants. This appears to contradict the Consumer Rights Directive.4 This 
limits merchants charging “in respect of the use of a given means of pay-
ment, fees that exceed the cost borne by the trader for the use of such 
means”.5 However, the impact study did point out that establishing and 
enforcing the true cost to a merchant of accepting a credit card payment 
may be complex and difficult.
The impact study also found potential confusion between payments 
under the PSD I and those relating to e-money, which are subject to the 
Electronic Money Directive II.6 In essence, a payment service provides 
secure messaging between the person or entity instructing the payment 
and the recipient of the funds and the respective businesses holding 
the money to be transmitted and the organisation receiving the funds. 
4 2011/83/EU, published in 2011 and enacted into national laws in 2013, https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32011L0083.
5 Ibid., Art 19.
6 2009/110/EC, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/ALL/?uri=CELEX: 
32009L0110.
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The impact study considered that this process, and its importance, may 
not be clear to customers.
There are a number of payment services providers who were exempt 
from the Directive (e.g. pre-paid cards, ATM operators, money 
exchanges, etc.) whom the review, though, could be used to circum-
vent the Directive’s requirements and hence gain an unfair competition 
advantage.
Another area of focus is known as “one-leg” transactions, mentioned 
earlier, since such transactions are normally undertaken by vulnerable 
migrant customers sending money home. The review recommended 
treating these types of transfers on the same basis as intra-EU payments. 
These and the other exemptions cause customer confusion since they 
may fail to understand which transactions are protected by the Directive 
and which fall outside it.
There was considerable confusion about the liability for unauthor-
ised payments. Article 61 limited customer liability to €150 except in 
circumstances involving customer fraud or gross negligence. However, 
implementation in member states varied. The issue appeared to be the 
different evidential requirements demonstrating “gross negligence” in 
each jurisdiction.
Finally, the review reported large differences between national com-
plaints arrangements required by the Directive. It praised those available 
in the Republic of Ireland and in the UK while observing that in most 
other member states, complaints systems had still to be developed.
In response to these findings in 2012, the EU Commission published 
a consultative “Green Paper”: “Towards an integrated European market 
for card, Internet and mobile payments”.7 The Commission remained 
particularly keen to develop cross-border payments. However, it is possi-
ble to speculate that the Commission was also concerned that the major 
credit card companies continued to dominate the consumer payments 
system within the EU. This may be seen as reflected in the Commission’s 
wish to help “to launch innovative, safe and easy-to-use digital payments 
services and to provide consumers and retailers with effective, convenient 
and secure payments methods in the Union”.8
7 http://ec.europa.eu/finance/consultations/2012/card-internet-mobile-payments/
index_en.htm.
8 PSD II, Recital 4.
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7.4  Payment services directive ii
In the light of this report and the rapid changes in technology, the EU 
quickly developed PSD II.9 This repealed and replaced all the measures 
in PSD I. However, many articles in the original Directive were re- 
enacted in PSD II.
PSD II was published at the end of 2015 and required implementa-
tion in local law by January 2018. The Directive required the European 
Banking Authority (EBA) to develop a range of technical guidance to 
flesh out the Directive. These are considered later in this chapter.
The aims of the new Directive were to:
• assist in the integration of the EU’s payments market,
• promote competition by encouraging new participants in the mar-
ket including FinTech and the development of mobile and Internet 
payment services across the EU,
• encourage lower prices for payments, and
• increase customer confidence in making more efficient electronic 
payments by introducing better customer protection against fraud 
and other abuses and error. This would require enhanced security 
arrangements.10
The main themes in the Directive were to increase security measures and 
other customer protections, level the competitive playing field by reduc-
ing the various exemptions from payment services regulation and to 
permit two new innovative arrangements: “account information service 
providers (AISPs)” and “payment initiation service providers (PISPs)”. 
These important developments are considered later. The next sections 
look at the other major changes first.
7.4.1  Scope of the Directive and the Removal of Exclusions
A number of exclusions exempting business operations from regulation 
have been removed. For example, payment arrangements which can only 
9 2015/2366/EC, http://ec.europa.eu/finance/payments/framework/index_en.htm.
10 European Commission—Fact Sheet, Payment Services Directive: frequently asked 
questions (12 January 2018), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-5793_
en.htm. Accessed 4 April 2018.
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be used for buying goods and services from a prescribed list of businesses 
are now included within the Directive’s scope.11 However, payments 
made within a group of companies remains exempt from the need for 
regulation as do payments aimed at collecting funds for charitable pur-
poses. As before, with PSD I, physical cash and paper based payment 
instruments (e.g. cheques) remain outside the scope of the Directive.
Payments sent or received where one of the Payment Service 
Providers (PSPs) is located outside the EEA will be covered, as will pay-
ments in non-EEA currencies.12
PSD II, as with PSD I, is limited to regulating payment services pro-
viders which do not also take deposits or issues electronic money. Firms 
which take deposits which are used to fund payments will continue to be 
regulated under the Capital Requirements Directive IV (i.e. banks and 
similar credit institutions).13 Similarly, businesses which issue electronic 
money will continue to be subject to their own Directive.14
7.4.2  Authorisation of Payment Institutions
There are no substantial changes from PSD I on the authorisation and 
supervision of payment institutions. However, the EBA is tasked with 
the job of determining criteria for establishing the minimum amount of 
professional indemnity insurance or other forms of guarantee required by 
authorised firms. Moreover, the APIs will only be permitted to provide 
credit when it is closely linked to the payment service.15
In order to enhance co-operation between EU member states, the 
Directive requires the EBA to assist in resolving cross-border disputes 
between regulators and to publish guidance on this and the necessary 
data exchanges to aid supervision.16 The EBA is also required to pub-
lish a central public register of authorised payment services firms.17 The 
Directive contains various other customer protection measures such as 
16 PSD II, Art 25 (5).
17 PSD II, Art 15.
11 PSD II, Recital 14.
12 PSD II, Art 2.
13 Directive 2013/36/EU.
14 PSD II, Art 63 (3), The taking up, pursuit and prudential supervision of the business 
of electronic money institutions, Directive 2009/110/EC.
15 PSD II, Art 1 (a).
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those relating to the transparency of charges and prohibitions on dis-
crimination, based on nationality or place of residence against those resi-
dents legally in the EU.18
Host member states are permitted to take precautionary measures in 
the event of an emergency situation such as a large-scale fraud.19
7.4.3  Innovation
PSD II seeks to promote the development of two aspects of FinTech. 
The first collects, aggregates and analyses information from customer 
payments transactions. The Directive describes this as an “account infor-
mation service” (AIS). PSD II views the second as a “software bridge 
between the website of the merchant and the online banking platform” 
of the customer initiating a payment across to the merchant’s account.20 
It is classified in the Directive as a “payment initiation service” (PIS). It 
is defined in Article 4 (15) as “a service to initiate a payment order at the 
request of the payment service user with respect to a payment account 
held at another payment service provider”. It is a secure messaging sys-
tem and at no stage does the PIS provider ever hold the customer’s 
payment.
Providers of such services are termed “PISPs” and “AISPs”. They are 
also known collectively as third-party providers (TPPs).21 These may be 
seen as distinct new financial services industries developing new customer 
services (Chiu 2017).
The Directive also refers to “account servicing payment service pro-
vider” (AS PSP). This is the firm where the customer’s payment account 
is held (e.g. the customer’s bank).
Customers must give explicit consent to use PIS and AIS arrange-
ments. There is no requirement for a contract between the customer 
and either the PISP or AISP. Nor is a contract necessary between the 
PISP and the merchant supplying goods or services to the customer.22 
Customer agreements with PSP can be either ad hoc, good for a sin-
gle transaction or set-up under a continuing contract. The latter must be 
18 PSD II, Art 98 and Title III.
19 PSD II, Art 30.
20 PSD II, Recital 26–29.
21 PSD II, Art 4.
22 PSD II, Recital 30.
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capable of termination without charge with a notice period not exceed-
ing a month.23
PISPs and AISPs must ensure that the personalised security creden-
tials are not shared with other parties and they must not store sensitive 
payment data. AS PSPs are required to treat payment orders and data 
requests transmitted via a PISP or AISP “without any discrimination 
other than for objective reasons”.24
However, both types of innovation enable third parties to delve into 
the payments accounts of customers. Hence the Directive delegates, to 
the EBA, the need to develop technical guidance for “secure customer 
authentication” (SCA). This important aspect is considered later.
7.4.4  Confirmation of Availability of Funds
PSD II creates a new fund availability confirmation service. It allows a 
third party with the customer’s express permission to obtain confirma-
tion from the customer’s AS PSP (i.e. their bank) that sufficient funds 
are available to enable a payment to be made. It only requires a “yes/
no” response.25 It is not clear how useful this facility will be in practice 
since it is of little help in assessing credit worthiness. However, there may 
be some value in a merchant knowing that the funds exist to satisfy a 
payment a few moments before a payment order is executed on a cus-
tomer’s account.
7.4.5  Enhancing Competition
There is a broad requirement in the Directive that those participating in 
a payments system within the EU provide access to authorised payment 
services firms in a non-discriminatory way.26 This is part of the gen-
eral theme within PSD II promoting increased competition in payment 
services.
23 PSD II, Art 55.
24 PSD II, Recital 33.
25 PSD II, Art 65.
26 PSD II, Recital 50 and Art 69.
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7.4.6  Customer Protection
Both the 2007 and the 2015 Directives on payment services are based 
on the understanding that in meeting their objectives customer trust is 
essential. PSD II, consequently, develops the protections provided ini-
tially by PSD I for individual “real” personal customers and EU mem-
ber states are empowered to extend the Directive’s safeguards to 
“micro-enterprises”.27
Issues with incorrect or unauthorised payments should be communi-
cated as soon as possible.28
There is an important protection afforded to customers in that the 
Directive requires that any alleged unauthorised transaction is immedi-
ately reimbursed unless there is a “high suspicion” that an “unauthorised 
transaction results from fraudulent behaviour” by the customer.29 The 
suspicion must be based on “objective grounds”. These must be passed 
to the national regulator and the PSP should “conduct, within a reasona-
ble time, an investigation before refunding the payer”.30 Customers have 
eight weeks to make a claim for a refund.31
The customers, unless they are acting fraudulently or are grossly neg-
ligent, should only be liable for a maximum of €50 for any loss of their 
“payment instrument” (e.g. a payment access card) prior to their notify-
ing the PSP.32 What constitutes “gross negligence” will be a matter for 
national law. Any contractual attempt by a PSP to change or shift the 
burden of proof against the customer will be nugatory.33
The customer’s PSP or PISP should assume responsibility for any 
failure in the payments chain.34 However, if the customer has used 
the wrong payee’s identifier, the PSP will not be liable but “should be 
obliged to cooperate in making reasonable efforts to recover the funds” 
28 PSD II, Arts 73–74.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
31 PSD II, Art 77.
32 PSD II, Art 74.
33 PSD II, Recital 72.
34 PSD II, Art 90.
27 Ibid., Art 4 (36).
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including providing information to the customer to help trace the miss-
ing funds.35
In terms of liability, in the event of an unauthorised, non-executed, 
defective or late executed payment initiated via a PISP, the AS PSP is 
required to refund the customer immediately. There is an obligation on 
the PISP to compensate the AS PSP where the former is liable, with the 
burden of proof lying with the PISP “to prove that, within its sphere of 
competence, the payment was authenticated, accurately recorded and not 
affected by a technical breakdown or other deficiency,” linked to the pay-
ment service of which it is in charge.36
The Directive stipulates that the full amount transferred should arrive 
intact without any charges being levied beyond those agreed at the 
outset.37
All payment made in Euros or other member state currencies should 
be executed within, at most one day. All other payments should also be 
completed within the same time period unless otherwise agreed.38
7.4.7  Security
Security measures must be proportionate to the security risk and PSPs 
must maintain measures to mitigate security risks and to provide the 
national regulator with regular updates assessing these risks together with 
their risk reduction actions.39 PSPs are under an obligation to report, 
quickly, major security incidents to national authorities.40
7.4.8  Complaints Handling
The Directive requires that member states have an easily accessible, inde-
pendent, impartial, transparent and effective alternative disputes resolu-
tion arrangement for issues between customers and PSPs.41 PSPs must 
35 PSD II, Recital 88.
36 PSD II, Art 72.
37 PSD II, Art 81.
38 PSD II, Art 83.
39 PSD II, Recital 91.
40 PSD II, Art 96.
41 PSD II, Art 102.
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have dispute resolution procedures and must respond to complaints 
within fifteen business days of a complaint being received.42
7.5  euroPean banking authority (eba)  
work on Psd ii
The EBA has a series of work projects in-hand on the implementation of 
PSD II to ensure that they are secure and efficient.43 It has been prepar-
ing a Regulatory Technical Standard (RTS) on home/host state cooperation 
and, in particular, the information exchanges needed by both. This includes 
separate guidance on the reporting of fraud by PSPs to local competent 
authorities.
The EBA has also produced an RTS and a set of Implementing 
Technical Standard (ITS) on setting up the EBA register mentioned 
earlier. There is also guidance on areas such as professional indemnity 
insurance. Important technical guidance on security measures and SCA, 
incident reporting and complaints handling have been agreed and pub-
lished. SCA is considered in more detail later below (see also Zetzsche 
et al. 2017).44
7.6  secure customer authentication (sca)
As part of the move to protect customers and businesses, PSD II requires 
SCA—which authenticates the identity of the customer and their right to 
make the transaction—before an electronic payment can be made.45 SCA 
“is based on the use of two or more elements categorised as knowledge 
42 PSD II, Art 101.
43 https://www.eba.europa.eu/regulation-and-policy/payment-services-and-electron-
ic-money/-/activity-list/MgjX6aveTl7v/more. Accessed 9 April 2018. See also ‘EBA man-
dates in PSD2 and their timelines’, https://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/87703/
EBA+Mandates+PSD2.pdf/5c2493a4-ef26-4434-8338-736895bd423f
44 The EBA has stated that it will be “analysing regulatory sandboxes [safe regulatory 
areas for testing innovative products, services and operations] and innovation hubs with a 
view to developing a set of best practices to enhance consistency and facilitate supervisory 
coordination”, EBA FinTech Roadmap (March 2018), 4, https://www.eba.europa.eu/
documents/10180/1919160/EBA+FinTech+Roadmap.pdf.
45 Supplementing Directive 2015/2366 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
with regard to RTS for SCA and common and secure open standards of communication, 
http://ec.europa.eu/finance/docs/level-2-measures/psd2-rts-2017-7782_en.pdf.
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(something only the user knows, e.g. a password or a PIN), possession 
(something only the user possesses, e.g. the card or an authentication 
code generating device) and inherence (something the user is, e.g. the 
use of a fingerprint or voice recognition)”.46 There is a view that these 
arrangements may “ring alarm bells” as these services “open up a new 
class of vulnerabilities” (Mansfield-Devin 2016). “For remote transac-
tions, such as online payments, the security requirements go even fur-
ther, requiring a dynamic link to the amount of the transaction and the 
account of the payee, to further protect the user by minimising the risks 
in case of mistakes or fraudulent attacks”.47
7.6.1  Exemptions for SCA
“As a matter of principle, all electronic means of payment are subject to 
the requirement for SCA. However, exemptions are possible as it is not 
always necessary and convenient to request the same level of security from 
all payment transactions”.48 For example, low value transactions such as 
that used for contactless payments at terminals should not require SCA.49
7.7  commentary
It is not immediately obvious how the availability of PISs will change how 
customers operate. Customers will not see much change if they use a PISP 
compared to using their current credit or debit card for making a payment. 
However, credit card issuers and acquirers are likely to be disintermediated 
since merchants will not need their services. The PISP will move the funds 
straight from the customer’s bank account into that of the merchant.
It is likely that this will be cheaper for merchants who, in any event, 
are not permitted to charge extra for different payment methods under 
the Directive (Grüschow et al. 2016). It may be possible for the mer-
chant to pass some of the margin saved to the customer but again how 
this might be done is still not clear since offering a discount, say, for 
those using a PIS compared with a credit card would fall foul of PSD II.
46 European Commission—Fact Sheet—PSD II: frequently asked questions, 16, http://
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AISPs may be able to help customers who have multiple financial 
products which they want to view regularly. With the customer’s express 
permission, the AISP could access all the customer’s accounts in the EU 
and present the information in near enough real time. The data could be 
expressed in charts and analysed into different categories of expenditure.
This information would be of value in the market both in aggre-
gate and individually. It would help firms decide what to market and to 
whom. It would be of value to competitors since, for example, a cus-
tomer could be enticed to move their current account with a cheaper 
overdraft offer.
However, it is not clear what actual level of customer demand exists 
for AIS. Typically, in the EU, only around 19% of customers have more 
than two bank accounts (EY 2012). Further, where a customer has 
two bank accounts, one will normally be for their banking transactions 
and the other for savings. There is a view that in Europe the advan-
tages for customers of A2A have yet to emerge (Wyman 2016). Banks 
will almost certainly act to protect their current positions since it is esti-
mated that some 9% of retail payments revenue may be under threat by 
2020 (Jackson 2018). The evidence is that most customers are very pas-
sive; reluctant to change “their” bank and it usually takes a significant 
operational failure to prompt a customer to move accounts (European 
Commission 2007).
There is scope for future socio-legal research on both merchant sup-
pliers and customer attitudes to the changes brought about by PSD II. 
Various businesses will be undertaking their own research but they are 
unlikely to approach it from the legal perspective. The EU will probably 
review whether the results from the Directive demonstrate that the mar-
kets in payment services are moving towards meeting its own objectives. 
Indeed, the EU will need to keep this whole area under close review as 
a result of both social and technological changes affects the markets and 
customer outcomes. Much also will depend on fraud prevention where 
even SCA may prove vulnerable (European Payments Council 2017).
PSD II provides scope for FinTech to develop in key parts of the pay-
ment services market. However, it is likely that growing market share 
will be a significant challenge for small innovators. Nevertheless, there 
are opportunities for large players such as the Apples and Amazons’ of 
this world to gain margin from card companies and for banks to intro-
duce their own A2A arrangements buttressed by their reputation with 
customers.
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8.1  introduction
In standard economic texts, money is usually referred to as a unit of 
account, a store of value, and a medium of exchange (Asmundson and 
Oner 2012), and yet when examined as a social phenomenon, other crit-
ically important attributes about our societies are revealed, most nota-
bly, how trust (Ingham 2004) and power structures (Baker 1987) are 
operationalised. This view that money’s extraeconomic, social basis 
(Zelizer 2011) should be acknowledged is one that carries increasing 
weight: the usefulness and value of money—and its concomitant forms 
of exchange—are socially constructed and locally contingent. Indeed, 
Simmel’s classic text on the philosophy of money (Simmel 1900), in 
which he examines the mechanisms that underpin economic exchange, 
considers financial transactions as a form of social interaction and adds 
that outside the exchange relation, money loses meaning. Dodd upholds 
a similar view of the inseparability of money and social relations: “[… ] 
money is a process, not a thing, whose value derives from the dynamic, 
ever-changing, and often contested social relations that sustain its circu-
lation” (Dodd 2014, Preface). This view allows us to move beyond the 
abstract, a socialised flow of value that are typical of the literature in eco-
nomics (Zelizer 2011).
While we are seeing a resurgence in how the use of money is under-
stood, at a practical level, this is being challenged by the move towards 
making money digital. For technology developers and the banking 
industry, money appears to be envisaged simply as aseptic, standardised 
data in binary form, viewed as an online resource, with payment pro-
moted as an efficient form of value token transaction as it moves across 
digital networks and is audited via a remote banking ledger (Wandhöfer 
2017). We argue that this view is not wrong, but that it is a very par-
tial perspective. Nevertheless, it is worth summarising the reasons for this 
orientation towards money as data so that we can explore its drivers and 
then begin to dissect how this may limit a discourse about its design and 
use. It is evident that connected ubiquitous mobile technologies have 
opened up opportunities for innovative financial technology solutions 
for storing money and payment instruments (e.g. digital wallets), and 
8 FROM TRANSACTIONS TO INTERACTIONS …  123
conducting transactions (e.g. Apple Pay, Square, Stripe). The benefits 
of transacting digitally, in large part lies in the speed with which iden-
tities can be verified and transactions confirmed. Digital payments (see 
Chapter 7) are considered to be a cheaper form of transaction, and it is 
estimated that the use of cash can cost countries more than 1% of their 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Denecker et al. 2013); electronic pay-
ment systems have lower administrative costs, lower security costs, and 
digital money does not require transportation, so that such reduced 
digital infrastructural overheads offer considerable advantages. So there 
is a reasonable argument to be made for considering the value of finan-
cial digitalisation as presenting efficiency gains with faster, cheaper, and 
more mobile transactions. Yet, as we have argued, this ignores aspects of 
money that are pervasive even in quantitative fields such as economics 
in which the use of money (through prices) provides information about 
markets, so that money necessarily involves interactions, not just transac-
tions. So how do we account for the social aspects around transactions? 
Returning to the conceptualisation of financial transactions embedded in 
social relations, we investigate where opportunities are for social interac-
tions in digital transactions.
In this chapter, we examine the affordances of digital transactions to 
illustrate possibilities for action, opportunities for interaction, and the 
roles of negotiation and intermediation within digital transactions. We 
then highlight some social impacts of digital transactions and its associ-
ated data generation, its embeddedness alongside other available forms 
of transaction, and the ways in which the digital world conflates money 
with payment systems.
8.2  affordances of digital money
How money is designed lends itself to different forms of use, both phys-
ically and socially, and we refer to these forms of use as affordances. 
Norman (1999, p. 39) explains that “the word affordance was coined by 
the perceptual psychologist J. J. Gibson (1977) to refer to the actiona-
ble properties between the world and an actor (a person or animal).” 
Similarly, how money is represented shapes the ways in which we can 
interact with it and use it. Different materials offer different affordances 
and ‘forcing functions’ (i.e. constraints on use; Norman 1999), histori-
cally illustrated by Jevons from classical literature, noting “there was a tra-
dition in Greece that Lycurgus obliged the Lacedæmonians to use iron 
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money, in order that its weight might deter them from overmuch trading” 
(Jevons 1876, p. 53). These notions of portability designed into the cur-
rency would seem to have had a direct impact on use, much in the same 
way that certain configurations of digital money and payment operations 
might confer financial benefits around Anti Money Laundering (AML)  or 
Know Your Customer (KYC)  regulations, or tracking data on user spend-
ing or income might, for example, allow different forms of social sharing, 
customised marketing, preferential interest rates, or personalised finan-
cial services to be made available to users. Here we list some of the affor-
dances of digital money and the opportunities for digital value transfer:
Frictionless: Digital money offers the promise of frictionless trans-
actions. That is, financial interactions that are fast and easy, enabled by 
contactless technologies. For example, checkout terminals supporting 
contactless payments are becoming increasingly ubiquitous, where pay-
ment simply requires the consumer to wave a card or device in front 
of a reader, eliminating the need for entering a PIN or swiping a card 
through the machine. Likewise, but offering a different set of social 
affordances, Alipay in China supports the use of personalised QR codes, 
where payment is completed with a scan of the QR code. But even these 
forms of directly replacing the traditional form of payment are being 
challenged as digital technology can reformat the nature of the transac-
tion dramatically. Thus, using a combination of computer vision, sen-
sor fusion, and deep learning with a mobile app, Amazon Go stores 
eliminate the need for consumers to pass through a checkout point 
altogether, and therefore eliminate the need for any interaction on the 
part of the consumer. Described as ‘grab-and-go,’ the transaction is fric-
tionless in that it is fully automated—consumers enter the store, select 
their items and then leave. Giving users a means of making sense of how 
this works, when it is operational, and which payment system is currently 
operating will be a significant challenge in order to ensure user under-
standing and trust.
Anonymous: Digital money offers new possibilities for conduct-
ing transactions anonymously. Persisting weaknesses in Internet secu-
rity and privacy concerns drive the need for technological solutions that 
protect consumers’ identities (Juang 2003). One early example of an 
attempt at an anonymous payment system was e-cash, invented by David 
Chaum, as a type of limited-traceability system (Chaum 1983; Chaum 
and Brands 1997). The aim was to emulate the anonymity of cash 
transactions, through cryptographic protocols (Goldberg et al. 1997). 
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Bitcoin, currently the most widely known cryptocurrency, is often cited 
as an anonymous currency, but it is in fact pseudonymous (Anonymous 
2017). Full anonymity, requires hiding not only the identities of those 
involved in the transaction, but also the content of the transaction as 
well as metadata such as the date of transaction and method of payment. 
Further, anonymity in transactions tends to be traded off against speed 
and requires high levels of processing power. Achieving fully anonymous 
digital transactions is still an ongoing challenge, and the socio-political 
value that payment anonymity holds is a topic of contentious debate. 
Anonymous—and partially anonymous—payments can be problematic in 
the context of customer service: showing that something has been paid 
for by a customer (e.g. for item pickup or returns) when it is unclear 
who has paid is likely to present difficulties when these scenarios are not 
actively considered by designers.
Transparent: Digital money offers mechanisms for transparency in 
financial transactions. Blockchain technology (see Chapter 10), popular-
ised by Bitcoin “[..] offers a way of recording transactions or any digital 
interaction in a way that is designed to be secure, transparent, highly resist-
ant to outages, auditable, and efficient” (Schatsky and Muraskin 2015). 
Transparency around transactions allows auditing, gauging who you are 
transacting with, and can help build trust and discourage fraudulent trans-
actions. While this enables an “unprecedented level of forensic analysis 
to be carried out on the transactions themselves” (Buenaventura 2017, 
p. 26), it also allows the transactional metadata to be used by other par-
ties, which might include banks, third-party financial services, govern-
ment agencies and tax authorities, or even users themselves in exploring 
their patterns of spending. Herein lies a challenge for designers in deter-
mining how transparency is managed, and who has access to what infor-
mation. To what extent would you like others to know your financial 
arrangements in the same way that Google, Facebook, and Amazon 
know about your digital existence: Your partner? Your boss? Your bank? 
Your life or health insurance company? The government? Permissioned 
transparency also potentially offers criminals access through a backdoor to 
users’ financial records.
Non-denominated: Digital money is divisible in ways that physical 
money is not. The use of digital money allows micropayments; payments 
that may even be below normal minimum denominations of currency 
(e.g. sub-cent or sub-penny). This is made more plausible when trans-
action charges are low, which enable payments in very small amounts to 
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be made viable. Early instantiations of micropayment systems faltered 
in the 1990s, but blockchain technology, with its potential for low- 
transaction cost micropayments offers credible opportunities for casual 
and ad hoc payments. This has been demonstrated as having value in 
thing-to-thing (also known as machine-to-machine) payments in the 
Internet of things (Lundqvist et al. 2017), for example, to purchase or 
sell power, bandwidth, or data. The effort of making or setting up mul-
tiple tiny payments manually, is however, a challenge, and allowing end 
users (i.e. ordinary citizens) to set these payments up, to monitor them 
over time, and to ensure that fraudulent payments are not being made 
requires user interface designs that are easily understandable and simple 
to operate.
Dataful: Using digital money itself generates data, in a way that using 
cash does not. This data has enormous potential value and can be used 
to both generate revenue with new business models, as well as to provide 
the users themselves with information about their monetary activities, in 
the same way that Google gains knowledge through users’ search activi-
ties at the same time as users can gain access to more personalised knowl-
edge as they do so.
8.3  oPPortunities for interaction
For money use to be conceived as social interactions, rather than just 
transactions, hinges on identifying the opportunities available for money 
users to engage in social encounters with each other. In the following 
sections, we draw attention to where these opportunities might be in 
the transaction, the effects of intermediation on these opportunities, and 
implications for understanding value in the transaction.
8.3.1  Negotiating Payment
Two parties coming to agreement on how payment will proceed, what 
information will be exchanged and how. While a typical cash transac-
tion occurs during a face-to-face exchange of cash, it is easy to imagine 
any means of exchange using similar physical formats of money. As 
one example, one party could place their money in a physical location 
and hand the other party a set of instructions for how to locate it. The 
mechanics we choose to adhere to during the exchange of money in our 
everyday lives are guided by social conventions (Carruthers 2010), but 
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not limited to them. Consequently, the rules for the exchange of phys-
ical money can be considered negotiable by the transacting parties and, 
hence, become opportunities for interaction.
8.3.2  Effects of Intermediation
The more the transaction is intermediated (by banks, financial institu-
tions, technology, and infrastructure companies), the less choice transact-
ing parties have in setting the rules of the value transfer. For example, a 
payment involving a bank deposit, will heed the rules as set by the bank 
and the regulatory framework in which the bank operates. Negotiable 
matters between the transacting parties are mostly limited to non- 
procedural decisions such as the agreement that bank deposit money is 
a valid form of payment and which banks may be involved. When pay-
ments involve digital money, the tools used in the transfer of digital 
money, and by implication the designers of those tools, further constrain 
which decisions are left to transacting parties concerning the rules of the 
value transfer.
8.3.3  Collaborative Value Creation
During a transaction, the value is not only something that is transferred 
between transactors, it can also be created by virtue of the interaction 
between the transacting parties (Carroll and Bellotti 2015). When peo-
ple (and devices) have to work together, that is, purposefully coordinate 
their actions to accomplish a monetary transaction, these transactors are 
engaging in what has been found to be a valuable set of opportunities for 
building social connections (Ferreira et al. 2015). In this way, transac-
tors are creating value in the exchange that extends beyond its economic 
value. Research into cumbersome transactions, that is, transactions that 
are perceived as slow or tedious, has highlighted the ways in which peo-
ple engage with each other during the transaction and the implications of 
this type of interaction for enriching their social relationships. Bringing 
digital payment devices, such as mobile phones, into the exchange sets 
up the interactions with yet more potential variations.
What this would suggest is that the payments technology used—infra-
structure, interaction design, and physical form factor—offer ways of cre-
ating new connections between people and new ways of using money to 
drive social interactions.
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8.4  social imPacts of digital transactions
Along with recognising the opportunities for social encounters in trans-
actions, there is a need to examine the social impacts brought on by 
transacting digitally. In this section, we present our observations on 
social impacts with respect to attitudes around financial data, the availa-
bility of different forms of money, and understanding of money and pay-
ment systems.
8.4.1  Sensitive Data Generation and Sharing
Financial and credit card data have been shown to be considered the 
most sensitive personal data (Rose et al. 2013) and Experian cyber ana-
lysts estimate the value of stolen financial data to be worth up to USD 
200 on the Dark Web (Stack 2018). In order to protect financial data, 
laws and regulations have emerged that impose strict security require-
ments on the institutions and other financial service providers that pro-
cess financial data. As a result, there are limitations on how financial data 
can be shared or opened up for inspection. In Europe, there have been 
moves to allowing third parties (in practice, new FinTech entrants being 
allowed banking) permissioned access. This poses challenges for new 
entrants to the FinTech space where no or limited access to data requires 
creative workarounds in the design of technologies that interface with 
financial infrastructures.
8.4.2  Choice Proliferation
Despite the drive towards cashless societies, digital money and digi-
tal exchange continue to co-exist alongside non-digital forms of money 
and non-digital forms of exchange. Increasingly, the money we use and 
the ways in which it is exchanged are understood to be a collection of 
pragmatic responses to wide-ranging needs. So despite governmental and 
regulatory attempts at homogenising the money system, the varieties of 
uses and social contexts that emerge around money continue to engen-
der new forms of money and exchange. For example, loyalty points, and 
volunteer currencies such as time dollars. The proliferation of connected 
digital tools that enable new forms.
An integrated approach to parallel physical and digital media 
seems to be a prevalent concern across fiat and alternative currencies 
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(see, for example, the Bristol and Brixton Pounds—Perry and Ferreira 
2018). Similarly, O’Neill et al. (2017) discuss the challenges and user 
practices around working digital money into the cash economy; these are 
non-trivial problems for users in making money work for them, in their 
individual and local circumstances. Moreover, the physical work that 
goes into making digital transactions also presents a considerable chal-
lenge to designers as they look to develop useful affordances into digital 
forms of money.
8.4.3  Untangling Money and Payment System
When we talk about digital payment systems, or refer to digital or mobile 
money, we refer not to money as an object of value itself, but to our use 
of the digital infrastructure that has been built up around the interme-
diated transfer of value using bank deposit money. This, along with the 
limited scope for ordinary people to negotiate their own rules around 
digital payment systems, invites a confusing situation where ‘money’ 
and ‘payment system’ become increasingly difficult concepts to sepa-
rate in the digital world. In the world of cryptocurrencies, this is taken 
a step further, with the payment system (as a digitally held ledger of 
balances) wholly superseding the need for an object—we might call 
this money—itself. Here, as with a card payment or bank transfer, no 
actual thing is transferred, but merely a digital record is updated. In this 
respect, the payment system—the financial infrastructure—takes on the 
role of money. However, this is very much at odds with the ways that 
most everyday users of money tend to conceive of its operation when 
they make or receive payments. The phrase “I’ll pay you” is very much 
an active process of transfer, compared to the reality of transactional 
settlement that might be functionally better expressed as “I’ll initiate a 
permissioned record change to your bank account.” Moreover, there 
is often very little directness to this financial transfer, with a variety of 
intermediaries sitting between payer and payee, to the extent that actual 
financial settlements between the payer and payee’s banks may only hap-
pen at a single point as an aggregate of all customer transactions between 
institutions over the accounting time period. When designing payment 
systems for customers, it may therefore be necessary to represent what 
actually happens in ways that map more to user perceptions of this pro-
cess than to institutional actuality.
130  J. FERREIRA AND M. PERRY
8.5  conclusion
Money is a multifaceted dynamic concept and our understanding of it 
is continually challenged and modified by financial innovations. Perhaps 
due to a long tradition within monetary theory of treating money as 
‘neutral,’ there is still no agreed position on what money is and, despite 
ongoing critique, the ‘textbook triad’ of money as a unit of account, a 
store of value and a medium of exchange, continues to structure much of 
the discussion. This difficulty carries over to discussions of digital money 
and digital transactions. Understanding its use and working to change its 
operation is an especially complex task precisely because money is so per-
vasively connected to our lives.
In this chapter, we examined the affordances of digital transactions to 
illustrate possibilities for action, opportunities for interaction, and the 
roles of negotiation and intermediation within digital transactions. We 
have highlighted some social impacts of digital transactions and its asso-
ciated data generation, its embeddedness alongside other available forms 
of transaction, and the ways in which the digital world conflate money 
and payment systems.
As digital money plays an increasingly central role in our lives, having 
the means to articulate our interactions with it helps to ensure digital 
transactions are designed to be the kinds of experiences we wish to have. 
Payment platforms, like any other digital tools, are open to be shaped by 
their designers, and can do more to support the interactional and trans-
actional work required—future systems that attend to their users’ needs 
offer opportunities that extend far beyond the rather limited current 
notions of faster payments and cheaper services.
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according to their principal function: native coins and crypto tokens. 
Native coins, like Bitcoin, generally compete with the traditional forms 
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ment infrastructure. Differently from native coins, crypto tokens are 
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9.1  introduction
Money is a social invention (Samuelson 1958; Menger 1892). A cryp-
tocurrency is “a digital currency in which encryption techniques are used 
to regulate the generation of units of currency and verify the transfer of 
funds, operating independently of a central bank” (Oxford Dictionary). 
Nowadays, there exist several cryptocurrencies, more than one thousand, 
and in the years to come tens of thousands cryptocurrencies are expected 
to populate our economy in a sort of currency competition à la Hayek.
Most of these cryptocurrencies have a public common underlying 
ledger termed blockchain (see Chapter 10), where tamper-proof blocks 
of transactions are linked through an “append-only” logic following a 
predefined set of rules. The structure has been engineered in order to 
allow users to trust the process, not the counterparty. Thus, users can 
exchange valuable information or monetary value even without know-
ing each other, their geographical position, their affiliation or national-
ity and especially their reliability. For the sake of simplicity, we refer to 
blockchain as the larger family of distributed ledger technologies, which 
encompass also non-block-based ledgers (e.g., Ripple or IOTA).
Cryptocurrencies represent the latest step of technology evolution in 
terms of currencies: a long process that has unfolded through millenni-
ums of trading from barter to the dematerialisation of banknotes that is 
bringing us to digital fiat. The recent development of peer-to-peer (P2P) 
networks, the Internet capacity transmission, computing processing, 
storage capacity and cryptography security, have fostered a technological 
and logical leap from the previous currency standards.
We refer to cryptocurrencies or crypto assets as the omni compre-
hensive family of digital tokens, which can be separated into native 
coins and crypto tokens. Native coins, like Bitcoin, represent a new asset 
class of electronic money universally accessible via peer-to-peer payment 
networks. Instead, crypto tokens are forms of “digital vouchers” that 
allow the token holders to get access to almost any type of service and 
assets: from monetary rewards, or commodities to loyalty points to even 
other cryptocurrencies. A token can either be fungible or non-fungible. 
Probably, at the moment, the most famous example of non-fungible 
tokens that hit the headlines are CryptoKitties. Each CryptoKitty is rep-
resented in the form of a non-fungible ERC-721 token, which allows for 
each entity to have specific attributes (“phenotype”) determined by its 
immutable genes (“genotype”) stored in the Ethereum smart contract.
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The creation of new tokens is generally a less complex process than 
creating native coins as it does not require to modify the codes from a 
particular protocol or create a new blockchain from scratch. Moreover, 
the recent implementation of blockchain middleware and app develop-
ment tools, Turing-complete codes for smart contracts on the block-
chain allow crypto tokens to be easily created, published, shared and 
exchanged.
This chapter will not provide a taxonomy of cryptocurrencies but it 
will rather focus on crypto tokens as alternative funding instruments of 
new token-based business models. For a taxonomy of cryptocurrencies, 
we refer the readers to Bech and Garratt (2017).
9.2  native digital assets
Native tokens are digital fungible assets created within a novel or 
“forked” off a pre-existing blockchain. A native token “a” exists and 
operates on the blockchain network “A” which allows peer-to-peer 
(sometimes, anonymous or pseudo-anonymous) transactions of “a” 
between different network participants. However, the reader should be 
aware that a native token needs a blockchain but a blockchain can func-
tion even without a token (Tasca and Tessone 2018).
In order to present the main features of native coins, we take the 
configuration proposed by Tasca (2016) who highlights a dual nature 
of Bitcoin: as a currency and as a payment network. In its first nature, 
Bitcoin operates as a currency. According to economic theory, a currency 
has three main features: it is a medium of exchange, a unit of account 
and a store of value. These frameworks can be extended beyond Bitcoin 
to analyse the characteristics of any other native coin.
Whether native coins could be considered currencies or not is an 
ongoing debate. As a matter of fact, the European Central Bank (ECB) 
and other financial market authorities do not confirm this view. For 
this reason, these institutions do prefer to use the term “digital tokens” 
instead of “cryptocurrencies” when referring to native coins. This thesis 
is supported by the fact that digital assets do not ensue a legal tender 
(Tasca 2015). Within a given jurisdiction, a legal tender is mandatory 
accepted, accepted at full-time value and it has the power to release 
debtors from paying their obligation. However, some jurisdictions have 
already begun the process towards legalisation of cryptocurrencies. For 
instance, in Japan the Financial Services Agency is working towards 
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the full regularisation of cryptocurrencies as a legal means of payment 
(Terazono 2017). Switzerland is also very advanced in this respect 
(FINMA 2018).
Despite the fact that native coins are not always perfectly designed 
and implemented, it is undoubted that they bring some features typi-
cal of money. Back to Bitcoin again, we can say that it acts as a means 
of exchange and allows counterparties to avoid the “coincidence of the 
wants”1: the number of daily transactions has grown over time from 
around 1000 in 2011 to around 200,000 in 2018. At the same time, 
Bitcoin is a unit of account since it is divisible (the smallest possible 
unit is called Satoshi: 1 satoshi = 0.00000001 Bitcoins), fungible and 
countable. At the same time, Bitcoin’s deflationary property prevents it 
from being considered as a good store of value. The number of Bitcoins 
issued over time is destined to decrease geometrically with 50% reduc-
tion every 4 years (Tasca 2015). That being said, from a pure monetary 
viewpoint, native coins do not generally fulfil the properties of money 
(Tasca 2016).
A novelty of native coins with respect to more traditional forms of 
money is that they come together with a network infrastructure that 
enables a disintermediated peer-to-peer exchange of coins. They com-
bine together the characteristic of money with those of the payment 
systems. To better understand this aspect, the framework proposed by 
Bradford and Keeton (2012) can be taken into consideration. It iden-
tifies four main relevant features of a payment network: speed, payer 
control, security and universality. As a matter of fact, a Bitcoin transac-
tion takes 1 + hours to be settled in the ledger. However, other coins are 
much faster. Ripple, for example, takes 4 seconds per transaction to be 
registered (Morgan 2018). With respect to payer control feature, there 
is no limit as cryptocurrencies can easily and quickly be transferred with-
out any working hours constraints from wallet app or other operators. 
From a security perspective, transfers in cryptocurrency networks happen 
1 Coincidence of wants (also known as “double coincidence of wants”) occurs when 
the supplier of good A is a demander of good B and vice versa. Without a medium of 
exchange, trades would be limited to this situation only (Jevons 1876; Ostroy and Starr 
1990).
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between hashed addresses so the risk of unauthorised transactions is very 
low (Antonopoulos 2014). However, wrong transactions cannot be can-
celled but only adjusted with other transactions of opposite sign. Finally, 
from the perspective of universality, although cryptocurrencies count on 
a smaller network when compared with more traditional payment sys-
tems, we need to highlight the constantly growing trend of users that 
opt for cryptocurrency payment systems. It has been roughly estimated 
that, as of March of 2017, the number of active users of Bitcoin wallets 
was in the range of 2.9 million and 5.8 million (Hileman and Rauchs 
2017). However, since then, proportional to the market valuation and 
price of Bitcoin, the cryptocurrency’s user base has grown at a rapid rate. 
Coinbase alone, the global market’s largest bitcoin brokerage and wallet 
platform, serves more than 13 million active users.
That being said, one should also consider that cryptocurrency pay-
ment networks are stand-alone systems: each native coin functions within 
its unique payment network without any possibility to interact with other 
networks. For this reason, the interoperability between different block-
chain systems remains one of the major future challenges to be addressed 
(Bridgwater 2018). In this respect, it is worth mentioning that some new 
technological solutions have been proposed to overcome this problem, 
see, for example, Sidechains (Back et al. 2014) and Quant Overledger 
(Verdian et al. 2018).
9.3  cryPto tokens
Since 2008, when an inventor (or group of inventors) under the pseudo-
nym of Satoshi Nakamoto introduced Bitcoin (Nakamoto 2008), many 
other cryptocurrencies have been introduced by leveraging on the orig-
inal Nakamoto’s protocol or by elaborating new ones. The recent tech-
nological improvements have enhanced the number of applications of 
blockchain through smart contracts to automatically move digital assets 
according to arbitrary pre-specified rules (Buterin 2014). Specifically, 
crypto tokens give the opportunity to create businesses and auto-
mate them while maintaining the record of the different states of data 
exchanged in the blockchain. Token Market provides a quite exhaustive 
list of the tokens available in the market.
A commonly accepted taxonomy—adopted by many institutions 
including the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority (FINMA 
2018)—dentifies three main token classes:
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• Payment tokens: these are synonymous with cryptocurrencies, 
intended as a means of payment for acquiring goods or services or 
as a means of money or value transfer;
• Utility tokens: these are intended to be the only way to provide dig-
ital access to applications and/or services (generally) built on the 
top of blockchain-based infrastructures.
• Asset/Debt tokens: they have a similar role as a share (Tasca et al. 
2018), and for the investor they represent assets such as a debt or 
equity security owned.
There is then a fourth type of tokens (i.e., Hybrid) which are character-
ised by a mixture of the previous three features.
This classification does not implement a rigid distinction between 
native coins and tokens but it classifies important tokens, which will be 
specified later in the chapter.
Tokens play a vital role in the crowdfunding process of platform-based 
businesses and have been recently adopted by startups seeking to bypass 
the complicated and costly auditing and regulatory burden surrounding 
traditional funding models via banks or venture capitalists. Tokens rep-
resent then a means to raise funds from both platform users and sophis-
ticated investors (Tasca et al. 2018). Much simpler than an Initial Public 
Offering (IPO), the Initial Coin Offering (ICO) process is composed of 
three distinctive phases:
1.  The white paper announcement: the initial report or proposal 
where the company presents to potential investors and supporters 
of the business and other important features.
2.  The release of tokens: often issued via smart contract whose code 
is public. Usually, the token generation is composed by two sub-
phases: pre-allocation, granting a discount on the purchase of 
tokens and allocation, at full price.
3.  Token listing: Complete the ICO, tokens are listed in one or more 
exchanges.
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9.4  token-based business models
Having an idea is useless if one does not have enough capital to translate it 
into a reality. That is why capital raising is a vital process for any entrepre-
neurial endeavour, which allows the entrepreneurs to get the business off 
the ground or help them in the daily operations or business development.
With regards to capital raising, the last number of years have wit-
nessed an exponential adoption of alternative token-based funding 
models. The lack of regulation and the relatively easy process of token 
creation engender the perfect conditions for a new funding trend: com-
panies, especially start-ups, instead of raising funds through the tradi-
tional channels (equity issuing or taking out a loan) have been selling 
tokens in the market to the public and bootstrapping their own project 
based on the proceedings collected with the token allocations. There has 
been a massive adoption of this solution resulting in the proliferation of 
token-based business models. At the moment of writing we count about 
800 tokens, which means an equivalent number of token-based business 
projects worldwide. Just to name a few, Nexo (www.nexo.io) is a token-
based business that offers the opportunity to provide crypto-backed 
loans. Another example is Augur (www.augur.net) which is a decentral-
ised oracle and prediction market. Coinlion (coinlion.com) distributes 
tokens to those who share information related to the portfolio manage-
ment and trading of cryptocurrencies.
Apart from a few notable projects, the quality of token-based busi-
ness models, whose number has skyrocketed in the last number of years, 
is generally very low (Tasca and Widmann 2017). Moreover, scams and 
frauds occur regularly. According to a recent study, 25% of the projects 
default in about 50 days after their token being listed in public trading 
markets (Tasca et al. 2018). As reported by Fortune, nearly half of ICOs 
started in 2017 failed by February 2018 (Morris 2018).
In order to protect investors and limit these frauds and excessive risks, 
regulators have started to develop the first regulatory frameworks and 
to promulgate the first official laws (Clayton 2017). On the other hand, 
a positive aspect of the token-based funding models is that investors 
are not locked-in for months or years as in the traditional VC market. 
Instead, tokens are tradable in the secondary market generally after a few 
weeks from the date of the ICO.
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9.5  driving forces behind the token-based  
business models
In the previous section, we have seen that new business models are 
designed and built around the concept, the meaning and the utility of 
“brand coins”, which represent alternative funding instruments for the 
platform economy (Hayes and Tasca 2016). This is a remarkable nov-
elty that stems from four major trends: (1) platform business models, (2) 
peer-to-peer networks, (3) open-innovation, and (4) crowdfunding.
Platform business models: These are “intermediaries that connect two or 
more distinct groups of users and enable their direct interaction” (Zhu and 
Furr 2016, p. 4). More recently, these platforms deal in not only market- 
mediated digitally-encoded information such as software, music and 
banking services, but also goods and services more generally. While, the 
first-generation platforms were online or digital only, the second gen-
eration of platforms has emerged operating “online to offline” (O2O) 
throughout the economy. Uber, Airbnb and Caviar are just a few examples 
of the myriad of O2O platforms operating across different sectors.
Three elements are recognised to make a platform business model 
successful (Boncheck and Choudary 2013):
• The Toolbox. It creates a connection by making it easy for others to 
plug into the platform;
• The Magnet. It creates a pull that attracts participants to the plat-
form. For transaction platforms, both producers and consumers 
must be present to achieve critical mass;
• The Matchmaker. It facilitates the connections between producers 
and consumers or lenders and borrowers.
Most successful internet-based businesses recently developed, have 
adopted the platform business model because they use technology to 
connect people, organisations and resources in an interactive ecosystem 
in which value can be created and exchanged. In these cases, the compa-
nies scale up by building on their networks of users instead of accumulat-
ing inventories (Parker et al. 2016).
Peer-to-peer (P2P) networks: A peer-to-peer network is “group of com-
puters, each of which acts as a node for sharing files within the group” 
(Technopedia). This form of network blossomed during the progressive 
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and constant increase in bandwidth Internet capacity registered during 
the 80s, 90s and 2000s (Oram 2001). P2P networks are built on dis-
intermediation and share of content. Indeed, the robustness of the net-
work itself is not provided by a single central entity or restricted group of 
peers anymore.
Open-innovation: This is important because it highlights organisations’ 
need for a more enlightened role for R&D in a world of abundant infor-
mation, better managing and accessing intellectual property, increasing 
future business (Chesbrough 2006).
Crowdfunding: Defined as an open call over the Internet for financial 
resources in the form of a monetary donation, sometimes in exchange 
for a future product, service or reward (Kleemann et al. 2008). The 
slow action by national and international regulators left a wide legislative 
space to new venture attracted by the opportunity to collect easily signif-
icant amount of funds from the retail market in non-traditional and not 
monitored ways. There are many facets of crowdfunding: (1) lending- 
based crowdfunding, which consists of loans which are repaid with inter-
est, (2) equity-based crowdfunding in which investors receive shares 
of the startup company, (3) reward-based crowdfunding that involves 
rewarding funders with a product that has actual monetary value, often 
an early version of the product or service being funded, and (4) donation- 
based crowdfunding in which backers donate funds because they believe 
in the cause (Pelizzon et al. 2016). See Chapter 1 for further discussion 
of crowdfunding.
Token-based business benefits from those four drivers as they build 
on the principles of the platform models by providing a digital means of 
exchanging information and value. At the same time, they leverage the 
latest innovations in the blockchain space that enhance the potential of 
P2P decentralised networks. Moreover, in line with the open-innovation  
trend described above, blockchain software is generally based on an 
open-source license model. The open-source model allows everyone to 
audit and improve the source code of protocols and smart contracts. 
For example, Ethereum is licensed under GNU LGPLv3, Bitcoin Core 
is licensed under the MIT License and Hyperledger Fabric is licensed 
under Apache 2.0. At the same time, blockchain-based systems leverage 
a crowdsourced means of verifying transactions. In that sense, it is like 
Wikipedia, where community consensus governs what information is 
trusted to be accurate. This aspect of token-based business models refers 
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not so much to open source, but to open culture based on the participa-
tion of the crowd brought together to build, exchange and share.
9.6  cryPto tokens to enhance the sharing economy
There is no official definition of the Sharing Economy because it is a 
concept adapted to the context of reference. Some proxies enclose ideas 
of the Sharing Economy. Take for instance “access-based consumption” 
which represents a set of “transactions that can be market mediated but 
where no transfer of ownership takes place and differ from both own-
ership and sharing” (Eckhardt and Bardhi 2015). Also “collaborative 
consumption” is a proxy for Sharing Economy. In this respect, it can be 
defined as a “peer-to-peer-based activity of obtaining, giving, or sharing 
the access to goods and services, coordinated through community-based 
online services” (Hamari et al. 2016, p. 2049).
Regardless of the different conceptual forms, it is inevitable that the 
Sharing Economy challenges the current economic institutional frame-
work by shifting from a framework that protects people from each 
other, to a framework that helps people trust each other via the “trust 
machine” (The Economist 2015). This is achieved thanks to universally 
acceptable censorship-resistant ledgers that solve the double spend prob-
lem and allow anonymous users to achieve consensus on the states of the 
shared ledgers.
The blockchain platforms that empower the token-based business mod-
els have the potential to lead us towards a new economic paradigm: a shift 
from centralised to decentralised online marketplace solutions and from 
centralised two-sided platform business models—which market-mediate 
suppliers (lenders) and consumers (borrowers)—to P2P blockchain-based 
platforms on the top of open and decentralised networks where users 
are also producers/shareholders and where the value created is fairly and 
transparently redistributed.
We are already living in the so-called economy of Collaborative 
Commons characterised by the prevalence of sharing over ownership. 
This major structural and cultural change mainly applies to fungible 
products and services that can be easily standardised and automated, 
similar to the broad spectrum of services offered by traditional banks. 
But this is not necessarily the case. These platforms allow also for non- 
fungible assets and services to be exchanged. For example, Rent and 
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Runway is a platform that enables women to rent unique clothing and 
personal accessories online.
As this new economic paradigm is unfolding, now a hybrid economy 
is flourishing where some industries based on the Commons are starting 
to operate at near zero marginal cost, while other industries continue to 
cling to capitalist consumer markets. Companies like Uber and Airbnb will 
attempt to bridge the gap between the two economies and take advan-
tage of both. Though, it is very likely that over the coming few years, new 
business models based on decentralised “dumb” platforms, such as Citi 
Arcade and LaZooz will continue to disrupt the Uber-like “smart” plat-
form business models. Blockchain allows buyers and sellers or lenders and 
borrowers to do business directly with each other, without the interven-
tion of a large commercial platform. In other words, as Ethereum founder 
Vitalik Buterin has put it: Blockchain does not make the taxi driver lose 
his job, the network technology makes Uber superfluous.
The introduction of token networks based on blockchain technol-
ogy in such a dynamic environment could represent an additional stage 
towards a completely disintermediated sharing economy and distributed 
business models where the lines between users, producers and investors 
are blurred. Decentralied Collaborative Commons will expand across lat-
eral networks, and as access will overcome ownership, competition will 
be superseded by cooperation, buyers (borrowers) and sellers (investors) 
will transition to prosumers.
Utility tokens will play an active role in this new system. A consumer 
who buys a utility token supports the network stability and liquidity. The 
more purchases and sales of services or goods happen in the network, the 
more effective the network will be. The use of utility tokens by new users 
increases the value of the tokens and consequently the investment value 
of the other users. More importantly, an investor using the utility token 
will increase the value of its investments while providing a better network 
for another user. Therefore, the distinction between stakeholders will 
fade: a customer will be an investor and vice versa. A business company 
based on utility tokens will potentially be favoured by a positive escala-
tion effect where use of tokens will benefit users and platform originating 
a self-enforcement mechanism.
To conclude, we also want to emphasise that a token-based economy 
is not immune from hazards. Cascade-effects, scams and hoarding move-
ments remain main risks to be addressed in order to smoothly evolve 
towards an authentic Sharing Economy.
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10.1  introduction
The financial services industry plays a key role for businesses and soci-
ety since it enables saving and investment, provides protection from risks 
and supports the creation of new jobs and enterprises (World Economic 
Forum 2013, 2016). Developments in information technologies have 
changed the industry over time by enabling an enormous increase in 
transactions and diversified products (Gardner 2011). However, the pace 
of innovation in the sector has traditionally been very slow (Gardner 
2011; Michel 2014). This is mostly due to the regulatory burden and 
to the conservative culture embedded within the industry (Gardner 
2011; Michel 2014; Das et al. 2018). The result is a linear and predict-
able innovation pattern (Luftenegger et al. 2010) with only five major 
technological innovations in a 50-year period, namely: (1) computerised 
information systems in 1950s (Luftenegger et al. 2010), (2) automatic 
teller machines (ATMs) in 1960s (Batiz-Lazo 2009), (3) electronic stock 
trading in 1970s (Terrell 2010), (4) mainframe computers in 1980s, and 
(5) the Internet in the 1990s/early 2000s (Desai 2015).
However, things have changed significantly over the last decade. As 
the industry moves to what the International Data Corporation refers to 
as the “third platform”—a technology trend towards ubiquitous com-
puting, big data, and the widespread adoption of social and mobile tech-
nologies (IDC 2012) in response to customer expectations for more 
innovative and personalised products. Regulatory changes such as, for 
example, the new EU Payment Service Directive (PSD2), which is dis-
cussed in Chapter 7 of this book, aim to significantly lower the barriers 
to market entry, therefore increasing competition. These recent changes 
have triggered what scholars and practitioners refer to as the “FinTech 
revolution” (Mackenzie 2015; Gomber et al. 2018), built around three 
main pillars: (1) capital availability both for start-ups in the form of ven-
ture capital and for incumbents; (2) new technologies; and (3) new busi-
ness models (Gomber et al. 2018).
As an enabling and disruptive technology, blockchain is arguably at 
the core of the FinTech revolution and has the potential to radically 
change a large number of activities and processes within the industry. 
These changes are expected to provide huge improvements in efficiency, 
generating potential savings of $16–20 billion a year (Santander 2015; 
Capgemini 2016).
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Blockchain is mostly known as the technology underpinning 
Bitcoin, “a payment system based on cryptographic proof instead of trust” 
(Nakamoto 2008, p. 1), also referred to as cryptocurrency. While cryp-
tocurrencies have been discussed in Chapter 9, this part of the book 
explores other blockchain applications for the financial sector and dis-
cusses related literature gathered from the finance, information systems 
and computer science fields. The rest of the chapter is structured as fol-
lows. The next section provides an overview of blockchain technology. 
This is followed by a discussion of the current challenges that the tech-
nology poses for financial services firms, and the impact of blockchain on 
four main financial activities: (1) payments and remittance, (2) credit and 
lending, (3) trading and settlement, and (4) compliance. The chapter 
concludes with a discussion of further avenues for research.
10.2  what is blockchain?
Commercial transactions have been stored in ledgers since ancient times. 
Initially kept on clay tablets or papyrus, they then moved to paper and 
ultimately to bytes with the advent of computerised information sys-
tems (Rosati and Paulsson 2017). Regardless the format in which ledgers 
were kept, they have traditionally relied on human inputs; as such, ledg-
ers have been prone to errors which translate into additional costs and 
inefficiencies for organisations and for the economic system as a whole. 
Digital distributed ledgers promise to fix these issues through a unique 
combination of distributed networks and cryptography. Blockchain tech-
nology is by far the most famous example of distributed ledgers tech-
nologies (Beck et al. 2017). It was first launched in 2008 by either 
a programmer or a group of programmers under the pseudonym of 
Satoshi Nakamoto (Nakamoto 2008) and today is mostly known for 
being the technology underpinning Bitcoin, arguably the most famous 
open-source peer-to-peer digital currency (Mougayar 2016). However, 
potential applications of blockchain extend beyond digital currencies, 
potentially impacting corporate governance, social institutions, demo-
cratic participation, and the functioning of capital markets (Wright and 
De Filippi 2015).
Blockchain can be defined as a decentralised, transactional data-
base that enables validated, tamper-resistant transactions across a 
large number of participants (i.e. nodes) in a network (Glaser 2017; 
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Beck et al. 2018). But blockchain is not just a technological innova-
tion. By providing a valid alternative to traditional trusted intermediar-
ies, it also carries philosophical, cultural, and ideological underpinnings 
that have to be taken into account (Mougayar 2016). For this reason, 
Mougayar (2016) proposes to integrate the technical definition with a 
business definition and a legal definition. From a business point of view, 
blockchain can be defined as a peer-to-peer exchange network for trans-
ferring value, while, from a legal perspective, it can be defined as a tech-
nology to validate transactions.
Blockchain has two main characteristics (Fig. 10.1). First, it brings 
trust where there is none (Beck et al. 2016; Rosati et al. 2016; Tapscott 
and Tapscott 2016; Glaser 2017). In fact, blockchain-based systems 
ensure higher transparency by making information available to all net-
work participants, but they also leverage cryptography and peer vali-
dation of transactions to ensure data integrity and record immutability 
(Böhme et al. 2015; Sun et al. 2016). Second, blockchain-based systems 
are fully distributed. Users’ privacy is protected by using pseudonyms 
while the system’s reliability is ensured by storing a copy of the database 
in every node (Böhme et al. 2015; Beck et al. 2016; Weber et al. 2016). 
These two key characteristics of blockchain are ultimately interconnected 
as mechanisms to build trust are needed for creating a decentralised net-
work, and decentralisation provides the means for users to get involved 
in the network by establishing the basis for a consensus mechanism 
(Seebacher and Schüritz 2017).
Users’ ability to read and submit transactions to a blockchain 
depends on their access to transactions. There are different “flavours” of 
Fig. 10.1 Characteristics of blockchain (Adapted from Seebacher and Schüritz 
[2017])
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blockchain (Table 10.1). In a public (permissionless) blockchain, every 
node can read and submit (validate) transactions while in a private (per-
missioned) blockchain only authorised nodes can (Peters and Panayi 
2016).
Regardless of the type of blockchain, there are some key features that 
are common (although to different extents) to all of them (Mougayar 
2016):
• Distributed network: the adoption of a blockchain removes all cen-
tralised entities and distributes access to all of the participants (i.e. 
nodes) in the network. In other words, all participants in the net-
work, and not a specific one, can verify the transactions. Miners 
are key actors in this distributed network as they work to solve the 
computational problems that allow to create, verify, and securely 
store transactions.
• Cryptography: it enables parties to maintain the privacy of the 
information they send to each other. Blockchain uses Public Key 
Infrastructure (PKI) mechanisms to execute transactions. Each 
blockchain user has a public key and a private key. In order to com-
plete a transaction, a sender needs to know the public key of the 
receiver who can decrypt the message by using its own private key. 
Every transaction is stored in a block, which has a unique finger-
print (i.e. hash) that ensures the authentication of the transaction 
source.
• Timestamp: every transaction that occurs on the blockchain is time-
stamped and no one is able to change it once it has been recorded.
Table 10.1 Types of blockchain (Adapted from Beck et al. [2018])




Public All nodes can read and submit  
transactions. Only authorised nodes  
can validate transactions—e.g. Ripple
All nodes can read, submit 
and validate transactions—e.g. 
Bitcoin
Private Only authorised nodes can read,  
submit and validate transactions—e.g. 
R3 Corda
Not applicable
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Blockchain is mostly known for its ability to process monetary and finan-
cial transactions. However, it can also ensure that transactions comply 
with specific rules parties have agreed upon in the form of “smart con-
tracts” (Tschorsch and Scheuermann 2016; Risius and Spohrer 2017). 
Beck and Müller-Bloch (2017) refer to blockchains supporting this kind 
of applications as “blockchain 2.0”.
Despite all the hype around blockchain, it is still a nascent technology 
and there are technical, non-technical, and regulatory challenges to over-
come in order to foster adoption. Extant academic research has focused 
on technical aspects of blockchain (Yli-Huumo et al. 2016; Risius 
and Spohrer 2017) but a number of issues, such as efficiency, latency, 
throughput, scalability, security, and systems integration still need to be 
(partially) addressed (Yli-Huumo et al. 2016). Security issues represent 
real concerns for financial institutions as they store and exchange highly 
sensitive information about their customers and operate under strict 
regulations. In addition, the new European General Data Protection 
Regulation1 (GDPR) now requires organisations to obtain specific con-
sent from their clients to use their private information. With permis-
sionless public blockchains, it is difficult to control who accesses the 
blockchain. As such, financial institutions are more likely to adopt a pri-
vate or permissioned blockchain than a public blockchain (Fink 2017). 
However, due to smaller number of participants (i.e. nodes), private or 
permissioned blockchains are more vulnerable to 51-percent attacks2 
(Peters and Panayi 2016; Yli-Huumo et al. 2016). Further research is 
arguably needed in this space in order to increase technology adoption in 
the financial sector.
Non-technical challenges, instead, are mostly related to (a) build-
ing up innovation legitimacy (Lynn et al. 2018), (b) understanding the 
determinants of users’ adoption, (c) measuring the value generated by 
blockchain investments, and (d) assessing potential impacts on society 
(Risius and Spohrer 2017). Finally, regulatory challenges mostly arise 
from the distributed nature of blockchain applications which, by defi-
nition, can span across multiple jurisdictions, with responsibilities for 
system maintenance are shared among all network participants (Yeoh 
2017).
1 See https://gdpr-info.eu/ for further details.
2 “The ability of someone controlling a majority of network hash rate to revise transaction 
history and prevent new transactions from confirming” (Bitcoin.org 2018).
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10.3  Payments and remittance
Departing from cryptocurrencies, here we mainly focus on interbank 
and cross-border payments which are often processed by intermediary 
clearing firms. These processes require a series of complicated processes 
including bookkeeping and transactions and balance reconciliations 
across multiple financial institutions3 (Guo and Liang 2016). The result 
is a long and time-consuming process which often translates in delays 
in payments settlement and additional costs. Cross-border payments 
totalled $27.7 trillion in the first quarter of 2017 (BIS 2017), and repre-
sent 20% of total transaction volumes in the payments industry and 50% 
of the revenues (McKinsey 2016). Notwithstanding the scale, 43% of the 
capital transferred is lost in transaction costs (Guo and Liang 2016).
Beside the actual transaction cost, the time delay between payment 
initiation and settlement creates a risk for the parties involved; this is 
mostly related to the risk default of the counterparty and to fluctuations 
of the foreign currency whose value is determined by market rules (Bott 
and Milkau 2017). By enabling peer-to-peer payments and by offering 
24/7 settlements, blockchain can reduce transaction costs and risk while 
bringing (almost) real-time settlements and increased transparency and 
traceability (Buitenhek 2016). Given these undeniable benefits, it is not 
surprising that both central banks and private institutions have started 
looking at blockchain-based applications for payments (Bott and Milkau 
2017).
Inefficient payments processing is a business as much as an ethical 
problem. In fact, cross-border multi-currency payments are not only 
associated with business transactions; remittance also accounts for a sig-
nificant amount of cross-border money transfers. According to recent 
World Bank estimates, international remittance totalled $585 billion in 
2017, 7.32% of which was lost in transfer fees (World Bank 2017). In 
addition, 39% of the world’s population, mostly comprised of the pop-
ulation in developing countries, does not have a bank account making it 
very hard for the receiver to actually collect the money being transferred 
(Mesropyan 2016). In this context, thoughtful combinations of block-
chain systems and mobile technologies could potentially put billions back 
3 See, for example, Park (2016) for more details on the current cross-border payment 
settlement process.
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into the pockets of families in developing countries therefore reducing 
(at least partially) the gap with richer countries.
10.4  credit and lending
Credit and lending is another area where blockchain can significantly 
change current operations. Other chapters in this book discuss peer- 
to-peer lending (Chapter 2) and crowdfunding (Chapter 1), two well- 
established innovations in the FinTech landscape with significant growth 
rates. Despite the attention they receive today, these practices are essen-
tially as old as commerce; the main difference is that they were tradition-
ally based on informal and interpersonal trust relationships. Peer-to-peer 
platforms have essentially found a way to reduce information asymme-
try and formalise the relationship between parties therefore increas-
ing trust between the two sides of the market, and, of course, to profit 
from their intermediation role. As a technology enabling peer-to-peer 
“trust-free” transactions, blockchain can replace both traditional (e.g. 
banks, credit unions) and new intermediaries (e.g. peer-to-peer lending 
platforms) therefore lowering transaction costs of lending and business 
financing (Larios-Hernández 2017). A typical example is the adoption 
of blockchain-based tokens to enable disintermediated crowdfunding 
campaigns also known as Initial Coin Offerings4 (ICOs) (see, among 
others, Rohr and Wright 2017; Adhami et al. 2018; Catalini and Gans 
2018; Chen 2018; Howell et al. 2018). Despite all the attention these 
blockchain-enabled peer-to-peer systems are receiving from investors, 
regulators, and the media, the volume of capital that goes through these 
channels still represents a tiny portion of the overall credit/lending mar-
ket. As Hawlitschek et al. (2018) suggest, these systems still struggle in 
crossing users’ “trust frontier”. The authors further suggest that a wide-
spread adoption of these systems depends on the development of trusted 
interfaces.
In the context of credit and lending, blockchain could also be lev-
eraged to improve lenders’ decision-making. Risk assessment of poten-
tial borrowers (be it a company or an individual) is usually based on the 
historical records of financial transactions. Data availability and quality, 
however, pose significant challenges to the validity and robustness of 
4 This topic is discussed in more details in the previous chapter.
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credit score models (Abdou and Pointon 2011). These issues are particu-
larly pronounced when potential borrowers are small- and medium-sized 
businesses or individuals for which information is rarely publicly and/or 
readily available (Thomas et al. 2017). This ultimately results in ineffi-
cient capital allocation (Jacobson and Roszbach 2003) and lost growth 
opportunities (Beck and Demirguc-Kunt 2006).
In order to overcome these limitations, financial institutions have 
started looking at using “alternative data” in their models such as 
mobile-phone information, psychometric testing, social media activity, 
or ecommerce transactions (McEvoy 2014). However, collecting, aggre-
gating, and integrating data from different sources can be challenging 
and require specialist skills that financial companies do not always have 
in-house. The growing demand for this kind of service has led to the 
emergence of data marketplaces (Stahl et al. 2014). Data marketplaces 
usually offer a wide range of capabilities, such as data gathering, aggrega-
tion, integration, processing, enrichment, etc. (Roman and Gatti 2016). 
When it comes to credit scoring, data marketplaces can represent a com-
mon point of entry for perspective lenders and borrowers through which 
information is exchanged securely (Roman and Gatti 2016). Data mar-
ketplaces are essentially centralised systems, therefore require different 
stakeholders to trust a third-party managing their data. This may prove 
to be particularly challenging for very sensitive and potentially valuable 
data like those used for credit scoring. In this context, blockchain can 
be leveraged to create disintermediated trusted data marketplaces that 
securely connect together information providers, perspective borrowers 
and lenders, and guarantees data provenance and data integrity (Roman 
and Gatti 2016). Blockchain-enabled systems have therefore the poten-
tial to improve the credit scoring processes, therefore lowering default 
rates and providing undoubted economic benefits (Byströrm 2016).
10.5  trading and settlements
Chapter 8 in this book is dedicated to recent advancements in trad-
ing technology. Even though trade execution time has been brought 
down to milliseconds, post-trade settlement is still a lengthy and redun-
dant process that spans over multiple days. Two-day (T + 2) or three-
day (T + 3) settlement is still the industry standard but more complex 
transactions like syndicated loans can take up to three weeks (Chiu and 
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Koeppl 2018). Figure 10.2 provides a brief summary of typical post-
trade activities.5
As per payments, long settlement time and inefficient processes gener-
ate considerable costs and risk for the counterparties involved in a trans-
action. According to Broadridge (2015), industry spends $6 billion to 
$9 billion per year in core and ancillaries post-trade activities for stand-
ardised asset classes like equities and fixed income, but these figures go 
up to $24 billion when including more sophisticated asset classes and 
over-the-counter (OTC) markets.
Benos et al. (2017) argue that blockchain may impact the post-trade 
cycle in six ways:
• Reducing reconciliation and data management costs: the adoption 
of blockchain technology would allow the creation of a distrib-
uted, shared and synchronised database of security ownership. As 
such, it can simplify and automate most post-trade processes and 
significantly reduce the need for reconciliation. Mainelli and Milne 
(2016) estimate a potential 50% reduction for this kind of transac-
tion costs.
• Flexible settlement times: intermediaries currently have at least a 
full day to prepare the settlement and borrow securities or cash as 
needed, therefore managing their own liquidity. A T + 0 (same-day) 
settlement, although desirable from a risk management perspective, 
would also require intermediaries to borrow cash or securities in 
advance, therefore increasing liquidity risk. In this context, flexible 
Fig. 10.2 Typical post-trade activities
5 See AFME (2015) for more details.
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settlement times appear more desirable in a blockchain environ-
ment, and could be implemented via smart contracts therefore cre-
ating benefits for all market participants. Khapko and Zoican (2018) 
demonstrate that a combination of flexible or short settlement 
cycles, coupled with option-like penalties for failures-to-deliver, 
would discipline competition on securities lending markets and 
improve market quality.
• Automated clearing: in a blockchain environment, when a trade is 
agreed the calculation of obligations (i.e. netting) could happen 
automatically and simultaneously therefore reducing the need for a 
clearing agent.
• Direct ownership: in the current market settings, investors are not 
always the owners of the securities they trade. There is indeed a 
chain of custodians who hold securities and act as intermediaries 
between issuers and investors. This creates implications for share-
holder rights (Micheler 2015; Van der Elst and Lafarre 2018). 
When securities are issued in the form of (or can be transformed 
into) digital tokens, blockchain could facilitate direct ownership and 
increase transparency in the market, therefore enabling peer-to-peer 
trading.
• Traceability and transparency: blockchain is an “append-only” data-
base. In other words, records cannot be deleted or altered once 
they have been stored in a block. This provides full traceability of 
transactions. The ledger is also shared among network participants, 
therefore increasing transparency. However, as Malinova and Park 
(2017) point out, investors often prefer privacy over transpar-
ency even when the latter may be socially desirable. Building on 
this point, the authors propose a blockchain-based market setting, 
which maximises social welfare, while protecting investors’ privacy.
• Security and resilience: being a decentralised system, a blockchain 
does not have a single point of failure. As such, it is more resilient 
to cyberattacks and not subject to cybersecurity-related downtimes 
to the same degree.
Benos et al. (2017) also highlight a number of challenges to overcome 
before blockchain goes mainstream in the area of clearing and settle-
ment. These are mostly related to (1) interaction between the digital 
and the physical world (e.g. current legacy assets held by custodians), 
(2) legal and regulatory limitations (e.g. proof of ownership), and (3) 
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technology readiness (e.g. scalability and throughput). A number of ini-
tiatives have been undertaken to overcome regulatory barriers (Van der 
Elst and Laferre 2018). For example, the State of Delaware explicitly 
reference the use of blockchain technology in Section 2246 of the gen-
eral corporation law (DGCL) on July 21, 2017. Also, there are ongoing 
efforts from multiple stakeholders aiming to enhance blockchain per-
formance and reliability (Yli-Huumo et al. 2016; Higgins 2018; Chiu 
and Koeppl 2018), which suggest that it will not be long before block-
chain-based applications start moving from the proof-of-concept stage to 
the production stage. For example, the European Central Bank and the 
Central Bank of Japan have already conducted a first study to evaluate 
the possibility of using blockchain for real-time gross settlements that are 
crucial in conducting monetary policy (ECB 2017).
10.6  comPliance
Regulation is becoming increasingly burdensome in financial services. 
In order to increase investor protection and to prevent financial crime, 
post-crisis regulatory changes have dramatically increased the amount 
of reporting and compliance requirements for all the actors involved in 
the industry. Banks spent almost $100 billion for compliance in 2016 
(McDowell 2017) and the overall expenditure is growing year-by-year 
(Thomson Reuters 2018). Regulatory technology (RegTech7) may be a 
way to reduce these costs and so financial services are investing a signifi-
cant amount of resources in this direction (Spezzati 2017).
In this section, we will focus on three main regulatory frameworks: 
(1) the EU Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID II8) and 
the corresponding US Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 




6 “Any records administered by or on behalf of the corporation in the regular course of 
its business, including its stock ledger, books of account, and minute books, may be kept 
on, or by means of, or be in the form of, any information storage device, method, or 1 or 
more electronic networks or databases (including 1 or more distributed electronic networks 
or databases) […]” (Delaware General Corporation Law—Section 224).
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Protection Act,9 (2) Know Your Customer (KYC) and Anti-Money 
Laundering (AML) regulation, and (3) financial reporting standards 
(IFRS/IAS). Blockchain can help financial companies and regulators in 
handling compliance requirements across all these areas. MiFID II and 
the Dodd-Frank have been enacted in response to the global financial 
crisis with the main objective of increasing transparency in the financial 
markets and strengthening investor protection (Black 2010; Prorokowski 
2015). Both regulations require financial firms to keep track of all inter-
actions related to every single transaction. Comprehensive, traceable and 
time-stamped reporting is essential to comply with these regulations and 
this is where blockchain may represent a valuable solution. For example, 
Sheridan (2017) argues that a publicly available blockchain can be an 
effective solution to effectively communicate equivalence decisions under 
MiFID II; this would represent a single source of truth for identifying 
third-party countries that are allowed to conduct financial business in the 
EU. Similarly, a distributed ledger can be used by different regulators to 
uniformly record firm-by-firm authorisations and permissions.
Processes for KYC/AML compliance are particularly redundant. 
Financial institutions are required to onboard their customers before 
conducting any business activity with them in order to avoid work-
ing with/for customers involved in illegal activities (Ruce 2011). The 
onboarding process consists of an exchange of documents and informa-
tion between a financial institution and the perspective customer. Even 
though most of the documents required for onboarding customers are 
standardised, the overall process has to be repeated by each institution 
for each customer with which it wants to interact. Secure and reliable 
information sharing could eliminate redundancies therefore making the 
process more efficient and improving customer experience (Moyano and 
Ross 2017). Moyano and Ross (2017) propose a system architecture for 
a distributed ledger through which financial institutions can verify the 
result of standardised KYC tasks that have already been conducted for 
a specific customer. Such a system would lower the cost associated with 
KYC processes without compromising participants’ security and privacy.
Financial reporting quality is historically a key concern for regulators. 
Even though this applies to every industry, the financial sector has tradi-
tionally received special attention in this respect due to the key enabling 
9 https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/111/hr4173/text.
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role that it plays in the economy. Standard setters are continuously try-
ing to increase the transparency and accuracy of financial statements, 
and to unify financial reporting practices across multiple jurisdictions 
(Barth et al. 2008). There is still limited evidence of blockchain appli-
cations for financial reporting purposes (Dai and Vasarhelyi 2017) 
and some contrasting opinions in the literature (Coyne and McMickle 
2017). However, some characteristics of the blockchain like data integ-
rity, (almost) real-time updates, instant sharing of necessary informa-
tion, and programmable and automatic controls may represent the basis 
for a new financial reporting ecosystem (Dai and Vasarhelyi 2017). Dai 
and Vasarhelyi (2017) present a first example of a blockchain-enabled 
triple-entry accounting information system, which may represent a 
step forward towards real continuous auditing. In a similar vein, Wang 
and Kogan (2018) propose a prototype of a blockchain-based trans-
action processing system for real-time accounting that leverages 
zero-knowledge proofs to find a trade-off between transparency and 
confidentiality. This kind of financial reporting systems could prove to 
be particularly suitable for the financial sector where every transaction 
has to be recorded and where traceability and records’ immutability are 
extremely important to prevent fraud. Furthermore, auditors and regula-
tors may be able to access financial records in real time if needed, there-
fore increasing transparency and timely interventions where needed.
10.7  conclusion and avenues for future research
This chapter provides an overview of blockchain technology and of the 
extant literature on its potential applications and implications for the 
financial sector. Despite all the hype and all the promises around block-
chain technology, it still remains an early-stage technology; the number 
of potential use cases is getting larger and larger but very few of them 
have made their way to the market. This is particularly the case for finan-
cial services where conservatism and regulatory requirements represent 
significant challenges for innovation.
Blockchain is, in essence, a technological innovation. Thus, perhaps 
unsurprisingly, most of the research so far comes from computer science 
domain. Even though pure technical aspects of blockchain go beyond 
the scope of this chapter, it is worth to briefly mention some existing 
technical challenges that also represent opportunities for research. First 
of all, integrating existing legacy systems with blockchain is still a very 
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difficult task; it would be naïve to think that organisations will get rid of 
existing systems to move to blockchain-based systems. Therefore, inte-
gration/migration patterns have to be identified in order to streamline 
adoption. The trade-off between security, performance, and sustainabil-
ity is another topic that is widely discussed. In relation to this, different 
combinations of block sizes and encryption and consensus mechanisms 
are being explored; different combinations are likely to be more suitable 
for some applications but not for others, hence the need for a contin-
gency approach to this issue.
Although there are a number of question marks around blockchain 
as a technology, the number of technical studies is arguably growing fast 
(Yli-Huumo et al. 2016). The same cannot be said for organisational and 
business-related research (Risius and Spohrer 2017). In a conservative, 
heavily regulated and profit-driven sector like financial services, reduc-
ing the uncertainty around implementation outcomes, and increasing 
regulatory and community acceptance are likely to play a critical role in 
fostering blockchain adoption. We identify at least two ways to reduce 
uncertainty: (1) in-depth investigations of different use cases: as Risius 
and Spohrer (2017) also point out the number of business case studies 
is still very limited; (2) a suitability framework for blockchain applica-
tions: not all applications or all organisations may benefit from block-
chain adoption, therefore a suitability framework like the one proposed 
by Misra and Mondal (2011) for cloud computing applications may 
represent a useful “reality check” for organisations. Building legitimacy 
around blockchain is extremely important in this context in order to 
increase regulatory and community (i.e. customers, employees, inves-
tors, and other stakeholders) acceptance (Rosati et al. 2016; Lynn et al. 
2018). While Lynn et al. (2018) offer a first approach to this matter, 
further research is needed to gain a deep understanding of how block-
chain legitimacy is changing over time, and if and how organisations are 
proactively trying to build it across multiple audiences (i.e. stakeholders). 
Regulators indeed have mostly taken a “wait and see” position on block-
chain so far but they would be more likely to incentivise the adoption of 
a technology that is welcomed by multiple stakeholders. Finally, creat-
ing an analytical framework for measuring the value generated by block-
chain investments may be extremely useful for building business cases for 
blockchain adoption. This is particularly relevant for financial services 
where financial resources are usually available but are allocated based on 
the return they are expected to generate. In this context being able to 
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assess and quantify, with reasonable certainty, the impact of blockchain 
technology over the short and long term likely facilitates management 
buy-in.
This chapter has provided an overview of potential blockchain appli-
cations for the financial services sector and discussed related academic 
literature. As blockchain has the potential to automate many financial 
operations, it can generate significant gains in efficiency across the entire 
sector. For some intermediaries like brokers, clearing, and settlement 
houses though, those efficiency gains will result in lower revenues. The 
advent of blockchain technology poses significant challenges for these 
actors, who must radically reconsider their value propositions in order 
to stay in business. However, blockchain still remains at an early stage 
of development and the extent of changes it can generate in the finan-
cial sector is contingent to overcoming its current technical limitations 
and to increasing the acceptance of different stakeholders. A more col-
laborative approach to research across different academic disciplines and 
industry could be particularly fruitful in this context to advance the tech-
nology and realise its full potential.
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